Metaethical Contextualism Defended
2010 (English)In: Ethics, ISSN 0014-1704, Vol. 121, 7-36 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
We defend a contextualist account of normative judgments as relativized both to (i) information and to (ii) standards or ends against recent objections that turn on practices of normative disagreement. Niko Kolodny and John MacFarlane argue that information-relative contextualism cannot accommodate the connection between deliberation and advice. In response, we suggest that they misidentify the basic concerns of deliberating agents, which are not to settle the truth of particular propositions but to promote certain values. For pragmatic reasons, semantic assessments of normative claims sometimes are evaluations of propositions other than those asserted. Other writers have raised parallel objections to standard-relative contextualism, particularly about moral claims; we argue for a parallel solution
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2010. Vol. 121, 7-36 p.
Metaethical contextaulism, assessor relativism, disagreement, insensitive assessments, John MacFarlande, Niko Kolodny
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:liu:diva-62798DOI: 10.1086/656304ISI: 000284940600002OAI: oai:DiVA.org:liu-62798DiVA: diva2:374514