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Moral Particularism and the Argument from Holism about Reasons
Linköping University, Department of Culture and Communication.
2011 (English)Independent thesis Advanced level (degree of Master (One Year)), 10 credits / 15 HE creditsStudent thesis
Abstract [en]

Proponents of moral particularism have often sought support for their negative claim about moral principles in a doctrine called holism in the theory of reasons. According to holism, a feature that is a reason in one case may be no reason at all, or even the opposite reason, in another. The aim of this thesis is to investigate and elucidate the supposed connection between holism and particularism. This is done by considering the particularistic position embraced by Jonathan Dancy in his book Ethics without Principles and the arguments against the argument from holism recently put forth by Sean McKeever and Michael Ridge in their book Principled Ethics: generalism as a regulative ideal. In conclusion it is argued that holism does provide at least some support for the form of particularism which Dancy defends.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2011. , 30 p.
Keyword [en]
Ethics, Particularism, Generalism, Holism, Atomism, Moral Knowledge, Moral principles, Moral reasons, Dancy; Jonathan
National Category
URN: urn:nbn:se:liu:diva-65626ISRN: LIU-IKK/PF-A-10/001--SEOAI: diva2:397334
Subject / course
Practical Philosophy
Humanities, Theology
Available from: 2011-02-14 Created: 2011-02-14 Last updated: 2011-12-13Bibliographically approved

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ReferencesLink to record
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