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’Objectivist’ traits of moral phenomenology and moral discourse don’t support moral objectivism
Linköping University, Department of Culture and Communication, Arts and Humanities.
2008 (English)Other (Other academic)
Place, publisher, year, pages
2008.
Keyword [sv]
metaetik, metodologi, absolutism, objektivism, oenighet, moralisk relativism
National Category
Philosophy
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:liu:diva-63441OAI: oai:DiVA.org:liu-63441DiVA: diva2:379599
Projects
Disagreement, objectivity, and insensitive assessments
Note
Forskningspresentation, Dpt. of Philosophy, University of ConnecticutAvailable from: 2010-12-18 Created: 2010-12-18

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Björnsson, Gunnar

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CiteExportLink to record
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Citation style
  • apa
  • harvard1
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