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Incitements for transportation collaboration by cost allocation
Linköping University, Department of Science and Technology, Communications and Transport Systems. Linköping University, Faculty of Science & Engineering. The Swedish National Road and Transport Research Institute, Linköping, Sweden.
Linköping University, Department of Science and Technology, Communications and Transport Systems. Linköping University, Faculty of Science & Engineering.
Linköping University, Department of Science and Technology, Communications and Transport Systems. Linköping University, Faculty of Science & Engineering.
Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration, Bergen, Norway.
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(English)Manuscript (preprint) (Other academic)
Abstract [en]

In this paper, we focus on how cost allocation can be used as a means to create incentives for collaboration between companies, with the aim of reducing the overall operational cost. Collaboration is assumed to be preceded by a simultaneous invitation of the companies to collaborate with an initiating company. We make use of concepts from cooperative game theory and develop specific cost allocation mechanisms in order to introduce a solid base, a part of a business model, with potential to establish large collaborations among the companies. The cost allocation mechanisms are tested on a case that involves transportation planning activities at forestry companies. Although the case study is from a specific transportation sector, the findings in this paper can be adapted to collaborations in any type of transportation planning activity. Two of the cost allocation mechanisms ensure that any sequence of companies joining the collaboration represent a monotonic path, that is, any sequence of collaborating companies is such that the sequences of allocated costs are non-increasing for all companies.

Keyword [en]
Collaboration, Forest industry, Monotonic Path, Cost Allocation
National Category
Transport Systems and Logistics
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:liu:diva-121558OAI: oai:DiVA.org:liu-121558DiVA: diva2:856504
Available from: 2015-09-24 Created: 2015-09-24 Last updated: 2015-09-24Bibliographically approved
In thesis
1. Cooperative Transportation Planning and Cost Allocation
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Cooperative Transportation Planning and Cost Allocation
2015 (English)Licentiate thesis, comprehensive summary (Other academic)
Abstract [en]

A freight forwarder may consolidate its goods transportations in order to achieve a more efficient operation. When goods transportations are consolidated, they may reduce operational costs, e.g. labor and fuel. This can be further improved if a number of freight forwarders cooperate and consolidate their collective goods transportations, i.e. it is a cooperation between competitors, a coopetition. In order to maintain the cooperation, a suitable business model, in which fair cost allocations plays an important role is essential. The potential by cooperating is not exclusive to freight forwarders, but in fact, any type of goods transportation planning may benefit from cooperation. In this thesis, cooperative game theory is used as an academic tool to study cooperation between stakeholders in different transportation planning applications. Cooperative game theory defines a number of criteria for fair cost allocations.

In Paper 1, the role of the municipality as an enabler of a cooperation between fictitious freight forwarders in an urban area, is studied. In this case, the municipality acts as a stakeholder with unusual characteristics. It is shown that a stable cooperation can be achieved if the municipality is willing to carry some of the cost. This cost is specified and discussed in Paper 1. The results of Paper 2 contribute to game theory by introducing a further development of a cost allocation method. Some small numerical examples are presented in order to illustrate the resulting changes. In Paper 3, the process of establishing a cooperation is studied, where the stakeholders, in this case forest companies, join the cooperation sequentially. Who will join and in what order, is not predetermined. It is shown that a stable cooperation can be achieved despite the uncertainty. This is done by using the cost allocation methods presented.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Linköping: Linköping University Electronic Press, 2015. 47 p.
Series
Linköping Studies in Science and Technology. Thesis, ISSN 0280-7971 ; 1726
National Category
Transport Systems and Logistics Economics and Business
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:liu:diva-121559 (URN)10.3384/diss.diva-121559 (DOI)liu-tek-lic 0280-7971 (Local ID)978-91-7685-969-8 (print) (ISBN)liu-tek-lic 0280-7971 (Archive number)liu-tek-lic 0280-7971 (OAI)
Presentation
2015-10-23, TP1, Täppan, Campus Norrköping, Norrköping, 10:15 (Swedish)
Opponent
Supervisors
Available from: 2015-09-24 Created: 2015-09-24 Last updated: 2015-10-01Bibliographically approved

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Dahlberg, JoenEngevall, StefanGöthe-Lundgren, Maud
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