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  • 1.
    Erlandsson, Arvid
    et al.
    Linköping University, Department of Behavioural Sciences and Learning, Psychology. Linköping University, Faculty of Arts and Sciences.
    Björklund, Fredrik
    Lund University, Sweden.
    Bäckström, Martin
    Lund University, Sweden.
    Choice-justifications after allocating resources in helping dilemmas2017In: Judgment and decision making, ISSN 1930-2975, E-ISSN 1930-2975, Vol. 12, no 1, p. 60-80Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    How do donors reason and justify their choices when faced with dilemmas in a charitable context? In two studies, Swedish students were confronted with helping dilemmas based on the identifiable victim effect, the proportion dominance effect and the ingroup effect. Each dilemma consisted of two comparable charity projects and participants were asked to choose one project over the other. They were then asked to provide justifications of their choice by stating the relative importance of different types of reasons. When faced with an identified victim dilemma, participants did not choose the project including an identified victim more often than the project framed statistically, but those who did emphasized emotional reasons (e.g., "Because I had more empathic feelings"), but not any other reasons, more than those choosing the statistical project. When faced with a Proportion dominance dilemma, participants more often chose the project with a high rescue proportion (e.g., you can save 100% out of 30) than the project with a low rescue proportion (e.g., you can save 4% out of 800), and those who did emphasized efficacy reasons (e.g., "Because my money can make a greater difference there"), but no other reasons, more than those favoring the low recue proportion project. Finally, when faced with an Ingroup dilemma, participants more often chose the project that could help ingroup-victims over the project that could help outgroup victims, and those who did emphasized responsibility reasons (e.g., "Because I have a greater obligation"), but no other reasons, more than those favoring outgroup projects. These results are consistent with and extend previous findings about how different helping effects are related to different psychological processes.

  • 2.
    Erlandsson, Arvid
    et al.
    Lunds Universitet, Lund, Sweden.
    Björklund, Fredrik
    Lunds Universitet, Lund, Sweden.
    Bäckström, Martin
    Lunds Universitet, Lund, Sweden.
    Emotional reactions, perceived impact and perceived responsibility mediate the identifiable victim effect, proportion dominance effect and in-group effect respectively2015In: Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, ISSN 0749-5978, E-ISSN 1095-9920, Vol. 127, p. 1-14Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This study investigated possible mediators of the identifiable victim effect (IVE), the proportion dominance effect (PDE), and the in-group effect (IGE) in helping situations. In Studies 1–3, participants rated their emotional reactions (distress and sympathy toward the victims), perceived impact of helping, perceived responsibility to help, and helping motivation toward four versions of a helping situation. Gradually increasing victim identifiability in the helping situations primarily affected emotional reactions and sympathy completely mediated the IVE. Gradually making the reference-group smaller primarily affected perceived impact, and impact completely mediated the PDE. Gradually increasing in-groupness primarily affected perceived responsibility, and responsibility completely mediated the IGE. Study 4 included real monetary allocations and largely replicated the results using a between-subject design. Together, the results shed light on how contextual factors trigger help motivation, and indicate that different helping effects are primarily mediated by different mechanisms.

  • 3.
    Erlandsson, Arvid
    et al.
    Lunds Universitet, Lund, Sweden.
    Björklund, Fredrik
    Lunds Universitet, Lund, Sweden.
    Bäckström, Martin
    Lunds Universitet, Lund, Sweden.
    Perceived Utility (not Sympathy) Mediates the Proportion Dominance Effect in Helping Decisions2014In: Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, ISSN 0894-3257, E-ISSN 1099-0771, Vol. 27, no 1, p. 37-47Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The proportion dominance effect (PDE) refers to a higher motivation to help when the victims are part of a small (you can help 56 out of 60) rather than a large (you can help 56 out of 560) reference group. In two studies using different experimental paradigms, we investigated possible mediators of the PDE. Study 1 (N = 168) was conducted in three separate steps in order to test each link of the mediator model independently. Students read six vignettes where it was possible to help a fixed number of victims but where the size of the reference group was either small or large. When the reference group was small, helping motivation and perceived utility were higher, whereas sympathy toward the victims and perceived rights were not. A within‐subject mediation analysis showed that perceived utility mediated the PDE. Study 2 (N = 36) presented four versions of a single helping situation in a joint evaluation mode where the size of the reference group became gradually smaller in each version. All participants compared and responded to each version. Helping motivation increased as the reference group became smaller, and this effect was mediated by perceived utility rather than by distress, sympathy, or perceived responsibilities. Our results suggest that unlike, for example, the identifiability and singularity effects, which have been suggested to be mediated by emotional reactions, the PDE is mediated by perceived utility. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

  • 4.
    Erlandsson, Arvid
    et al.
    Linköping University, Department of Behavioural Sciences and Learning, Psychology. Linköping University, Faculty of Arts and Sciences. Lund University, Sweden.
    Jungstrand, Amand A.
    Lund University, Sweden.
    Västfjäll, Daniel
    Linköping University, Department of Behavioural Sciences and Learning, Psychology. Linköping University, Faculty of Arts and Sciences. Decis Research, OR USA.
    Anticipated Guilt for Not Helping and Anticipated Warm Glow for Helping Are Differently Impacted by Personal Responsibility to Help2016In: Frontiers in Psychology, ISSN 1664-1078, E-ISSN 1664-1078, Vol. 7, no 1475Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    One important motivation for people behaving prosocially is that they want to avoid negative and obtain positive emotions. In the prosocial behavior literature however, the motivations to avoid negative emotions (e.g., guilt) and to approach positive emotions (e.g., warm glow) are rarely separated, and sometimes even aggregated into a single mood-management construct. The aim of this study was to investigate whether anticipated guilt if not helping and anticipated warm glow if helping are influenced similarly or differently when varying situational factors related to personal responsibility to help. Helping scenarios were created and pilot tests established that each helping scenario could be formulated both in a high-responsibility version and in a low-responsibility version. In Study 1 participants read high-responsibility and low-responsibility helping scenarios, and rated either their anticipated guilt if not helping or their anticipated warm glow if helping (i.e., separate evaluation). Study 2 was similar but here participants rated both their anticipated guilt if not helping and their anticipated warm glow if helping (i.e., joint evaluation). Anticipated guilt was clearly higher in the high-responsibility versions, but anticipated warm glow was unaffected (in Studies 1a and 1b), or even higher in the low-responsibility versions (Study 2). In Studies 3 (where anticipated guilt and warm glow were evaluated separately) and 4 (where they were evaluated jointly), personal responsibility to help was manipulated within-subjects. Anticipated guilt was again constantly higher in the high-responsibility versions but for many types of responsibility-manipulations, anticipated warm glow was higher in the low-responsibility versions. The results suggest that we anticipate guilt if not fulfilling our responsibility but that we anticipate warm glow primarily when doing over and beyond our responsibility. We argue that future studies investigating motivations for helping should measure both anticipated negative consequences for oneself if not helping, and anticipated positive consequences for oneself if helping.

  • 5.
    Erlandsson, Arvid
    et al.
    Linköping University, Department of Behavioural Sciences and Learning, Psychology. Linköping University, Faculty of Arts and Sciences. Lund Univ, Sweden.
    Moyner Hohle, Sigrid
    Simula Res Lab, Norway.
    Lohre, Erik
    Simula Res Lab, Norway.
    Västfjäll, Daniel
    Linköping University, Department of Behavioural Sciences and Learning, Psychology. Linköping University, Faculty of Arts and Sciences. Decis Res, OR USA.
    The rise and fall of scary numbers: The effect of perceived trends on future estimates, severity ratings, and help-allocations in a cancer context2018In: Journal of Applied Social Psychology, ISSN 0021-9029, E-ISSN 1559-1816, Vol. 48, no 11, p. 618-633Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Statistical information such as death risk estimates is frequently used for illustrating the magnitude of a problem. Such mortality statistics are however easier to evaluate if presented next to an earlier estimate, as the two data points together will illustrate an upward or downward change. How are people influenced by such changes? In seven experiments, participants read mortality statistics (e.g., number of yearly deaths or expert-estimated death risks) made at two points of time about various cancer types. Each cancer type was manipulated to have either a downward trajectory (e.g., the estimated death risk was 37% in 2012, and was adjusted downward to 22% in 2014), an upward trajectory (e.g., 7% -amp;gt; 22%), or a flat trajectory (e.g., 22% -amp;gt; 22%). For each cancer type, participants estimated future mortality statistics and rated the perceived severity. They also allocated real money between projects aimed at preventing the different cancer types. Participants responses indicated that they thought that a trend made out of two data points would continue in the future. People also perceived cancer types with similar present mortality statistics as more severe and allocated more money to them when they had an upward trajectory compared to a flat or downward trajectory. Although there are boundary conditions, we conclude that peoples severity ratings and helping behavior can be influenced by trend information even when such information is based on only two data points.

  • 6.
    Erlandsson, Arvid
    et al.
    Linköping University, Department of Behavioural Sciences and Learning, Psychology. Linköping University, Faculty of Arts and Sciences.
    Nilsson, Arthur
    Lund University, Department of Psychology, Lund, Sweden.
    Tinghög, Gustav
    Linköping University, Department of Management and Engineering, Economics. Linköping University, Faculty of Arts and Sciences.
    Västfjäll, Daniel
    Linköping University, Department of Behavioural Sciences and Learning, Psychology. Linköping University, Faculty of Arts and Sciences. Decision Research, Eugene, OR, United States of America.
    Bullshit-sensitivity predicts prosocial behavior2018In: PLoS ONE, ISSN 1932-6203, E-ISSN 1932-6203, Vol. 13, no 7, article id e0201474Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Bullshit-sensitivity is the ability to distinguish pseudo-profound bullshit sentences (e.g. “Your movement transforms universal observations”) from genuinely profound sentences (e.g. “The person who never made a mistake never tried something new”). Although bullshit-sensitivity has been linked to other individual difference measures, it has not yet been shown to predict any actual behavior. We therefore conducted a survey study with over a thousand participants from a general sample of the Swedish population and assessed participants’ bullshit-receptivity (i.e. their perceived meaningfulness of seven bullshit sentences) and profoundness-receptivity (i.e. their perceived meaningfulness of seven genuinely profound sentences), and used these variables to predict two types of prosocial behavior (self-reported donations and a decision to volunteer for charity). Despite bullshit-receptivity and profoundness-receptivity being positively correlated with each other, logistic regression analyses showed that profoundness-receptivity had a positive association whereas bullshit-receptivity had a negative association with both types of prosocial behavior. These relations held up for the most part when controlling for potentially intermediating factors such as cognitive ability, time spent completing the survey, sex, age, level of education, and religiosity. The results suggest that people who are better at distinguishing the pseudo-profound from the actually profound are more prosocial.

  • 7.
    Erlandsson, Arvid
    et al.
    Linköping University, Department of Behavioural Sciences and Learning, Psychology. Linköping University, Faculty of Arts and Sciences.
    Nilsson, Artur
    Lund Univ, Sweden.
    Tinghög, Gustav
    Linköping University, Department of Management and Engineering, Economics. Linköping University, Faculty of Arts and Sciences.
    Andersson, David
    Linköping University, Department of Management and Engineering, Economics. Linköping University, Faculty of Arts and Sciences.
    Västfjäll, Daniel
    Linköping University, Department of Behavioural Sciences and Learning, Psychology. Linköping University, Faculty of Arts and Sciences.
    Donations to Outgroup Charities, but Not Ingroup Charities, Predict Helping Intentions Toward Street-Beggars in Sweden2019In: Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, ISSN 0899-7640, E-ISSN 1552-7395, Vol. 48, no 4, p. 814-838Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This article investigates how donation behavior to charitable organizations and helping intentions toward begging European Union (EU)-migrants are related. This question was tested by analyzing survey responses from 1,050 participants sampled from the general Swedish population. Although the overall results suggested that donations to charitable organizations were positively related to helping intentions toward beggars, the results differed substantially as a function of whether the organization was perceived to focus its efforts on outgroup victims or on ingroup victims. Specifically, whereas donation behavior toward outgroup-focused organizations clearly predicted more helping intentions toward beggars (also when controlling for demographics, education, income, religiosity, and political inclination), donation behavior toward ingroup-focused organizations predicted slightly less helping intentions toward beggars. We conclude that the type of charitable organization a person donates to might tell us more about his or her values and preferences than merely whether or not he or she donates at all.

  • 8.
    Erlandsson, Arvid
    et al.
    Linköping University, Department of Behavioural Sciences and Learning, Psychology. Linköping University, Faculty of Arts and Sciences.
    Nilsson, Artur
    Lund University, Lund, Sweden.
    Västfjäll, Daniel
    Linköping University, Department of Behavioural Sciences and Learning, Psychology. Linköping University, Faculty of Arts and Sciences. Decision Research, Eugene, Oregon, USA.
    Attitudes and donation behavior when reading positive and negative charity appeals2018In: Journal of Nonprofit & Public Sector Marketing, ISSN 1049-5142, E-ISSN 1540-6997, Vol. 30, no 4, p. 444-474Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This article tries to clarify whether negative charity appeals (i.e., advertisements emphasizing the bad consequences of not helping) or positive charity appeals (i.e., advertisements emphasizing the good consequences of helping) are more effective. Previous literature does not provide a single answer to this question and we suggest that one contributing reason for this is that different studies have operationalized appeal effectiveness in different ways (e.g., actual behavior, self-rated helping intentions, or expressed attitudes about the ad or the organization). Results from four separate studies suggest that positive appeals are more effective in inducing favorable attitudes toward the ad and toward the organization but that negative appeals are more effective (in studies 1A and 1B) or at least equally effective (in studies 1C and 1D) in eliciting actual donations. Also, although people’s attitude toward the appeal (i.e., liking) was a good predictor for the expected effectiveness in increasing donation behavior (in Study 2), it was a poor predictor of actual donation behavior in all four main studies. These results cast doubt on marketing theories suggesting that attitudes toward an advertisement and toward the brand always lead to higher purchase behavior.

  • 9.
    Erlandsson, Arvid
    et al.
    Linköping University, Department of Behavioural Sciences and Learning, Psychology. Linköping University, Faculty of Arts and Sciences. Lund University, Sweden.
    Västfjäll, Daniel
    Linköping University, Department of Behavioural Sciences and Learning, Psychology. Linköping University, Faculty of Arts and Sciences. University of Oregon, OR 97403 USA.
    Sundfelt, Oskar
    Lund University, Sweden.
    Slovic, Paul
    University of Oregon, OR 97403 USA.
    Argument-inconsistency in charity appeals: Statistical information about the scope of the problem decrease helping toward a single identified victim but not helping toward many non-identified victims in a refugee crisis context2016In: Journal of Economic Psychology, ISSN 0167-4870, E-ISSN 1872-7719, Vol. 56, p. 126-140Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    It is known that both the characteristics of the victims one can help and the existence of victims one cannot help influence economic helping decisions in suboptimal ways. The aim of this study was to systematically test if these two aspects interact with each other. In Studies 1 and 2, we created hypothetical charity appeals related to the Syrian refugee crisis and factorially manipulated characteristics of victims possible to help (one identified child/nine non-identified children) and presence of statistical information about the scope and nature of the problem (information-box absent/present). We found a significant interaction effect both when using self-rated helping intention (Study 1), and when using actual donation behavior as the dependent variable (Study 2). Statistical information decreased helping intentions toward a single identified child but had no, or even a small positive effect on helping nine non-identified children. In Study 3, non-student participants reading a charity appeal with both a story about one identified child and statistical information donated less often than participants reading appeals with either only a story about one identified child or only statistical information. We suggest that both emotional arguments (e.g., a story and picture of an identified child in need) and analytical arguments (e.g., detailed statistical information about the scope and nature of the problem) can make us more motivated to help refugees, but that mixing different argument-types can make charity appeals internally inconsistent and decrease donations. (C) 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

  • 10.
    Hagman, William
    et al.
    Linköping University, Department of Behavioural Sciences and Learning, Psychology. Linköping University, Faculty of Arts and Sciences.
    Erlandsson, Arvid
    Linköping University, Department of Behavioural Sciences and Learning, Psychology. Linköping University, Faculty of Arts and Sciences.
    Dickert, Stephan
    Queen Mary University of London, London, UK; Klagenfurt University, Klagenfurt, Austria.
    Tinghög, Gustav
    Linköping University, Department of Management and Engineering, Economics. Linköping University, Faculty of Arts and Sciences.
    Västfjäll, Daniel
    Linköping University, Department of Behavioural Sciences and Learning, Psychology. Linköping University, Faculty of Arts and Sciences.
    The effect of paternalistic alternatives on attitudes toward default nudges2019In: Behavioural Public Policy, ISSN 2398-0648Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Nudges are increasingly being proposed and used as a policy tool around the world. The success of nudges depends on public acceptance. However, several questions about what makes a nudge acceptable remain unanswered. In this paper, we examine whether policy alternatives to nudges influence the public's acceptance of these nudges: Do attitudes change when the nudge is presented alongside either a more paternalistic policy alternative (legislation) or a less paternalistic alternative (no behavioral intervention)? In two separate samples drawn from the Swedish general public, we find a very small effect of alternatives on the acceptability of various default nudges overall. Surprisingly, we find that when the alternative to the nudge is legislation, acceptance decreases and perceived intrusiveness increases (relative to conditions where the alternative is no regulation). An implication of this finding is that acceptance of nudges may not always automatically increase when nudges are explicitly compared to more paternalistic alternatives.

  • 11.
    Lind, Therese
    et al.
    Linköping University, Department of Management and Engineering, Economics. Linköping University, Faculty of Arts and Sciences.
    Erlandsson, Arvid
    Linköping University, Department of Behavioural Sciences and Learning, Psychology. Linköping University, Faculty of Arts and Sciences.
    Västfjäll, Daniel
    Linköping University, Department of Behavioural Sciences and Learning, Psychology. Linköping University, Faculty of Arts and Sciences. Decision Research, Eugene, OR, USA.
    Tinghög, Gustav
    Linköping University, Department of Management and Engineering, Economics. Linköping University, Department of Medical and Health Sciences, Division of Health Care Analysis. Linköping University, Faculty of Arts and Sciences. Linköping University, Faculty of Medicine and Health Sciences.
    Motivated reasoning when assessing the effects of refugee intake2018In: Behavioural Public Policy, ISSN 2398-063XArticle in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Do differences in worldview ideology hinder people from objectively interpreting the effect of immigration? In an experiment with Swedish adults (n = 1015), we investigate whether people display motivated reasoning when interpreting numerical information about the effects of refugee intake on crime rate. Our results show clear evidence of motivated reasoning along the lines of worldview ideology (i.e., whether people identify themselves primarily as nationally oriented or globally oriented). In scenarios where refugee intake was associated with higher crime rate, nationally oriented people were 18 percentage points more likely to make the correct assessment compared to globally oriented people. Likewise, in scenarios where refugee intake was associated with lower crime rate, nationally oriented people were 20 percentage points less likely to make the correct assessment compared to globally oriented people. Individuals with higher numeric ability were less likely to engage in motivated reasoning, suggesting that motivated reasoning more commonly is driven by feelings and emotional cues rather than deliberate analytical processes.

  • 12.
    Moche, Hajdi
    et al.
    Linköping University, Department of Behavioural Sciences and Learning, Psychology. Linköping University, Faculty of Arts and Sciences.
    Erlandsson, Arvid
    Linköping University, Department of Behavioural Sciences and Learning, Psychology. Linköping University, Faculty of Arts and Sciences.
    Andersson, David
    Linköping University, Department of Management and Engineering, Economics. Linköping University, Faculty of Arts and Sciences.
    Västfjäll, Daniel
    Linköping University, Department of Behavioural Sciences and Learning, Psychology. Linköping University, Faculty of Arts and Sciences. Decis Res, OR USA.
    Opportunity Cost in Monetary Donation Decisions to Non-identified and Identified Victims2020In: Frontiers in Psychology, ISSN 1664-1078, E-ISSN 1664-1078, Vol. 10, article id 3035Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Do people consider alternative uses of money (i.e., opportunity cost) when asked to donate to a charitable cause? To answer this question, we examined the effect of providing versus not providing participants with an opportunity cost reminder when they are asked to donate money to causes with identified and non-identified victims. The results of two studies show that when making one-time donation decisions, people become less willing to donate to charity when reminded of opportunity cost, but mainly for non-identified victims. Moreover, framing the opportunity cost reminder as prosocial versus proself did not influence willingness to donate. Overall, our evidence suggests that opportunity cost reminders influence peoples donation behavior depending on whether charities identify supported victims or not.

  • 13.
    Nilsson, Artur
    et al.
    Lund University, Lund, Sweden.
    Erlandsson, Arvid
    Lund University, Lund, Sweden.
    The Moral Foundations taxonomy: Structural validity and relation to political ideology in Sweden2015In: Personality and Individual Differences, ISSN 0191-8869, E-ISSN 1873-3549, Vol. 76, p. 28-32Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Although Moral Foundations Theory claims that the foundations of morality are universal, there are still few studies addressing it through non-English measures. In the current research, 540 persons filled out a Swedish translation of the Moral Foundations Questionnaire, and 332 of them filled out political attitude measures. Confirmatory factor analyses suggested that the fit of the five-factor model was better than alternative models but not optimal, replicating previous findings. Concerns with fairness and prevention of harm predicted political identity leftward, mediated mainly by preference for equality, and concerns with loyalty, authority, and sanctity predicted political identity rightward, mediated mainly by resistance to change and system justification, as hypothesized. Fairness and authority concerns were the best predictors of political ideology.

  • 14.
    Nilsson, Artur
    et al.
    Lund Univ, Sweden.
    Erlandsson, Arvid
    Linköping University, Department of Behavioural Sciences and Learning, Psychology. Linköping University, Faculty of Arts and Sciences. Lund Univ, Sweden.
    Västfjäll, Daniel
    Linköping University, Department of Behavioural Sciences and Learning, Psychology. Linköping University, Faculty of Arts and Sciences. Decis Res, OR USA.
    The Complex Relation Between Receptivity to Pseudo-Profound Bullshit and Political Ideology2019In: Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, ISSN 0146-1672, E-ISSN 1552-7433, Vol. 45, no 10, p. 1440-1454Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This research systematically mapped the relationship between political ideology and receptivity to pseudo-profound bullshit-that is, obscure sentences constructed to impress others rather than convey truth. Among Swedish adults (N = 985), bullshit receptivity was (a) robustly positively associated with socially conservative (vs. liberal) self-placement, resistance to change, and particularly binding moral intuitions (loyalty, authority, purity); (b) associated with centrism on preference for equality and even leftism (when controlling for other aspects of ideology) on economic ideology self-placement; and (c) lowest among right-of-center social liberal voters and highest among left-wing green voters. Most of the results held up when we controlled for the perceived profundity of genuine aphorisms, cognitive reflection, numeracy, information processing bias, gender, age, education, religiosity, and spirituality. The results are supportive of theoretical accounts that posit ideological asymmetries in cognitive orientation, while also pointing to the existence of bullshit receptivity among both right- and left-wingers.

  • 15.
    Nilsson, Artur
    et al.
    Lund University, Sweden.
    Erlandsson, Arvid
    Linköping University, Department of Behavioural Sciences and Learning, Psychology. Linköping University, Faculty of Arts and Sciences. Lund University, Sweden.
    Västfjäll, Daniel
    Linköping University, Department of Behavioural Sciences and Learning, Psychology. Linköping University, Faculty of Arts and Sciences. Decis Research, OR 97401 USA.
    The congruency between moral foundations and intentions to donate, self-reported donations, and actual donations to charity2016In: journal of Research in Personality, ISSN 0092-6566, E-ISSN 1095-7251, Vol. 65, p. 22-29Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    We extend past research on the congruency between moral foundations and morally relevant outcomes to ingroup- and outgroup-focused charitable giving. We measured intentions to donate to outgroup members (begging EU-migrants) and self-reported donations to ingroup (medical research) and outgroup (international aid) charity organizations in a heterogeneous sample (N = 1008) and actual donations to ingroup (cancer treatment) and outgroup (hunger relief) organizations in two experimental studies (N = 126; N = 200). Individualizing intuitions predicted helping in general across self-report and behavioral data. Binding intuitions predicted higher donations to ingroup causes, lower donations to outgroup causes, and less intentions to donate to outgroup members in the self-report data, and they predicted lower donations overall in the behavioral data. (C) 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

  • 16.
    Slovic, Paul
    et al.
    Decis Research, OR 97401 USA; University of Oregon, OR 97403 USA.
    Västfjäll, Daniel
    Linköping University, Department of Behavioural Sciences and Learning, Psychology. Linköping University, Faculty of Arts and Sciences. Decis Research, OR 97401 USA.
    Erlandsson, Arvid
    Linköping University, Department of Behavioural Sciences and Learning, Psychology. Linköping University, Faculty of Arts and Sciences. Lund University, Sweden.
    Gregory, Robin
    Decis Research, OR 97401 USA; ChoiceWorks Ltd, Canada.
    Iconic photographs and the ebb and flow of empathic response to humanitarian disasters2017In: Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, ISSN 0027-8424, E-ISSN 1091-6490, Vol. 114, no 4, p. 640-644Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The power of visual imagery is well known, enshrined in such familiar sayings as "seeing is believing" and "a picture is worth a thousand words." Iconic photos stir our emotions and transform our perspectives about life and the world in which we live. On September 2, 2015, photographs of a young Syrian child, Aylan Kurdi, lying face-down on a Turkish beach, filled the front pages of newspapers worldwide. These images brought much-needed attention to the Syrian war that had resulted in hundreds of thousands of deaths and created millions of refugees. Here we present behavioral data demonstrating that, in this case, an iconic photo of a single child had more impact than statistical reports of hundreds of thousands of deaths. People who had been unmoved by the relentlessly rising death toll in Syria suddenly appeared to care much more after having seen Aylans photograph; however, this newly created empathy waned rather quickly. We briefly examine the psychological processes underlying these findings, discuss some of their policy implications, and reflect on the lessons they provide about the challenges to effective intervention in the face of mass threats to human well-being.

  • 17.
    Västfjäll, Daniel
    et al.
    Linköping University, Department of Behavioural Sciences and Learning, Psychology. Linköping University, Faculty of Arts and Sciences. Decision Research, Eugene, OR, USA.
    Erlandsson, Arvid
    Linköping University, Department of Behavioural Sciences and Learning, Psychology. Linköping University, Faculty of Arts and Sciences. Lund University, Sweden.
    Slovic, Paul
    Decision Research, Eugene, OR, USA; University of Oregon, Eugene, OR, USA.
    Tinghög, Gustav
    Linköping University, Department of Management and Engineering, Economics. Linköping University, Faculty of Arts and Sciences.
    Commentary: Empathy and its discontents2017In: Frontiers in Psychology, ISSN 1664-1078, E-ISSN 1664-1078, article id 542Article in journal (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    In “Empathy and its discontents” Bloom (2017: see also Bloom, 2016) argues that we should abandon empathy as a moral compass in favor of compassion. Bloom’s central premise is that empathy is narrow in its focus on single identified individuals, biased in that it favors the in-group, and can be used as a tool to motivate us to do things that are not optimally effective, or even destructive (e.g., motivate war). For all these reasons, Bloom argues that policy decision should not be motivated by empathy. There is indeed ample evidence that empathy is fraught with biases and we have, as Bloom, argued that deliberate mechanisms are needed to counteract the innumeracy and parochialism of empathy (Slovic and Västfjäll, 2010). While there is much to agree with Bloom on, there are a few points where we disagree; (1) the definition of compassion, (2) data supporting why empathy, but not compassion, is bad, (3) the role of deliberation in moral judgment. 

  • 18.
    Västfjäll, Daniel
    et al.
    Linköping University, Department of Behavioural Sciences and Learning, Psychology. Linköping University, Faculty of Arts and Sciences.
    Paul, Slovic
    Decision Research Eugene, OR, USA.
    Burns, William
    Decision Research Eugene, OR, USA.
    Erlandsson, Arvid
    Linköping University, Department of Behavioural Sciences and Learning, Psychology. Linköping University, Faculty of Arts and Sciences.
    Koppel, Lina
    Linköping University, Department of Management and Engineering, Economics. Linköping University, Faculty of Arts and Sciences.
    Asutay, Erkin
    Linköping University, Department of Behavioural Sciences and Learning, Psychology. Linköping University, Faculty of Arts and Sciences.
    Tinghög, Gustav
    Linköping University, Department of Management and Engineering, Economics. Linköping University, Faculty of Arts and Sciences.
    The Arithmetic of Emotion: Integration of Incidental and Integral Affect in Judgments and Decisions2016In: Frontiers in Psychology, ISSN 1664-1078, E-ISSN 1664-1078, Vol. 7, p. 325-Article, review/survey (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Research has demonstrated that two types of affect have an influence on judgment and decision making: incidental affect (affect unrelated to a judgment or decision such as a mood) and integral affect (affect that is part of the perceiver’s internal representation of the option or target under consideration). So far, these two lines of research have seldom crossed so that knowledge concerning their combined effects is largely missing. To fill this gap, the present review highlights differences and similarities between integral and incidental affect. Further, common and unique mechanisms that enable these two types of affect to influence judgment and choices are identified. Finally, some basic principles for affect integration when the two sources co-occur are outlined. These mechanisms are discussed in relation to existing work that has focused on incidental or integral affect but not both.

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