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Conditional reciprocity in the investment game
Linnaeus University, Växjö, Sweden and Swedish Collegium for Advanced Study, Uppsala, Sweden.ORCID iD: 0000-0002-1798-8284
2011 (English)In: The Social science journal (Fort Collins), ISSN 0362-3319, E-ISSN 1873-5355, Vol. 48, no 2, 404-408 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

This paper investigates whether people are conditional reciprocators in an investment game experiment, in the sense that the more they are trusted, the more they reciprocate. The results show that the majority of participants are conditional reciprocators but that they can be classified into three types: (1) exploitative reciprocators who do not reciprocate and exploit trust; (2) egoistic reciprocators who neither exploit nor reward trust; and (3) generous reciprocators who reward trusting behavior.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Elsevier, 2011. Vol. 48, no 2, 404-408 p.
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URN: urn:nbn:se:liu:diva-88039DOI: 10.1016/j.soscij.2010.11.005OAI: diva2:601399
Available from: 2013-01-29 Created: 2013-01-29 Last updated: 2015-03-06

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Ahmed, Ali
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