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  • 1.
    Collste, Göran
    Linköpings universitet, Filosofiska fakulteten. Linköpings universitet, Institutionen för religion och kultur, Centrum för tillämpad etik.
    The Internet doctor and medical ethics2002Ingår i: Medicine, Health care and Philosophy, ISSN 1386-7423, E-ISSN 1572-8633, Vol. 5, nr 2, s. 121-125Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
  • 2.
    de Boer, Marjolein
    et al.
    Univ Oslo, Norway.
    Zeiler, Kristin
    Linköpings universitet, Institutionen för tema, Tema teknik och social förändring. Linköpings universitet, Filosofiska fakulteten.
    Slatman, Jenny
    Tilburg Univ, Netherlands.
    Sharing lives, sharing bodies: partners negotiating breast cancer experiences2019Ingår i: Medicine, Health care and Philosophy, ISSN 1386-7423, E-ISSN 1572-8633, Vol. 22, nr 2, s. 253-265Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    By drawing on Jean-Luc Nancys philosophy of ontological relationality, this article explores what it means to be a we in breast cancer. What are the characteristicsthe extent and diversityof couples relationally lived experiences of bodily changes in breast cancer? Through analyzing duo interviews with diagnosed women and their partners, four ways of sharing an embodied life are identified. (1) While being different together, partners have different, albeit connected kinds of experiences of breast cancer. (2) While being there for you, partners take care of each other in mutually dependent ways. (3) While being reconnected to you, partners (re-)relate to each other through intimacy and sexuality. (4) While being like you, partners synchronize their embodied daily lives to one another, sometimes up to the point that the self cannot be distinguished from the other anymore. These ways reveal that being a we involves complex affective, bodily encounters in which the many fault lines that both separate partners into individual selves and join them together as a unity are continuously reshaped and negotiated. Being a we may be understood as something we have to do. Therefore, in being true to the legacy of Nancy, we argue at the end of this article for a sensible praxis of sharing a life and body, particularly in breast cancer.

  • 3.
    Gelhaus, Petra
    Linköpings universitet, Institutionen för medicin och hälsa, Hälsa och samhälle. Linköpings universitet, Hälsouniversitetet. Östergötlands Läns Landsting, Närsjukvården i västra Östergötland, Psykiatri- och habiliteringsenheten.
    The desired moral attitude of the physician: (I) Empathy2012Ingår i: Medicine, Health care and Philosophy, ISSN 1386-7423, E-ISSN 1572-8633, Vol. 15, nr 2, s. 103-113Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    In professional medical ethics, the physician traditionally is obliged to fulfil specific duties as well as to embody a responsible and trustworthy personality. In the public discussion, different concepts are suggested to describe the desired underlying attitude of physicians. In this article, one of them—empathy—is presented in an interpretation that is meant to depicture (together with the two additional concepts compassion and care) this attitude. Therefore empathy in the clinical context is defined as the adequate understanding of the inner processes of the patient concerning his health-related problems. Adequacy is scrutinized on behalf of the emotional and subjective involvement of he physician, and on the necessary dependence on medical—moral—goals. In the present interpretation, empathy alone is no guarantee of the right moral attitude, but a necessary instrumental skill in order to perceive and treat a patient as an individual person. The concepts of compassion and care that will be discussed in two forthcoming articles are necessary parts to describe the desired moral attitude of the physician more completely.

  • 4.
    Gelhaus, Petra
    Linköpings universitet, Institutionen för medicin och hälsa, Hälsa och samhälle. Linköpings universitet, Hälsouniversitetet. Östergötlands Läns Landsting, Närsjukvården i västra Östergötland, Psykiatri- och habiliteringsenheten.
    The desired moral attitude of the physician: (II) Compassion2012Ingår i: Medicine, Health care and Philosophy, ISSN 1386-7423, E-ISSN 1572-8633, Vol. 15, nr 4, s. 397-410Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    Professional medical ethics demands of health care professionals in addition to specific duties and rules of conduct that they embody a responsible and trustworthy personality. In the public discussion, different concepts are suggested to describe the desired implied attitude of physicians. In a sequel of three articles, a set of three of these concepts is presented in an interpretation that is meant to characterise the morally emotional part of this attitude: “empathy”, “compassion” and “care”. In the first article of the series, “empathy” has been developed as a mainly cognitive and morally neutral capacity of understanding. In this article, the emotional and virtuous core of the desired professional attitude—compassion—is elaborated. Compassion is distinguished from sympathy, empathy and pity. Several problems of compassion as a spontaneous, warm emotion for being a professional virtue are discussed: especially questions of over-demand, of justice and of concerns because of a possible threat to the patient’s dignity and autonomy. An interpretation of compassion as processed and learned professional attitude, that founds dignity on the general idea of man as a sentient being and on solidarity, not on his independence and capacities, is developed. It is meant to rule out the possible side effects and to make compassion as a professional attitude and as professional virtue attractive, teachable and acquirable. In order to reach the adequate warmth and closeness for the particular physician-patient-relation, professional compassion has to be combined with the capacity of empathy. If appropriate, the combination of both empathy and compassion as “empathic compassion” can demand a much warmer attitude towards the patient than each of the elements alone, or the simple addition of them can provide. The concept of “care” that will be discussed in a forthcoming article of this sequel is a missing necessary part to describe the active potential of the desired moral attitude of the physician more completely. The reconstruction of the desired professional attitude in terms of “empathic compassionate care” is certainly not the only possible description, but it is a detailed proposal in order to give an impulse for the discussion about the inner tacit values and the meaning of medicine and clinical healthcare professions.

  • 5.
    Gelhaus, Petra
    Linköpings universitet, Institutionen för medicin och hälsa, Hälsa och samhälle. Linköpings universitet, Hälsouniversitetet. Östergötlands Läns Landsting, Närsjukvården i västra Östergötland, Psykiatri- och habiliteringsenheten.
    The desired moral attitude of the physicians: (III) Care2013Ingår i: Medicine, Health care and Philosophy, ISSN 1386-7423, E-ISSN 1572-8633, Vol. 16, nr 2, s. 125-139Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    In professional medical ethics, the physician traditionally is obliged to fulfil specific duties as well as to embody a responsible and trustworthy personality. In the public discussion, different concepts are suggested to describe the desired moral attitude of physicians. In a series of three articles, three of the discussed concepts are presented in an interpretation that is meant to characterise the morally emotional part of this attitude: “empathy”, “compassion” and “care”. In the first article of the series, “empathy” has been developed as a mainly cognitive and morally neutral capacity of understanding. In the second article, the emotional and virtuous core of the desired professional attitude—compassion—has been presented. Compassion as a professional attitude has been distinguished from a spontaneous feeling of compassion, and has been related to a general idea of man as vulnerable and solidary being. Thus, the dignity of the patient is safeguarded in spite of the asymmetry of compassion. In this article, the third concept of the triad—“care”—is presented. Care is conceived as an attitude as well as an activity which can be directed to different objects: if it is directed to another sentient being, it is regarded as intrinsically morally valuable; implying (1) the acceptance of being addressed, (2) a benevolent inclination to help and to foster, and (3) activity to realize this. There are different forms of benevolence that can underlie caring. With regard to the professional physician’s ethos, the attitude of empathic compassion as developed in the two previous articles is proposed to be the adequate underlying attitude of care which demands the right balance between closeness and professionalism and the right form of attention to the person of the patient. ‘Empathic compassionate care’ does not, however, describe the whole of the desired attitude of a physician, but focuses on the morally-emotive aspects. In order to get also the cognitive and practical aspects of biomedicine into the picture, ‘empathic compassionate care’ has to be combined with an attitude of responsibility that is more directed to decision-making and outcome than a caring attitude alone can be. The reconstruction of the desired professional attitude in terms of “empathic compassionate care” and “responsibility” is certainly not the only possible description, but it is a detailed proposal in order to give an impulse for the discussion about the inner tacit values and the meaning of medicine and clinical healthcare professions.

  • 6.
    Grankvist, Hannah
    et al.
    Linköpings universitet, Institutionen för tema, Tema teknik och social förändring. Linköpings universitet, Filosofiska fakulteten.
    Kimmelman, Jonathan
    Studies for Translation, Research Ethics, and Medicine (STREAM), Biomedical Ethics Unit/Social Studies of Medicine, McGill University.
    How do researchers decide early clinical trials?2016Ingår i: Medicine, Health care and Philosophy, ISSN 1386-7423, E-ISSN 1572-8633, Vol. 19, nr 2, s. 191-198Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    Launch of clinical investigation represents a substantial escalation in commitment to a particular clinical translation trajectory; it also exposes human subjects to poorly understood interventions. Despite these high stakes, there is little to guide decision-makers on the scientific and ethical evaluation of early phase trials. In this article, we review policies and consensus statements on human protections, drug regulation, and research design surrounding trial launch, and conclude that decision-making is largely left to the discretion of research teams and sponsors. We then review what is currently understood about how research teams exercise this discretion, and close by laying out a research agenda for characterizing the way investigators, sponsors, and reviewers approach decision-making in early phase research.

  • 7.
    Guntram, Lisa
    et al.
    Linköpings universitet, Institutionen för tema, Tema teknik och social förändring. Linköpings universitet, Filosofiska fakulteten.
    Zeiler, Kristin
    Linköpings universitet, Institutionen för tema, Tema teknik och social förändring. Linköpings universitet, Filosofiska fakulteten.
    The Ethics of the Societal Entrenchment-approach and the case of live uterus transplantation-IVF2019Ingår i: Medicine, Health care and Philosophy, ISSN 1386-7423, E-ISSN 1572-8633, Vol. 22, nr 4, s. 557-571Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    In 2014, the first child in the world was born after live uterus transplantation and IVF (UTx-IVF). Before and after this event, ethical aspects of UTx-IVF have been discussed in the medical and bioethical debate as well as, with varying intensity, in Swedish media and political fora. This article examines what comes to be identified as important ethical problems and solu-tions in the media debate of UTx-IVF in Sweden, showing specifically how problems, target groups, goals, benefits, risks and stakes are delineated and positioned. It also demonstrates how specific assumptions, norms and values are expressed and used to underpin specific positions within this debate, and how certain subjects, desires and risks become shrouded or simply omitted from it. This approach—which we label the Ethics of the Societal Entrenchment-approach, inspired by Koch and Stemerding (1994)—allows us to discuss how the identification of something as the problem helps to shape what gets to be described as a solution, and how specific solutions provide frameworks within which problems can be stated and emphasised. We also offer a critical discussion of whether some of these articulations and formations should be seen as ethically troubling, and if so, why.

  • 8.
    Gustafsson Stolt, Ulrica
    et al.
    Linköpings universitet, Institutionen för molekylär och klinisk medicin, Pediatrik. Linköpings universitet, Hälsouniversitetet.
    Ludvigsson, Johnny
    Linköpings universitet, Institutionen för molekylär och klinisk medicin, Pediatrik. Linköpings universitet, Hälsouniversitetet.
    Liss, Per Erik
    Linköpings universitet, Institutionen för hälsa och samhälle. Linköpings universitet, Hälsouniversitetet.
    Svensson, Tommy
    Linköpings universitet, Institutionen för beteendevetenskap. Linköpings universitet, Hälsouniversitetet.
    Bioethical theory and practice in genetic screening for type 1 diabetes2003Ingår i: Medicine, Health care and Philosophy, ISSN 1386-7423, E-ISSN 1572-8633, Vol. 6, nr 1, s. 45-50Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    Due to the potential ethical and psychological implications of screening, and especially inregard of screening on children without available and acceptable therapeutic measures, there is a common view that such procedures are not advisable. As part of an independent research- and bioethical case study, our aim was therefore to explore and describe bioethical issues among a representative sample of participant families (n = 17,055 children) in the ABIS (All Babies In South-east Sweden) research screening for Type 1 diabetes (IDDM).The primary aim is the identification of risk factors important for the development of diabetes and other multifactorial immune-mediated diseases. Four hundred, randomly chosen, participant mothers were asked to complete a questionnaire exploring issues of information, informed consent, bio-material, confidentiality and autonomy, and of prevention/intervention. 293 completed the questionnaire, resulting in a response rate of 73.3%. The majority of questions had the form of 6-point Likert-type response scales (1–6).We found that the majority of respondents felt calm in regard of samples and written material, and also concerning the possibility of their child in the future being identified as having high risk of developing Type 1 diabetes. An important finding concerning access and control of mainly biological data was indicated, with the respondents expressing concern for potential future use. We believe our findings indicate that this kind of empirical studies can substantially contribute to our understanding of bioethical issues of medical research involving genetics. Issues, such as safeguards ensuring theethical criteria of autonomy and respect, were emphasised by our respondents. We believe theissues brought up may promote further discussion, and do suggest issues for consideration by, among others, researchers, bioethicists and Institutional Review Boards.

  • 9.
    Gustavsson, Erik
    et al.
    Linköpings universitet, Institutionen för medicin och hälsa, Avdelningen för hälso- och sjukvårdsanalys. Linköpings universitet, Medicinska fakulteten.
    Sandman, Lars
    Linköpings universitet, Institutionen för medicin och hälsa, Avdelningen för hälso- och sjukvårdsanalys. Linköpings universitet, Medicinska fakulteten. University of Boras, Sweden.
    Health-care needs and shared decision-making in priority-setting2015Ingår i: Medicine, Health care and Philosophy, ISSN 1386-7423, E-ISSN 1572-8633, Vol. 18, nr 1, s. 13-22Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    In this paper we explore the relation between health-care needs and patients desires within shared decision-making (SDM) in a context of priority setting in health care. We begin by outlining some general characteristics of the concept of health-care need as well as the notions of SDM and desire. Secondly we will discuss how to distinguish between needs and desires for health care. Thirdly we present three cases which all aim to bring out and discuss a number of queries which seem to arise due to the double focus on a patients need and what that patient desires. These queries regard the following themes: the objectivity and moral force of needs, the prediction about what kind of patients which will appear on a micro level, implications for ranking in priority setting, difficulties regarding assessing and comparing benefits, and implications for evidence-based medicine.

  • 10.
    Jaarsma, Pier
    et al.
    Linköpings universitet, Institutionen för medicin och hälsa, Hälsa och samhälle. Linköpings universitet, Filosofiska fakulteten.
    Gelhaus, Petra
    Linköpings universitet, Institutionen för medicin och hälsa, Hälsa och samhälle. Linköpings universitet, Hälsouniversitetet. Östergötlands Läns Landsting, Närsjukvården i västra Östergötland, Psykiatri- och habiliteringsenheten.
    Welin, Stellan
    Linköpings universitet, Institutionen för medicin och hälsa, Hälsa och samhälle. Linköpings universitet, Filosofiska fakulteten.
    Living the Categorical Imperative: autistic perspectives on lying and truth telling-between Kant and care ethics2012Ingår i: Medicine, Health care and Philosophy, ISSN 1386-7423, E-ISSN 1572-8633, Vol. 15, nr 3, s. 271-277Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    Lying is a common phenomenon amongst human beings. It seems to play a role in making social interactions run more smoothly. Too much honesty can be regarded as impolite or downright rude. Remarkably, lying is not a common phenomenon amongst normally intelligent human beings who are on the autism spectrum. They appear to be 'attractively morally innocent' and seem to have an above average moral conscientious objection against deception. In this paper, the behavior of persons with autism with regard to deception and truthfulness will be discussed in the light of two different ethical theories, illustrated by fragments from autobiographies of persons with autism. A systemizing 'Kantian' and an empathizing 'ethics of care' perspective reveal insights on high-functioning autism, truthfulness and moral behavior. Both perspectives are problematic from the point of view of a moral agent with autism. High-functioning persons with autism are, generally speaking, strong systemizes and weak empathizers. Particularly, they lack 'cognitive empathy' which would allow them to understand the position of the other person. Instead, some tend to invent a set of rules that makes their behavior compatible with the expectations of others. From a Kantian point of view, the autistic tendency to always tell the truth appears praiseworthy and should not be changed, though it creates problems in the social life of persons with autism. From a care ethics perspective, on the other hand, a way should be found to allow the high-functioning persons with autism to respect the feelings and needs of other persons as sometimes overruling the duty of truthfulness. We suggest this may even entail 'morally educating' children and adolescents with autism to become socially skilled empathic 'liars'.

  • 11.
    Jaarsma, Pier
    et al.
    Linköpings universitet, Institutionen för medicin och hälsa, Hälsa och samhälle. Linköpings universitet, Hälsouniversitetet.
    Welin, Stellan
    Linköpings universitet, Institutionen för medicin och hälsa, Hälsa och samhälle. Linköpings universitet, Hälsouniversitetet.
    Human capabilities, mild autism, deafness and the morality of embryo selection2013Ingår i: Medicine, Health care and Philosophy, ISSN 1386-7423, E-ISSN 1572-8633, Vol. 16, nr 4, s. 817-824Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    A preimplantation genetic test to discriminate between severe and mild autism spectrum disorder might be developed in the foreseeable future. Recently, the philosophers Julian Savulescu and Guy Kahane claimed that there are strong reasons for prospective parents to make use of such a test to prevent the birth of children who are disposed to autism or Asperger’s disorder. In this paper we will criticize this claim. We will discuss the morality of selection for mild autism in embryo selection in a hypothetical in vitro fertilization (IVF) situation where preimplantation genetic diagnosis is performed and compare this with a similar selection for congenital deafness. To do this we first discuss relevant human differences. We then introduce the principle of human capabilities (PC) and compare this principle with the principle of procreative beneficence (PB) introduced by Savulescu and Kahane. We apply the two principles to selection for mild autism and selection for congenital deafness. We argue that PC allows for the selection for mild autism but rules out selection for congenital deafness. PB will not give clear answers; the ruling of PB depends to a large extent on expected social, cultural and political developments. We will argue that PC is preferable to PB. We will discuss arguments for the value of mild autism for individuals who have this condition and argue that they are able to lead a life with human dignity provided autism-friendly social circumstances are present. Neither PC nor PB yields strong reasons for prospective parents to seek to prevent the birth of children who are disposed to mild autism spectrum disorder.

  • 12.
    Johansson Agnafors, Marcus
    Linköpings universitet, Institutionen för kultur och kommunikation, Avdelningen för kulturvetenskaper, KVA. Linköpings universitet, Filosofiska fakulteten.
    The harm argument against surrogacy revisited: two versions not to forget2014Ingår i: Medicine, Health care and Philosophy, ISSN 1386-7423, E-ISSN 1572-8633, Vol. 17, nr 3, s. 357-363Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    It has been a common claim that surrogacy is morally problematic since it involves harm to the child or the surrogate-the harm argument. Due to a growing body of empirical research, the harm argument has seen a decrease in popularity, as there seems to be little evidence of harmful consequences of surrogacy. In this article, two revised versions of the harm argument are developed. It is argued that the two suggested versions of the harm argument survive the current criticism against the standard harm argument. The first version argues that the child is harmed by being separated from the gestational mother. The second version directs attention to the fact that surrogacy involves great incentives to keep the gestational mothers level of maternal-fetal attachment low, which tend to increase the risk of harm to the child. While neither of the two arguments is conclusive regarding the moral status of surrogacy, both constitute important considerations that are often ignored.

  • 13.
    Lerner, Henrik
    Linköpings universitet, Institutionen för medicin och hälsa, Hälsa och samhälle.
    Rollin, B.E. Science and ethics2009Ingår i: Medicine, Health care and Philosophy, ISSN 1386-7423, E-ISSN 1572-8633, Vol. 12, nr 2, s. 226-227Artikel, recension (Övrigt vetenskapligt)
  • 14.
    Liss, Per-Erik
    et al.
    Linköpings universitet, Institutionen för hälsa och samhälle.
    Aspevall, Olle
    Karolinska institutet.
    Karlsson, Daniel
    Linköpings universitet, Tekniska högskolan. Linköpings universitet, Institutionen för medicinsk teknik, Medicinsk informatik.
    Forsum, Urban
    Linköpings universitet, Hälsouniversitetet. Linköpings universitet, Institutionen för molekylär och klinisk medicin, Klinisk mikrobiologi. Östergötlands Läns Landsting, Laboratoriemedicinskt centrum, Klinisk mikrobiologi.
    Interpreting definitions: The problem of interpreting definitions of medical concepts2004Ingår i: Medicine, Health care and Philosophy, ISSN 1386-7423, E-ISSN 1572-8633, Vol. 7, s. 137-141Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
  • 15.
    Malmqvist, Erik
    Linköpings universitet, Filosofiska fakulteten. Linköpings universitet, Institutionen för medicin och hälsa, Hälsa och samhälle.
    Analysing our qualms about "designing" future persons: Autonomy, freedom of choice, and interfering with nature2007Ingår i: Medicine, Health care and Philosophy, ISSN 1386-7423, E-ISSN 1572-8633, Vol. 10, nr 4, s. 407-416Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    Actually possible and conceivable future uses of preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) and germ-line genetic intervention in assisted reproduction seem to offer increasing possibilities of choosing the kind of persons that will be brought to existence. Many are troubled by the idea of these technologies being used for enhancement purposes. How can we make sense of this worry? Why are our thoughts about therapeutic genetic interventions and non-genetic enhancement (for instance education) not accompanied by the same intuitive uneasiness? I argue that the concepts of autonomy and freedom of choice, typically invoked to delimit the morally acceptable uses of reproductive technologies, cannot fully answer these questions. Instead, I suggest that an alternative answer might begin with reflections on the notion of interfering with nature. Drawing on Martin Heidegger's critique of modern technology and Hans Jonas's moral philosophy, I outline an argument that attempts to capture what might be particularly troubling about the idea of "designing" future persons. At the core of the argument is the suggestion that enhancing selections and modifications on embryos might be bound up with an instrumentalising, non-responsive perspective on the future persons into which they are intended to grow. © Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2007.

  • 16.
    Malmqvist, Erik
    Linköpings universitet, Institutionen för tema, Tema teknik och social förändring. Linköpings universitet, Filosofiska fakulteten.
    Cooper, M. and Waldby, C. Clinical Labour: Tissue Donors and Research Subjects in the Global Bioeconomy (Durham: Duke UP, 2014)2014Ingår i: Medicine, Health care and Philosophy, ISSN 1386-7423, E-ISSN 1572-8633, Vol. 17, nr 4, s. 651-652Artikel, recension (Övrigt vetenskapligt)
  • 17.
    Malmqvist, Erik
    Linköpings universitet, Institutionen för tema, Tema teknik och social förändring. Linköpings universitet, Filosofiska fakulteten.
    Does the ethical appropriateness of paying donors depend on what body parts they donate?2016Ingår i: Medicine, Health care and Philosophy, ISSN 1386-7423, E-ISSN 1572-8633, Vol. 19, nr 3, s. 463-473Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    The idea of paying donors in order to make more human bodily material available for therapy, assisted reproduction, and biomedical research is notoriously controversial. However, while national and international donation policies largely oppose financial incentives they do not treat all parts of the body equally: incentives are allowed in connection to the provision of some parts but not others. Taking off from this observation, I discuss whether body parts differ as regards the ethical legitimacy of incentives and, if so, why. I distinguish two approaches to this issue. On a ”principled” approach, some but not all body  parts are inherently special in a way that proscribes payment. On a ”pragmatic” approach, the appropriateness of payment in relation to a specific part must be determined through an overall assessment of e.g. the implications of payment for the health and welfare of providers, recipients, and third parties, and the quality of providers’ consent. I argue that the first approach raises deep and potentially divisive questions about the good life, whereas the second approach invokes currently unsupported empirical assumptions and requires difficult  balancing between different values and the interests of different people. This does not mean that any attempt to distinguish between body parts in regard to the appropriateness of payment necessarily fails. However, I conclude, any plausible such attempt should either articulate and defend a specific view of the good life, or gather relevant empirical evidence and apply defensible principles for weighing goods and interests.

  • 18.
    Malmqvist, Erik
    Linköpings universitet, Filosofiska fakulteten. Linköpings universitet, Institutionen för hälsa och samhälle, Tema hälsa och samhälle.
    The notion of health and the morality of genetic intervention2006Ingår i: Medicine, Health care and Philosophy, ISSN 1386-7423, E-ISSN 1572-8633, Vol. 9, nr 2, s. 181-192Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    In the present paper it is argued that genetic interventions on human embryos are in principle permissible if they promote the health of the persons that these embryos will one day become and impermissible if they compromise their health. This so called health-intervention principle is reached by, inter alia, rejecting alternative approaches to the problem of the permissibility of genetic intervention. The health-intervention principle can be interpreted in different ways depending on how the notion of health is understood. The central part of the paper is an attempt to find a concept of health which is such that it makes the health-intervention principle normatively plausible. For this purpose I examine two influential competing theories of health: Cristopher Boorse's biostatistical theory of health and Lennart Nordenfelt's welfare theory of health. I argue that the health-intervention principle is more plausible if health is understood in the latter sense, although it is not ruled out that the principle may be given an even more plausible explication in terms of some other notion of health. © Springer 2006.

  • 19.
    Malmqvist, Erik
    et al.
    Université Paris Descartes, France.
    Helgesson, Gert
    Karolinska institutet, Stockholm.
    Natunen, Kari
    University of Tampere, Finland.
    Lehtinen, Johannes
    University of Tampere, Finland.
    Lehtinen, Matti
    University of Tampere, Finland.
    The ethics of implementing human papillomavirus vaccination in developed countries2011Ingår i: Medicine, Health care and Philosophy, ISSN 1386-7423, E-ISSN 1572-8633, Vol. 14, nr 1, s. 19-27Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    Human papillomavirus (HPV) infection is the world’s most common sexually transmitted infection. It is a prerequisite for cervical cancer, the second most common cause of death in cancer among women worldwide, and is also believed to cause other anogenital and head and neck cancers. Vaccines that protect against the most common cancer-causing HPV types have recently become available, and different countries have taken different approaches to implementing vaccination. This paper examines the ethics of alternative HPV vaccination strategies. It devotes particular attention to the major arguments for and against one strategy: voluntary, publicly funded vaccination for all adolescent boys and girls. This approach seems attractive because it would protect more people against cervical cancer and other HPV-related cancers than less inclusive alternatives, without the sacrifice of autonomy that a comparably broad compulsory programme would require. Also, the herd immunity that it would likely generate would protect those who remain unvaccinated, a major advantage from a justice perspective. However, there is a possibility that a HPV vaccination programme targeting all adolescents of both sexes is not considered sufficiently cost-effective. Also, it might pose more difficulties for achieving informed consent than comparable vaccination programmes against other diseases. Ultimately, society’s choice of HPV vaccination strategy requires careful consideration not only of the values at stake but also of available and emerging scientific evidence.

  • 20.
    Murano, Maria Cristina
    Linköpings universitet, Institutionen för kultur och kommunikation. Linköpings universitet, Filosofiska fakulteten.
    Medicalising short children with growth hormone? Ethical considerations of the underlying sociocultural aspects2018Ingår i: Medicine, Health care and Philosophy, ISSN 1386-7423, E-ISSN 1572-8633, Vol. 21, nr 2, s. 243-253Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    In 2003, the Food and Drug Administration approved the use of growth hormone treatment for idiopathic short stature children, i.e. children shorter than average due to an unknown medical cause. Given the absence of any pathological conditions, this decision has been contested as a case of medicalisation. The aim of this paper is to broaden the debate over the reasons for and against the treatment, to include considerations of the sociocultural phenomenon of the medicalisation of short stature, by means of a critical understanding of the concept of medicalisation. After defining my understanding of medicalisation and describing both the treatment and the condition of idiopathic short stature, I will problematise two fundamental issues: the medical/non-medical distinction and the debate about the goals of medicine. I will analyse them, combining perspectives of bioethics, medical sociology, philosophy of medicine and medical literature, and I will suggest that there are different levels of normativity of medicalisation. Ultimately, this study shows that: (1) the definition of idiopathic short stature, focusing only on actual height measurement, does not provide enough information to assess the need for treatment or not; (2) the analysis of the goals of medicine should be broadened to include justifications for the treatment; (3) the use of growth hormone for idiopathic short stature involves strong interests from different stakeholders. While the treatment might be beneficial for some children, it is necessary to be vigilant about possible misconduct at different levels of medicalisation.

  • 21.
    Nikku, Nina
    Linköpings universitet, Filosofiska fakulteten. Linköpings universitet, Institutionen för tema, Tema Kommunikation.
    Literature notice on "The perversion of Autonomy"2004Ingår i: Medicine, Health care and Philosophy, ISSN 1386-7423, E-ISSN 1572-8633, Vol. 7, nr 2, s. 229-229Artikel i tidskrift (Övrigt vetenskapligt)
  • 22.
    Nikku, Nina
    Linköpings universitet, Filosofiska fakulteten. Linköpings universitet, Institutionen för beteendevetenskap, Avdelningen för sociologi.
    Recension av "The politics of women's health. Exploring agency and autonomy"1999Ingår i: Medicine, Health care and Philosophy, ISSN 1386-7423, E-ISSN 1572-8633, Vol. 2, nr 1, s. 65-66Artikel i tidskrift (Övrigt vetenskapligt)
  • 23.
    Nordenfelt, Lennart
    Linköpings universitet, Filosofiska fakulteten. Linköpings universitet, Institutionen för hälsa och samhälle, Tema hälsa och samhälle.
    Commentary on the notions of genetic disease and causes of illness in clinical practice2006Ingår i: Medicine, Health care and Philosophy, ISSN 1386-7423, E-ISSN 1572-8633, Vol. 9, s. 317-319Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
  • 24.
    Nordenfelt, Lennart
    Linköpings universitet, Filosofiska fakulteten. Linköpings universitet, Institutionen för medicin och hälsa, Hälsa och samhälle.
    Commentary on Wim Dekkers's and Marcel Olde Rikkert's: "What is a genetic disease? The example of Alzheimer's Disease", and Stephen Tyreman's2006Ingår i: Medicine, Health care and Philosophy, ISSN 1386-7423, E-ISSN 1572-8633, Vol. 9, nr 3, s. 317-319s. 317-319Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    [No abstract available]

  • 25.
    Nordenfelt, Lennart
    Linköpings universitet, Filosofiska fakulteten. Linköpings universitet, Institutionen för hälsa och samhälle, Tema hälsa och samhälle.
    Descriptive or normative conceptual analysis1998Ingår i: Medicine, Health care and Philosophy, ISSN 1386-7423, E-ISSN 1572-8633, Vol. 1, s. 15-16Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
  • 26.
    Nordenfelt, Lennart
    Linköpings universitet, Filosofiska fakulteten. Linköpings universitet, Institutionen för hälsa och samhälle, Tema hälsa och samhälle.
    Dignity and the Care of the Elderly2003Ingår i: Medicine, Health care and Philosophy, ISSN 1386-7423, E-ISSN 1572-8633, Vol. 6, s. 103-110Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
  • 27.
    Nordenfelt, Lennart
    Linköpings universitet, Filosofiska fakulteten. Linköpings universitet, Institutionen för hälsa och samhälle, Tema hälsa och samhälle.
    Dignity of the elderly: An introduction2003Ingår i: Medicine, Health care and Philosophy, ISSN 1386-7423, E-ISSN 1572-8633, Vol. 6, s. 99-101Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
  • 28.
    Nordenfelt, Lennart
    Linköpings universitet, Filosofiska fakulteten. Linköpings universitet, Institutionen för hälsa och samhälle, Tema hälsa och samhälle.
    Establishing a middle range position in the theory of health2007Ingår i: Medicine, Health care and Philosophy, ISSN 1386-7423, E-ISSN 1572-8633, Vol. 10, nr 1, s. 29-32Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    The relationship between individual and population health is partially built on the broad dichotomization of medicine into clinical medicine and public health. Potential drawbacks of current views include seeing both individual and population health as absolute and independent concepts. I will argue that the relationship between individual and population health is largely relative and dynamic. Their interrelated dynamism derives from a causally defined life course perspective on health determination starting from an individual’s conception through growth, development and participation in the collective till death, all seen within the context of an adaptive society. Indeed, it will become clear that neither individual nor population health is identifiable or even definable without informative contextualization within the other. For instance, a person’s health cannot be seen in isolation but must be placed in the rich contextual web such as the socioeconomic circumstances and other health determinants of where they were conceived, born, bred, and how they shaped and were shaped by their environment and communities, especially given the prevailing population health exposures over their lifetime. We cannot discuss the “what” and “how much” of individual and population health until we know the cumulative trajectories of both, using appropriate causal language.

  • 29.
    Nordenfelt, Lennart
    Linköpings universitet, Filosofiska fakulteten. Linköpings universitet, Institutionen för hälsa och samhälle, Tema hälsa och samhälle.
    On Holism and Normality2004Ingår i: Medicine, Health care and Philosophy, ISSN 1386-7423, E-ISSN 1572-8633, Vol. 7, s. 149-152Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
  • 30.
    Nordenfelt, Lennart
    Linköpings universitet, Filosofiska fakulteten. Linköpings universitet, Institutionen för hälsa och samhälle, Tema hälsa och samhälle.
    On Medicine and Health Enhancement1998Ingår i: Medicine, Health care and Philosophy, ISSN 1386-7423, E-ISSN 1572-8633, Vol. 1Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
  • 31.
    Nordenfelt, Lennart
    Linköpings universitet, Filosofiska fakulteten. Linköpings universitet, Institutionen för hälsa och samhälle, Tema hälsa och samhälle.
    On Setting Priorities in the Health Area1998Ingår i: Medicine, Health care and Philosophy, ISSN 1386-7423, E-ISSN 1572-8633, Vol. 1, s. 19-Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
  • 32.
    Nordenfelt, Lennart
    Linköpings universitet, Filosofiska fakulteten. Linköpings universitet, Institutionen för hälsa och samhälle, Tema hälsa och samhälle.
    On the comparative approach to defining health2000Ingår i: Medicine, Health care and Philosophy, ISSN 1386-7423, E-ISSN 1572-8633, Vol. 3, s. 309-312Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
  • 33.
    Nordenfelt, Lennart
    Linköpings universitet, Filosofiska fakulteten. Linköpings universitet, Institutionen för hälsa och samhälle, Tema hälsa och samhälle.
    Review of Caplan, MacCartney and Sisti (eds.) Health, Disease and Illness: Concept in Medicine2005Ingår i: Medicine, Health care and Philosophy, ISSN 1386-7423, E-ISSN 1572-8633, Vol. 8, s. 125-125Artikel i tidskrift (Övrigt vetenskapligt)
  • 34.
    Nordenfelt, Lennart
    Linköpings universitet, Filosofiska fakulteten. Linköpings universitet, Institutionen för hälsa och samhälle, Tema hälsa och samhälle.
    The concepts of health and illness revisited2007Ingår i: Medicine, Health care and Philosophy, ISSN 1386-7423, E-ISSN 1572-8633, Vol. 10, nr 1Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    Contemporary philosophy of health has been quite focused on the problem of determining the nature of the concepts of health, illness and disease from a scientific point of view. Some theorists claim and argue that these concepts are value-free and descriptive in the same sense as the concepts of atom, metal and rain are value-free and descriptive. To say that a person has a certain disease or that he or she is unhealthy is thus to objectively describe this person. On the other hand it certainly does not preclude an additional evaluation of the state of affairs as undesirable or bad. The basic scientific description and the evaluation are, however, two independent matters, according to this kind of theory. Other philosophers claim that the concept of health, together with the other medical concepts, is essentially value-laden. To establish that a person is healthy does not just entail some objective inspection and measurement. It presupposes also an evaluation of the general state of the person. A statement that he or she is healthy does not merely imply certain scientific facts regarding the person's body or mind but implies also a (positive) evaluation of the person's bodily and mental state. My task in this paper will be, first, to present the two principal rival types of theories and present what I take to be the main kind of reasoning by which we could assess these theories, and second, to present a deeper characterization of the principal rival theories of health and illness. © Springer Science+Business Media, Inc. 2006.

  • 35.
    Nordenfelt, Lennart
    Linköpings universitet, Filosofiska fakulteten. Linköpings universitet, Institutionen för hälsa och samhälle, Tema hälsa och samhälle.
    Towards a New Paradigm for Health Promotion2000Ingår i: Medicine, Health care and Philosophy, ISSN 1386-7423, E-ISSN 1572-8633, Vol. 3, s. 317-319Artikel i tidskrift (Övrigt vetenskapligt)
  • 36.
    Nordgren, Anders
    Linköpings universitet, Institutionen för kultur och kommunikation, Centrum för tillämpad etik. Linköpings universitet, Institutionen för kultur och kommunikation, Avdelningen för kulturvetenskaper, KVA. Linköpings universitet, Filosofiska fakulteten.
    Genes, body clocks and prevention of sleep problems2016Ingår i: Medicine, Health care and Philosophy, ISSN 1386-7423, E-ISSN 1572-8633, Vol. 19, nr 4, s. 569-579Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    Chronobiologists argue that their scientific findings have implications for prevention of sleep problems. They claim that some sleep problems are caused by the fact that people live against their individual body clock rather than adjusted to it. They also claim that by taking the findings of chronobiology seriously in policy-making some sleep problems can be prevented. I investigate applications of chronobiology in two social areas—school schedules and shift work—and show that in order for these applications to be justified certain implicit presumptions have to be justified. The first presumption is explanatory, namely that a chronobiological explanation is an adequate explanation of the sleep problems at hand. In addition I analyse three ethical presumptions. The first ethical presumption is that sleep is of vital value. The second is that sleep is not an exclusively private issue. The third ethical presumption is that the preventive measures to be undertaken are ethically acceptable. My main point is that it is not possible to simply “read off” policy measures from the empirical findings of chronobiology.

  • 37.
    Nordgren, Anders
    Linköpings universitet, Institutionen för kultur och kommunikation, Avdelningen för kultur och estetik. Linköpings universitet, Filosofiska fakulteten. Linköpings universitet, Institutionen för kultur och kommunikation, Centrum för tillämpad etik.
    How to respond to resistiveness towards assistive technologies among persons with dementia2018Ingår i: Medicine, Health care and Philosophy, ISSN 1386-7423, E-ISSN 1572-8633, Vol. 21, nr 3, s. 411-421Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    It is a common experience among care professionals that persons with dementia often say ‘no’ to conventional caring measures such as taking medication, eating or having a shower. This tendency to say ‘no’ may also concern the use of assistive technologies such as fall detectors, mobile safety alarms, Internet for social contact and robots. This paper provides practical recommendations for care professionals in home health care and social care about how to respond to such resistiveness towards assistive technologies. Apart from the option of accepting the ‘no’, it discusses a number of methods for influencing persons with dementia in order to overcome the ‘no’. These methods range from various non-coercive measures—including nudging—to coercion. It is argued that while conventional caring measures like those mentioned are essential for survival, health or hygiene, assistive technologies are commonly merely potentially beneficial supplements. With this in mind, it is concluded that care professionals should be more restrictive in using methods of influence involving some degree of pressure regarding assistive technologies than regarding conventional caring measures.

  • 38.
    Nordin, Ingemar
    Linköpings universitet, Filosofiska fakulteten. Linköpings universitet, Institutionen för medicin och hälsa, Hälsa och samhälle.
    Complex causation and the virtue of pluralism2006Ingår i: Medicine, Health care and Philosophy, ISSN 1386-7423, E-ISSN 1572-8633, Vol. 9, nr 3, s. 321-323Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    [No abstract available]

  • 39.
    Nordin, Ingemar
    Linköpings universitet, Filosofiska fakulteten. Linköpings universitet, Institutionen för hälsa och samhälle, Tema hälsa och samhälle.
    Expert and Non-Expert Knowledge in Medical Practise2000Ingår i: Medicine, Health care and Philosophy, ISSN 1386-7423, E-ISSN 1572-8633, Vol. 3, nr 3, s. 295-302Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
  • 40.
    Svenaeus, Fredrik
    Linköpings universitet, Filosofiska fakulteten. Linköpings universitet, Institutionen för hälsa och samhälle, Tema hälsa och samhälle.
    Das Unheimliche: Towards a Phenomenology of Illness2000Ingår i: Medicine, Health care and Philosophy, ISSN 1386-7423, E-ISSN 1572-8633, Vol. 3, nr 1Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
  • 41.
    Svenaeus, Fredrik
    Linköpings universitet, Filosofiska fakulteten. Linköpings universitet, Institutionen för hälsa och samhälle, Tema hälsa och samhälle.
    Phenomenological Ethics: Potentials and Pitfalls2004Ingår i: Medicine, Health care and Philosophy, ISSN 1386-7423, E-ISSN 1572-8633, Vol. 7, nr 1Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
  • 42.
    Svenaeus, Fredrik
    Linköpings universitet, Filosofiska fakulteten. Linköpings universitet, Institutionen för hälsa och samhälle, Tema hälsa och samhälle.
    The Body Uncanny: Further Steps Towards a Phenomenology of Illness2000Ingår i: Medicine, Health care and Philosophy, ISSN 1386-7423, E-ISSN 1572-8633, Vol. 3, nr 2, s. 125-137Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
  • 43.
    Svenaeus, Fredrik
    Linköpings universitet, Filosofiska fakulteten. Linköpings universitet, Institutionen för hälsa och samhälle, Tema hälsa och samhälle.
    Wittgensteinian Perspectives on Bioethics2001Ingår i: Medicine, Health care and Philosophy, ISSN 1386-7423, E-ISSN 1572-8633, Vol. 4, nr 1Artikel i tidskrift (Övrigt vetenskapligt)
  • 44.
    Zeiler, Kristin
    Linköpings universitet, Institutionen för medicin och hälsa, Avdelningen för hälsa och samhälle. Linköpings universitet, Filosofiska fakulteten. Uppsala University, Sweden.
    A philosophical defense of the idea that we can hold each other in personhood: intercorporeal personhood in dementia care2014Ingår i: Medicine, Health care and Philosophy, ISSN 1386-7423, E-ISSN 1572-8633, Vol. 17, nr 1, s. 131-141Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    Since John Locke, regnant conceptions of personhood in Western philosophy have focused onindividual capabilities for complex forms of consciousness that involve cognition such as thecapability to remember past events and one’s own past actions, to think about and identify oneself asoneself, and/or to reason. Conceptions of personhood such as this one qualify as cognition-oriented,and they often fail to acknowledge the role of embodiment for personhood. This article offers analternative conception of personhood from within the tradition of phenomenology of the body. Thearticle presents a phenomenological analysis of joint musical activity in dementia care and outlines anintercorporeal conception of personhood based on this analysis. It also provides a philosophical basisfor the idea that others can hold us in personhood and it questions a strict one-body-one-person logicthat has pertained in much personhood debate.

  • 45.
    Zeiler, Kristin
    Linköpings universitet, Institutionen för medicin och hälsa, Avdelningen för hälsa och samhälle. Linköpings universitet, Filosofiska fakulteten.
    Correction: Neither property right nor heroic gift, neither sacrifice nor aporia: the benefit of the theoretical lens of sharing in donation ethics (vol 13, pg 225, 2010) in MEDICINE HEALTH CARE AND PHILOSOPHY vol 17, Issue 2, pg 3212014Ingår i: Medicine, Health care and Philosophy, ISSN 1386-7423, E-ISSN 1572-8633, Vol. 17, nr 2, s. 1s. 321-321Artikel i tidskrift (Övrigt vetenskapligt)
    Abstract [en]

    n/a

  • 46.
    Zeiler, Kristin
    Linköpings universitet, Institutionen för medicin och hälsa, Hälsa och samhälle. Linköpings universitet, Filosofiska fakulteten.
    Just love in live organ donation2009Ingår i: Medicine, Health care and Philosophy, ISSN 1386-7423, E-ISSN 1572-8633, Vol. 12, nr 3, s. 323-331Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    Emotionally-related live organ donation is different from almost all other medical treatments in that a family member or, in some countries, a friend contributes with an organ or parts of an organ to the recipient. Furthermore, there is a long-acknowledged but not well-understood gender-imbalance in emotionally-related live kidney donation. This article argues for the benefit of the concept of just love as an analytic tool in the analysis of emotionally-related live organ donation where the potential donor(s) and the recipient are engaged in a love relation. The concept of just love is helpful in the analysis of these live organ donations even if no statistical gender-imbalance prevails. It is particularly helpful, however, in the analysis of the gender-imbalance in live kidney donations if these donations are seen as a specific kind of care-work, if care-work is experienced as a labour one should perform out of love and if women still experience stronger pressures to engage in care-work than do men. The aim of the article is to present arguments for the need of just love as an analytic tool in the analysis of emotionally-related live organ donation where the potential donor(s) and the recipient are engaged in a love relation. The aim is also to elaborate two criteria that need to be met in order for love to qualify as just and to highlight certain clinical implications.

  • 47.
    Zeiler, Kristin
    Linköpings universitet, Institutionen för medicin och hälsa, Avdelningen för hälsa och samhälle. Linköpings universitet, Filosofiska fakulteten.
    Neither property right nor heroic gift, neither sacrifice nor aporia: the benefit of the theoretical lens of sharing in donation ethics2014Ingår i: Medicine, Health care and Philosophy, ISSN 1386-7423, E-ISSN 1572-8633, Vol. 17, nr 2, s. 171-181Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    Two ethical frameworks have dominated the discussion of organ donation for long: that of property rights and that of gift-giving. However, recent years have seen a drastic rise in the number of philosophical analyses of the meaning of giving and generosity, which has been mirrored in ethical debates on organ donation and in critical sociological, anthropological and ethnological work on the gift metaphor in this context. In order to capture the flourishing of this field, this article distinguishes between four frameworks for thinking about bodily exchanges in medicine: those of property rights, heroic gift-giving, sacrifice, and gift-giving as aporia. These frameworks represent four different ways of making sense of donation of organs as well as tissue, gametes and blood, draw on different conceptions of the relations between the self and the other, and bring out different ethical issues as core ones. The article presents these frameworks, argues that all of them run into difficulties when trying to make sense of reciprocity and relational interdependence in donation, and shows how the three gift-giving frameworks (of heroism, sacrifice and aporia) hang together in a critical discussion about what is at stake in organ donation. It also presents and argues in favour of an alternative intercorporeal framework of giving-through-sharing that more thoroughly explicates the gift metaphor in the context of donation, and offers tools for making sense of relational dimensions of live and post mortem donations.

  • 48.
    Zeiler, Kristin
    Linköpings universitet, Filosofiska fakulteten. Linköpings universitet, Institutionen för hälsa och samhälle, Tema hälsa och samhälle.
    Reproductive Autonomous Choice - A Cherished Illusion?2004Ingår i: Medicine, Health care and Philosophy, ISSN 1386-7423, E-ISSN 1572-8633, Vol. 7, nr 2Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
  • 49.
    Zeiler, Kristin
    Linköpings universitet, Institutionen för medicin och hälsa, Hälsa och samhälle. Linköpings universitet, Filosofiska fakulteten.
    Reproductive autonomous choice--a cherished illusion? Reproductive autonomy examined in the context of preimplantation genetic diagnosis.2004Ingår i: Medicine, Health care and Philosophy, ISSN 1386-7423, E-ISSN 1572-8633, Vol. 7, nr 2, s. 175-183Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    Enhancement of autonomous choice may be considered as an important reason for facilitating the use of genetic tests such as preimplantation genetic diagnosis. The principle of respect for autonomy is a crucial component not only of Western liberal traditions but also of Western bioethics. This is especially so in bioethical discussions and analyses of clinical encounters within medicine. On the basis of an analysis of qualitative research interviews performed with British, Italian and Swedish geneticists and gynaecologists on ethical aspects of preimplantation genetic diagnosis, the plausibility of the notion of autonomy within reproductive medicine is discussed. The analysis of interviews indicates not only that there is a gap between theoretical discussions and concrete practice, but also that an increase in choice--paradoxically--can hamper couples' choice.

  • 50.
    Zeiler, Kristin
    Linköpings universitet, Institutionen för medicin och hälsa, Hälsa och samhälle. Linköpings universitet, Filosofiska fakulteten.
    Shared decision-making, gender and new technologies.2007Ingår i: Medicine, Health care and Philosophy, ISSN 1386-7423, E-ISSN 1572-8633, Vol. 10, nr 3, s. 279-287Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    Much discussion of decision-making processes in medicine has been patient-centred. It has been assumed that there is, most often, one patient. Less attention has been given to shared decision-making processes where two or more patients are involved. This article aims to contribute to this special area. What conditions need to be met if decision-making can be said to be shared? What is a shared decision-making process and what is a shared autonomous decision-making process? Why make the distinction? Examples are drawn from the area of new reproductive medicine and clinical genetics. Possible gender-differences in shared decision-making are discussed.

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