Self-interest, norms, and explanation
2016 (English)In: Normativity and Naturalism in the Social Sciences / [ed] Mark Risjord, London: Routledge, 2016, 212-229 p.Chapter in book (Refereed)
Rationality and self-interest are routinely attributed an explanatory priority as an inherently understandable basis - as an ideal of natural order - for all social scientific explanation. We argue that this is not consistent with a causal-mechanistic understanding of science and that using self-interest and rationality heuristically as a default baseline biases social scientific research. From a naturalist perspective, both rationality and self-interest are empirical objects of explanation. We discuss one such explanatory hypothesis, according to which consistent self-interested behavior is sustained by a social norm.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
London: Routledge, 2016. 212-229 p.
rationality, normativity. explanation, self-interest
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:liu:diva-127618ISBN: 978-1-138-93662-1OAI: oai:DiVA.org:liu-127618DiVA: diva2:926057