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  • 1.
    Ahmed, Ali M.
    et al.
    Centre for Labour Market Policy Research (CAFO), School of Management and Economics, Växjö University Sweden.
    Skogh, Göran
    Linköping University, Department of Management and Engineering, Economics. Linköping University, Faculty of Arts and Sciences.
    Choices at various levels of uncertainty: An experimental test of the restated diversification theorem2006In: Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, ISSN 0895-5646, E-ISSN 1573-0476, Vol. 33, no 3, p. 183-196Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Our "Restated diversification theorem" (Skogh and Wu, 2005) says that risk-averse agents may pool risks efficiently without assignment of subjective probabilities to outcomes, also at genuine uncertainty. It suffices that the agents presume that they face equal risks. Here, the theorem is tested in an experiment where the probability of loss, and the information about this probability, varies. The result supports our theorem. Moreover, it tentatively supports an evolutionary theory of the insurance industry-starting with mutual pooling at uncertainty, turning into insurance priced ex ante when actuarial information is available. © Springer Science + Business Media, LLC 2006.

  • 2. Andersson, F
    et al.
    Skogh, Göran
    Linköping University, Faculty of Arts and Sciences. Linköping University, Department of Management and Engineering, Economics .
    Quality, self-regulation, and competition: The case of insurance2003In: Insurance, Mathematics & Economics, ISSN 0167-6687, E-ISSN 1873-5959, Vol. 32, no 2, p. 267-280Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In this paper, insurers' credibility problems explain contracting, co-operation, and regulation in the insurance industry. First, it is noted that cheating by policyholders may be eliminated if the insurer withholds compensation on the basis of detecting careless behaviour with high enough probability. Then, assuming that care taken is imperfectly observable and non-contractible, the problem that insurers may deceive policyholders is addressed. In a repeated game, insurers' building a reputation for being generous can sustain an efficient outcome. Finally, intra-industry co-operation is considered, it is shown that the industry's monitoring care and "fair" compensation, while sustaining monopolistic pricing, mitigates negative credibility externalities. ⌐ 2003 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.

  • 3.
    Sellenthin, Mark
    et al.
    Linköping University, Faculty of Arts and Sciences. Linköping University, The Tema Institute, Technology and Social Change.
    Skogh, Göran
    Linköping University, Faculty of Arts and Sciences. Linköping University, Department of Management and Economics, Economics and Economic History.
    Kan äganderätt rädda utrotningshotade djur? Exemplet den svenska järven2001In: Ekonomisk debatt / utgiven av Nationalekonomiska föreningen, ISSN 0345-2646, Vol. 29, no 8, p. 559-564Article in journal (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    Vi föreslår införandet av privat äganderätt till den utrotningshotade svenska järven. Förslaget ger de renägande samerna jakträtten. Samtidigt skall svenska staten betala för skydd av de järvar som lever inom respektive samebys område. Uppfödning av ren och skydd av järv blir därmed en kombinerad näring för samerna samtidigt som incitamentet till tjuvjakt försvinner. Dagens system med politiskt bestämd ersättning till Sametinget för rivna renar minskar inte tjuvjakten. Skadestånd till enskilda renägare fungerar inte heller, eftersom rovdjurens skadeverkningar inte kan uppskattas tillräckligt exakt. En anledning till varför vårt förslag är genomförbart är att antalet järvar inom ett område är mätbart till relativt låga kostnader. Systemet kan finansieras via omfördelning av dagens bidrag till samerna.

  • 4.
    Skogh, Göran
    Linköping University, Faculty of Arts and Sciences. Linköping University, Department of Management and Engineering, Economics .
    A European nuclear accident pool2008In: Geneva papers on risk and insurance. Issues and practice, ISSN 1018-5895, E-ISSN 1468-0440, Vol. 33, no 2, p. 274-287Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The compensation to victims of nuclear accidents is based on a Paris (OECD) and a Vienna (UN) convention. A problem with the system is that a strictly liable, but insolvent or uninsured plant owner leaves victims without compensation. In this paper, it is argued that a system could be better organised by, for example, the European Union (EU). A State that permits a nuclear reactor on its territory should be strictly liable. Benefits are: (i) States are able to compensate large damages, (ii) theory suggests that stepwise modified risk-sharing could be made beneficial for risk-averse States, (iii) the EU can enforce sharing agreements by Member States, (iv) a State can limit its financial burden by redressing some liability to the domestic nuclear industry. The incentive created hereby, as well as regulations on location and safety may prevent accidents. A European nuclear accident pool will have a collective interest in accident prevention. © 2008 The International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics.

  • 5.
    Skogh, Göran
    Linköping University, Faculty of Arts and Sciences. Linköping University, Department of Management and Economics, Economics and Economic History.
    An Economic Analysis of a Swedish Environmental Liability Case1998In: European Journal of Law and Economics, ISSN 0929-1261, E-ISSN 1572-9990, Vol. 5, p. 167-177Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 6.
    Skogh, Göran
    Linköping University, Faculty of Arts and Sciences. Linköping University, Department of Management and Economics, Economics and Economic History.
    Development Risks, Strict Liability, and the Insurability of Industrial Hazards1998In: Geneva papers on risk and insurance. Issues and practice, ISSN 1018-5895, E-ISSN 1468-0440, Vol. 23, p. 247-264Article in journal (Other academic)
  • 7.
    Skogh, Göran
    Linköping University, Department of Management and Engineering, Economics. Linköping University, Faculty of Arts and Sciences.
    En transaktionskostnadsteori om försäkring2005In: Studier i rättsekonomi: festskrift till Ingemar Ståhl / [ed] Christian Dahlman, Lund: Studentlitteratur AB, 2005, p. 193-205Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 8.
    Skogh, Göran
    Linköping University, Faculty of Arts and Sciences. Linköping University, Department of Management and Economics, Economics and Economic History.
    En transaktionsteori om försäkring2005In: Festskrift till Ingemar Ståhl, Lund: Studentlitteratur , 2005Chapter in book (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
  • 9.
    Skogh, Göran
    Linköping University, Faculty of Arts and Sciences. Linköping University, Department of Management and Economics, Economics and Economic History.
    Institutional Economics of Insurance and Liability1999In: Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, entry Mandatory Insurance, London: Edward Elgar Publishing , 1999Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 10.
    Skogh, Göran
    Linköping University, Faculty of Arts and Sciences. Linköping University, Department of Management and Economics, Economics and Economic History.
    Property Rights and the Environment. A law and economics approach2000Report (Other academic)
  • 11.
    Skogh, Göran
    Linköping University, Faculty of Arts and Sciences. Linköping University, Department of Management and Engineering, Economics .
    Risk-sharing institutions for unpredictable losses1999In: Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, ISSN 0932-4569, E-ISSN 1614-0559, Vol. 155, no 3, p. 505-515Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Traditional insurance theory assumes that the parties involved assign subjective probabilities of losses. Here, we demonstrate that mutually beneficial risk-sharing is possible without the assignment of a probability it is enough that the sharing parties presume that they are faced with the same probability This explains why parties facing similar risks, like shipowners, guilds, and joint ventures, tend to share risks in common pools - especially at the early stage when the probability distribution of losses is most uncertain. An insurance industry with policies paid ex ante usually emerges first when considerable actuarial information is available. Uncertainty and the impossibility of assigning reliable subjective probabilities render also an explanation, thus far neglected, of why the State covers risks collectively.

  • 12.
    Skogh, Göran
    Linköping University, Faculty of Arts and Sciences. Linköping University, Department of Management and Economics, Economics and Economic History.
    Risk-sharing Institutions for Unpredictable Losses1999In: Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, ISSN 0932-4569, E-ISSN 1614-0559, Vol. October, p. 505-515Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 13.
    Skogh, Göran
    et al.
    Linköping University, Faculty of Arts and Sciences. Linköping University, Department of Management and Economics, Economics and Economic History.
    Braunerhjelm, Pontus
    Linköping University, Faculty of Arts and Sciences. Linköping University, Department of Management and Economics, Economics and Economic History.
    Sista fracken inga fickor har. Filantropi och ekonomisk tillväxt.2004 (ed. 1)Book (Other academic)
    Abstract [sv]

    Den svenska, skattebaserade modellen är utsatt för betydande påfrestningar.  Går det att långsiktigt bibehålla omfattning och kvalitet på de offentligt  organiserade verksamheterna när skattebaserna blir allt rörligare? Den  anglosaxiska världen har löst detta genom att förmögenheter förväntas återföras  till samhället genom donationer. Innan det är dags för den sista "fracken" - kistan - är det snarare regel än undantag att donera delar av förmögenheten.

    I boken visas att donationer bidrar till att ny kunskap utvecklas och  kommersialiseras, driver på tillväxt samt ökar resurser och mångfald i  forskningen. Dessutom stärker donationer legitimiteten för marknaden och det  kapitalistiska systemet. Det är dags att ändra det svenska  samhällskontraktet!

  • 14.
    Skogh, Göran
    et al.
    Linköping University, Faculty of Arts and Sciences. Linköping University, Department of Management and Economics, Economics and Economic History.
    Sellenthin, Mark
    Property rights in endangered species. The wolverine case.2004In: European Journal of Law and Economics, ISSN 0929-1261, E-ISSN 1572-9990, Vol. 18, no 2, p. 239-247Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 15.
    Skogh, Göran
    et al.
    Linköping University, Faculty of Arts and Sciences. Linköping University, Department of Management and Economics, Economics and Economic History.
    Sjögren, Hans
    Linköping University, Faculty of Arts and Sciences. Linköping University, Department of Management and Economics, Economics and Economic History.
    New Perspectives on economic crime.2004Book (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    Economic crime is, by definition, crime committed to gain profit within an otherwise legitimate business. Examples are illegal pollution, brand name infringement and tax evasion. The victims of such crimes may be private citizens, businesses and the state. The leading authors in this vital new book survey recent advances in the study of economic crime from a variety of disciplinary perspectives.

    The key areas examined are: • the economics of corporate crime • enforcing regulation • law and economics of environmental crime • corporate fraud and tax evasion • the history of economic crime

    This important volume will be of interest to scholars and policymakers involved in examining and regulating economic crime in both developed and developing countries.

  • 16.
    Skogh, Göran
    et al.
    Linköping University, Faculty of Arts and Sciences. Linköping University, Department of Management and Economics, Economics and Economic History.
    Tibiletti, l
    Compensation of uncertain lost earnings1999In: European Journal of Law and Economics, ISSN 0929-1261, E-ISSN 1572-9990, Vol. 8, p. 51-61Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 17.
    Skogh, Göran
    et al.
    Linköping University, Faculty of Arts and Sciences. Linköping University, Department of Management and Economics, Economics and Economic History.
    Wu, Hong
    The Diversification Theorem Restated: Risk-pooling Without Assignment of Probabilities2005In: Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, ISSN 0895-5646, E-ISSN 1573-0476, Vol. 31Article in journal (Refereed)
1 - 17 of 17
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  • en-GB
  • en-US
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  • nn-NO
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