A philosophical defense of the idea that we can hold each other in personhood: intercorporeal personhood in dementia care
2014 (English)In: Medicine, Health care and Philosophy, ISSN 1386-7423, E-ISSN 1572-8633, Vol. 17, no 1, 131-141 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Since John Locke, regnant conceptions of personhood in Western philosophy have focused onindividual capabilities for complex forms of consciousness that involve cognition such as thecapability to remember past events and one’s own past actions, to think about and identify oneself asoneself, and/or to reason. Conceptions of personhood such as this one qualify as cognition-oriented,and they often fail to acknowledge the role of embodiment for personhood. This article offers analternative conception of personhood from within the tradition of phenomenology of the body. Thearticle presents a phenomenological analysis of joint musical activity in dementia care and outlines anintercorporeal conception of personhood based on this analysis. It also provides a philosophical basisfor the idea that others can hold us in personhood and it questions a strict one-body-one-person logicthat has pertained in much personhood debate.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Springer Netherlands, 2014. Vol. 17, no 1, 131-141 p.
Personhood, Intercorporeality, Dementia, Phenomenology of the body, Music, Joint activity
Medical and Health Sciences
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:liu:diva-103820DOI: 10.1007/s11019-013-9515-zISI: 000330735500015OAI: oai:DiVA.org:liu-103820DiVA: diva2:691737