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Quantum cryptography and authentication with low key-consumption
Linköping University, Department of Electrical Engineering, Information Coding. Linköping University, The Institute of Technology.
Austrian Institute of Technology, Austria.
Austrian Institute of Technology, Austria.
Linköping University, Department of Electrical Engineering, Information Coding. Linköping University, The Institute of Technology.ORCID iD: 0000-0002-1082-8325
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2011 (English)In: Proceedings of SPIE - The International Society for Optical Engineering, 2011, 818916- p.Conference paper, Published paper (Refereed)
Abstract [en]

Quantum Key Distribution (QKD - also referred to as Quantum Cryptography) is a technique for secret key agreement. It has been shown that QKD rigged with Information-Theoretic Secure (ITS) authentication (using secret key) of the classical messages transmitted during the key distribution protocol is also ITS. Note, QKD without any authentication can trivially be broken by man-in-the-middle attacks. Here, we study an authentication method that was originally proposed because of its low key consumption; a two-step authentication that uses a publicly known hash function, followed by a secret strongly universal2 hash function, which is exchanged each round. This two-step authentication is not information-theoretically secure but it was argued that nevertheless it does not compromise the security of QKD. In the current contribution we study intrinsic weaknesses of this approach under the common assumption that the QKD adversary has access to unlimited resources including quantum memories. We consider one implementation of Quantum Cryptographic protocols that use such authentication and demonstrate an attack that fully extract the secret key. Even including the final key from the protocol in the authentication does not rule out the possibility of these attacks. To rectify the situation, we propose a countermeasure that, while not informationtheoretically secure, restores the need for very large computing power for the attack to work. Finally, we specify conditions that must be satisfied by the two-step authentication in order to restore informationtheoretic security.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2011. 818916- p.
Series
Proceedings of SPIE, ISSN 0277-786X ; 8189
National Category
Other Physics Topics
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:liu:diva-76601DOI: 10.1117/12.898344ISBN: 978-081948817-6 (print)OAI: oai:DiVA.org:liu-76601DiVA: diva2:515405
Conference
Quantum-Physics-Based Information Security, Prague, 19-21 September 2011
Projects
ICG QC
Available from: 2012-04-12 Created: 2012-04-12 Last updated: 2016-09-07Bibliographically approved

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Abidin, AysajanLarsson, Jan-Åke

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CiteExportLink to record
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Citation style
  • apa
  • harvard1
  • ieee
  • modern-language-association-8th-edition
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  • Other style
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  • de-DE
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  • nn-NB
  • sv-SE
  • Other locale
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Output format
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