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The Explanatory Component of Moral Responsibility
Linköping University, Department of Culture and Communication, Arts and Humanities. Linköping University, Faculty of Arts and Sciences.
University of Gothenburg.
2012 (English)In: Noûs, ISSN 0029-4624, E-ISSN 1468-0068, Vol. 46, no 2, 326-354 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

In this paper, we do three things. First, we put forth a novel hypothesis about judgments of moral responsibility according to which such judgments are a species of explanatory judgments. Second, we argue that this hypothesis explains both some general features of everyday thinking about responsibility and the appeal of skeptical arguments against moral responsibility. Finally, we argue that, if correct, the hypothesis provides a defense against these skeptical arguments.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Wiley-Blackwell, 2012. Vol. 46, no 2, 326-354 p.
Keyword [en]
moral responsibility, free will, scepticism, skepticism, judgments of moral responsibility, determinism
National Category
URN: urn:nbn:se:liu:diva-64533DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0068.2010.00813.xISI: 000304136000007OAI: diva2:392366
Available from: 2011-01-26 Created: 2011-01-26 Last updated: 2012-06-15

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ReferencesLink to record
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