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  • 151.
    Björnsson, Gunnar
    Linköpings universitet, Institutionen för kultur och kommunikation, Avdelningen för kulturvetenskaper, KVA.
    Contextualism and relativism about 'ought'2010Annet (Annet vitenskapelig)
  • 152.
    Björnsson, Gunnar
    Linköpings universitet, Institutionen för kultur och kommunikation, Avdelningen för kulturvetenskaper, KVA. Linköpings universitet, Filosofiska fakulteten.
    Contextualism, assessment-relativity and content-insensitivity2009Konferansepaper (Annet vitenskapelig)
    Abstract [en]

    Recently, a number of authors have argued that contextualist analyses of for example epistemic modals and matters of taste are inadequate and need to be recast in terms of assessment-relative truth or assessment-relative contents. The viability of such relativist proposals have been much discussed recently, but what has not been noted is that a minor adjustment of a standard non-relativist background assumption yields the same predictions of linguistic intuitions and behaviour as does the intrusive revisions called for by relativism. The evidence adduced to support assessment-relative accounts consists mostly in cases where the following seems to be true: EVIDENCE: The correctness of an utterance (or belief) is appropriately assessed without sensitivity to the truth-conditions assigned to that utterance by contextualist accounts. Such cases might seem to suggest that the content of the utterance, or the proposition it expresses, has assessment-relative truth-conditions, or that the utterance has its contents relative to contexts of assessment. From the non-relativist perspective, however, such cases can simply be understood as cases of appropriate content-insensitive assessments; the assessor is simply assessing a content other than (but related to) that expressed by the original speaker or accepted as true by the original believer. Instead of relativizing contents or truth-conditions to contexts of assessment, this perspective gives a contextualist account of the content of acts of assessment, where the content of utterances like "no", "yes" or of the form "[what he said/that] is [true/right/wrong]" depend on their context in ways corresponding exactly to the assessor-relativity proposed by critics of contextualist analyses. In my talk, which is based on joint work with Alexander Almér, I compare this contextualist interpretation with relativist alternatives and argue that it provides a theoretically preferable accommodation of various examples of EVIDENCE.

  • 153.
    Björnsson, Gunnar
    Linköpings universitet, Filosofiska fakulteten. Linköpings universitet, Institutionen för kultur och kommunikation.
    Contextualism for Conditional2008Inngår i: Utterance Interpretation and Cognitve Models,2008, 2008Konferansepaper (Fagfellevurdert)
    Abstract [en]

    Contextualism for Conditionals Consider the following sentences: (1) If Sarah has the measles, she will have a fever. (2) If Sarah has a fever, then she has the measles. (3) If Julia asks nicely, Bill still won-t help us. Intuitively, (1) would be used to communicate that the present case is of the kind in which having fever follows causally from having measles, (2) would be used to communicate that the case is one in which having the measles follows evidentially from having a fever, and (3) would probably be used to communicate that the case in question isn-t the kind in which asking nicely elicits helpful action. My question is through what processed these intuitive messages concerning causal and evidential relations are encoded and decoded given the conventional contribution of the -if P, Q- form. Standard philosophical theories of indicative conditionals - the material implication theory, the conditional probability theory, and versions of the possible world theory - take these intuitive messages to be pragmatically inferred from the utterance of a sentence the conventional meaning of which gives it more abstract truth- or acceptability conditions. Elsewhere, I have defended an alternative model: relational contextualism. It agrees that the intuitive messages are determined pragmatically, but denies that we identify the intuitive messages by first identifying more abstract truth- or acceptability conditions. Instead, the conventional contribution of if-clauses to the meaning of conditionals is that if-clauses introduce a proposition without asserting it so that the main clause can be understood in relation to it. When we decode the conditional form, our primary task is to identify the relevant relation between the content of the if-clause and the main clause. In the case of conditionals like (1), (2) and (3), that relation will typically be one of causal or evidential consequence or independence. There are several reasons to think that something like relational contextualism is correct. It gives a unified account of a wide variety of conditionals: apart from consequence conditionals like (1) and (2) and independence conditionals like (3), it covers relevance conditionals (-If anyone cares to ask, I do have views on celebrity couples-) as well as conditionals expressing conditional commands, questions and bets (-If it is snowing hard, stay with your car-). It explains both why conditionals embed systematically and why some embedding constructions nevertheless seem unintelligible. And it promises a unified account of indicative and subjunctive conditionals, as well as a straightforward explanation of the well-known context-relativity of the latter. My concern in this talk is to clarify how relational contextualism explains a phenomenon that appears to undermine standard theories of conditionals. Standard theories all take it that when the consequent is highly probable independently of the antecedent, we have good reasons to accept what the conditional says. But not all such conditionals seem acceptable. I am reasonably confident that both clauses of the following conditional are true, but I find the conditionals nonsensical rather than acceptable: (4) If Berne is the capital of Switzerland, John Lennon was killed in 1980. I am also reasonable confident that it will rain tomorrow, independently of what I do, but my first intuitive verdict about the following is false: (5) If I go to the movies tonight, it will rain tomorrow. Verdicts like these are very common, especially among people without background in logic and the theory of conditionals, and relational contextualism explains them easily: (4) comes off as unintelligible because no relation between antecedent and consequent has been identified; (5) comes off as false because it has been taking to convey a relation of causal consequence between

  • 154.
    Björnsson, Gunnar
    Linköpings universitet, Institutionen för kultur och kommunikation, Avdelningen för kulturvetenskaper, KVA.
    Contextualism for Conditionals2010Annet (Annet vitenskapelig)
  • 155.
    Björnsson, Gunnar
    Linköpings universitet, Institutionen för kultur och kommunikation, Avdelningen för kulturvetenskaper, KVA.
    Contextualism for Indicative Conditionals2009Konferansepaper (Fagfellevurdert)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper argues that the conventional contribution of the If P, Q form to communicated contents is radically dependent on pragmatic factors that vary with context of utterance and contents of if-clause and main clause. That pragmatics play a considerable role in the understanding of conditionals is familiar, and although some accounts of conditionals exclude non-conditional conditionals, such as (1) There are biscuits on the table if you want some. and conditional bets or requests, others want to include those (Stephen Barker 1995, DeRose and Grandy 1999, David Barnett 2006, Smith and Smith 1988, Noh 1996), and all standard accounts are meant to cover all paradigmatic “conditional” conditionals, such as (2) If Sarah has the measles, she will be having a fever. (3) If you are really hungry, Bill still won’t share his food. Standard accounts can be represented by materialism, expressivism and credalism. According to materialism, indicative conditionals express material implications: asserting a conditional like (2) “if Sarah has the measles, she will be having a fever” is asserting that it isn’t both the case that Sarah has the measles and that she doesn’t have a fever. According to expressivism, conditionals lack truth-conditions, but asserting (2) is expressing a high subjective probability for Sarah’s having a fever conditional on her having the measles. (Adams 1975; Bennett 2003; Edgington 1995) And according credalism, asserting (2) is asserting that Sarah has a fever in all relevant possible worlds in which she has the measles and which matches the present world with respect to what we believe or know. (Nolan 2003; Stalnaker 1981; Weatherson 2001) Two things are notable about these accounts: (A) They all take the conventional contribution of conditionals to determine a truth- or assertability condition in a context according to some conventional rule. (Although assumptions about the relation between the semantics of conditionals and the process of interpretation are seldom detailed, I will assume that these theories take normal utterance interpretation to proceed by taking this content as input, to be modified by pragmatic processes.) (B) They take this content to be mute on whether the consequent would follow from or holds independently of the antecedent. When we sense that (2), unlike (3), communicates that the consequent would follow from the antecedent, we have added to the literal content of the conditional. If the argument of this paper is correct, neither (A) nor (B) is sustainable. What the arguments suggest, instead, is that the conventional contribution of the If P, Q form is restricted to the following: Non-assertoric Introduction: If-clauses introduce a proposition without presenting it as true it so that the main clause can be understood in relation to it. According to this hypothesis – relational contextualism – the content of conditionals could be represented as follows at the most abstract level: (4) If P, Q / Q if P =df R(P, Q) R would be supplied by context, and could take such values as (a) THE POSSIBILITY … MAKES THE ASSERTION OF … RELEVANT (b) UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES LIKE THE PRESENT, THE POSSIBILITY … HAS … AS A CONSEQUENCE where (a) would provide the relevant relation for normal interpretations of (1) and (b) the relation for (2), to provide two examples. (Notice that only parts of the content would be understood as asserted content: it is not asserted that the antecedent represents a possibility rather than the truth, and utterances of conditionals of form (a) typically assert their consequents.) In the paper, I pose three kinds of problem for standard accounts, and offer relational contextualism as the solution to these problems. The first problem is that neither of these accounts make good sense of how we learn to use sentences of the If P, Q form. A child who is learning to use and interpret conditionals will have to grasp non-assertoric introduction before understanding that conditionals convey the relation of material implication or any other relation postulated as the literal content by standard theories of conditionals. Furthermore, there are reasons to think that the relations that standard accounts take to provide the literal meaning of conditionals are too abstract to be grasped to be associated with the conditional form. Grasping these contents could only be the result of fairly sophisticated abstraction. For learners who have not reached that level of sophistication, interpretation would have to proceed along the very lines suggested by relational contextualism. The second problem is that even if such abstraction could take place, a child who has grasped non-assertoric introduction has nothing to gain but something to loose in interpretive effectiveness by assuming that the conditional form itself conveys any of these other relations. The third problem for standard accounts is that they fail to provide adequate explanations of why some conditionals that would be literally true or acceptable are normally perceived to be false or meaningless. For example, in the case of both of the following conditionals, I am right now fairly confident that the consequent is true, independently of the antecedent: (5) If I go to the movies tonight, it will rain tomorrow. (6) If Berne is the capital of Switzerland, John Lennon was killed in 1980. Their literal contents are obviously acceptable on both materialism, expressivism and credalism. Nevertheless, (5) seems false to me – tomorrow’s weather is independent of my cinematic activities – and (6) seems nonsensical. Studies of students of different backgrounds at different universities show that such verdicts are very common (even among people with some familiarity with logic). Proponents of standard accounts hope to explain such reactions with reference to conversational pragmatics, but it is unclear what principles would support these explanations. As I make clear, standard explanations in terms of Gricean maxims or relevance theoretic constraints seem to yield the wrong results. By contrast, relational contextualism can explain typical reaction to both (5) and (6) and standard epistemic constraints on indicative conditionals.

  • 156.
    Björnsson, Gunnar
    Linköpings universitet, Institutionen för kultur och kommunikation, Avdelningen för kulturvetenskaper, KVA.
    Contextualism, Relativism And The Pragmatics Of Insensitive Assessments2010Annet (Annet vitenskapelig)
    Abstract [en]

    Argues that the phenomenon highlighted by defenders of so-called Asessor Relativism is but one example of a wider sort of phenomena and is best accounted for by a pragmatic account of semantic assessments.

  • 157.
    Björnsson, Gunnar
    Linköpings universitet, Institutionen för kultur och kommunikation, Avdelningen för kulturvetenskaper, KVA. Linköpings universitet, Filosofiska fakulteten.
    Illusions of Undermined Responsibility2011Inngår i: Morality and the Cognitive Sciences, Book of abstracts, Riga, Latvia: Center for the Cognitive Sciences and Semantics, University of Latvia , 2011Konferansepaper (Fagfellevurdert)
    Abstract [en]

    Many of us find attributions of moral responsibility undermined when we reflect on skeptical philosophical arguments. Defenders of moral responsibility try to explain away such reactions and undermine premises of these arguments, but the worries seem uncomfortably independent of any one particular argument or dubious premise. By contrast, skeptics seem to have a straightforward explanation of why people seem responsible though in fact they are not: we have paid insufficient attention to features highlighted by the skeptical arguments.

    In this paper, I argue that the shoe is on the other foot. Judging by recent work on the psychology of responsibility judgments, skeptical intuitions are best seen as side-effects of cognitive systems designed to (i) track explanatory relations between aspects of agents’ motivation and the objects of responsibility and (ii) guide practices of holding agents responsible for those events. I begin by reviewing the relevant psychological model of responsibility judgments and its support and indicating how it explains the appeal of various skeptical arguments. I then argue that if these explanations are correct, intuitions of undermined responsibility triggered by such arguments are akin to visual illusions, preventing us from seeing a relation that is really there.

     

  • 158.
    Björnsson, Gunnar
    Linköpings universitet, Institutionen för kultur och kommunikation, Avdelningen för kulturvetenskaper, KVA.
    In Defence of Contextual Theories of Indicative Conditionals2010Annet (Annet vitenskapelig)
  • 159.
    Björnsson, Gunnar
    Linköpings universitet, Institutionen för kultur och kommunikation, Avdelningen för kulturvetenskaper, KVA.
    Manipulation arguments and the explanatory nature of moral responsibility2010Inngår i: Moral Responsibility: Analytic Approaches, Substantive Accounts and Case Studies, 18-19 October, Ghent, Belgium, Program/Book of abstracts, 2010Konferansepaper (Fagfellevurdert)
    Abstract [en]

    Manipulation arguments and the explanatory nature of moral responsibility Manipulation arguments against moral responsibility (or against compatibilism about moral responsibility) rely on the following assumption: (M) Manipulation reduces responsibility because of features shared with causation (or with deterministic causation). Consequently, they would be undermined if the reduction were due specifically to the agent’s being manipulated—intentionally caused to act in ways not relying on the agent’s rational cooperation. To strengthen (M), Pereboom has argued that responsibility is equally reduced by versions of his manipulation cases where analogous natural events are substituted for manipulators. Significantly, however, these versions seem less intuitively compelling, suggesting that (M) is mistaken. In this talk, I suggest that manipulation arguments seem uniquely compelling because manipulation provides particularly straightforward cases of actions caused by conditions outside the agent’s control. Moreover, equally straightforward non-manipulative cases are possible: manipulation arguments are merely a species of arguments from straightforward causation by external factors. Such arguments rely on the following assumption: (S) Straightforward causation by external factors reduces responsibility because of features shared with causation (or with deterministic causation). (S) might seem more plausible than (M): although the intentional and social nature of manipulation might be especially responsibility undermining, whether causation is straightforward in the relevant sense depends on explanatory interests and perspectives, and it might seem that moral responsibility must rest on a more secure basis than that. Before closing, however, I provide evidence that our everyday notion of moral responsibility is essentially guided by certain explanatory interests, suggesting a way for defenders of moral responsibility to reject (S).

  • 160.
    Björnsson, Gunnar
    Linköpings universitet, Institutionen för kultur och kommunikation, Avdelningen för kulturvetenskaper, KVA.
    Metaethical Contextualism Defended2010Annet (Annet vitenskapelig)
  • 161.
    Björnsson, Gunnar
    Linköpings universitet, Institutionen för kultur och kommunikation, Avdelningen för kulturvetenskaper, KVA. Linköpings universitet, Filosofiska fakulteten.
    Neurophysiology and the Illusion of Undermined Responsibility2011Inngår i: Ethical and moral aspects of naturalising the mind, Siena, Italy, June 2011: Abstracts, http://www.unisi.it/eventi/naturalisation_mind/abstracts.pdf, 2011Konferansepaper (Annet vitenskapelig)
    Abstract [en]

    Many of us find attributions of moral responsibility undermined when we reflect on skeptical philosophical arguments. Defenders of moral responsibility try to explain away such reactions and undermine premises of these arguments, but the worries seem uncomfortably independent of any one particular argument or dubious premise. By contrast, skeptics seem to have a straightforward explanation of why people seem responsible though in fact they are not: we have paid insufficient attention to features highlighted by the skeptical arguments.

    In this paper, I argue that the shoe is on the other foot. Judging by recent work on the psychology of responsibility judgments, skeptical intuitions are best seen as side-effects of cognitive systems designed to (i) track explanatory relations between aspects of agents’ motivation and the objects of responsibility and (ii) guide practices of holding agents responsible for those events. I begin by reviewing the relevant psychological model of responsibility judgments and its support and indicating how it explains the appeal of various skeptical arguments. I then argue that if these explanations are correct, intuitions of undermined responsibility triggered by such arguments are akin to visual illusions, preventing us from seeing a relation that is really there.

  • 162.
    Björnsson, Gunnar
    Linköpings universitet, Institutionen för kultur och kommunikation, Avdelningen för kulturvetenskaper, KVA.
    ’Objectivist’ traits of moral phenomenology and moral discourse don’t support moral objectivism2008Annet (Annet vitenskapelig)
  • 163.
    Björnsson, Gunnar
    Linköpings universitet, Institutionen för kultur och kommunikation, Avdelningen för kulturvetenskaper, KVA. Linköpings universitet, Filosofiska fakulteten.
    Projektorienterad uppsatshandledning2009Inngår i: Ett år med Bologna - vad har hänt vid LiU?: En rapport från CUL-dagen 11 december 2008, Linköping: LiU-Tryck , 2009, s. 105-115Kapittel i bok, del av antologi (Annet (populærvitenskap, debatt, mm))
  • 164.
    Björnsson, Gunnar
    Linköpings universitet, Filosofiska fakulteten. Linköpings universitet, Institutionen för kultur och kommunikation.
    Projektorienterad uppsatshandledning2008Inngår i: CUL-dagen,2008, 2008Konferansepaper (Annet vitenskapelig)
    Abstract [en]

    Det här föredraget presenterar ett systematiskt sätt att förbättra uppsatshandledningen på kandidatnivå: projektorienterad uppsatshandledning. Metoden utarbetades i samband med Bolognaanpassningen av kursplanerna i praktisk och teoretisk filosofi vid Göteborgs universitet, och har under hösten införts på uppsatsmomentet i praktisk filosofi vid Linköpings universitet. I filosofi, liksom i flera andra humanistiska ämnen, är uppsatsmomentet på kandidatnivå en stötesten för många studenter. Många blir klara först långt efter utsatt deadline, och andra skriver aldrig sin uppsats. Ofta är både handledare och studenter frustrerade. Handledare är frustrerade över att studenten inte blir klar, inte förstått vad som kännetecknar en bra uppsats, eller inte behärskar språket; över att det krävs enormt arbete för att rätta till felen; och över att det blir väldigt lite tid för att kommentera innehållet. Studenter är frustrerade över att det är oklart vad som förväntas, över bristen på intresse för den frågeställning som engagerar dem och över bristen på kommentarer och feedback på det arbete som tagit åtminstone ett par månader att förfärdiga. Projektorienterad uppsatshandledning är ett sätt att hantera dessa och andra problem på uppsatsmomenten så tidigt som möjligt för att minska den arbetsinsats som krävs för att höja kvaliteten på uppsatserna och minska problemet med att uppsatser inte blir klara i tid. Dessutom kan bekantskap med och erfarenhet av grundläggande strategier för projektarbete läggas till läromålen för kursen, vilket ökar studenternas anställningsbarhet. Föredraget presenterar metoden och tankarna bakom, samt vilka effekter den haft under de två år som den tillämpats.       

  • 165.
    Björnsson, Gunnar
    Linköpings universitet, Filosofiska fakulteten. Linköpings universitet, Institutionen för kultur och kommunikation.
    Regaining the Importance of Metaethics2008Inngår i: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice,2008, 2008Konferansepaper (Fagfellevurdert)
    Abstract [en]

    Two of the traditional distinctions within metaethics, that between cognitivism and noncognitivism and, within cognitivism, that between objectivism and relativism, used to have clear consequences for both ethical theory and moral practice. However, developments in metaethics the last decades have made things much more complicated. The heirs of noncognitivism - expressivists - have employed truth and related notions like fact, belief, description, and mistake in a minimalist sense to say exactly the things that many cognitivists and objectivists have wanted to say: that there are moral facts and that they are moral facts independently of who is assessing them; that moral judgments are beliefs, beliefs that are true if they correspond to the facts; and that if two people disagree about a moral issue, then one of them must be mistaken. On the other side, critics of expressivism and noncognitivism have argued that because expressivists acknowledge speaker-relativist norms of sincere assertion, it collapses into a form of speaker relativism. With these developments, metaethics has not lost only its original straightforward distinctions, but also a clear view of its relevance: although very interesting from the point of view of moral psychology, the modern debate has tended to obscure the ethical and existential importance of metaethics. In this paper, I suggest a way in which the traditional distinctions can be salvaged even if we grant expressivists their minimalist uses of truth and its ilk. First, I develop a notion of substantial, non-projective criteria of correctness for moral judgments, a notion defined without relying on any of the core concepts that have been -minimized- or deflated by expressivists. The central notion is that of a judgment-internal intention of correctness, the intention to get things right when we make moral judgments. If these intentions are the same independently of whom the moral judge is, and if they have non-relativistic contents, some kind of objectivism is correct. If judgment-internal intentions of correctness vary from judge to judge, then either some form of relativism, or some form of noncognitivism is correct. One consequence of this way of drawing the distinction is that moral judgments have cognitive content on reasonable forms of both relativism and noncognitivism: they are formed with somewhat determinate judgment-internal intentions of correctness. To distinguish between these two views, I introduce the notion of intended communicative content. Given relativist cognitivism, the cognitive content of the judgment is part of the normal intended communicative content; on noncognitivist forms, it is not. Before closing, I argue that this way of redrawing the original distinctions preserves what was interesting about them. What used to be prima facie evidence for or against the old positions continues to be prima facie evidence for or against their new counterparts. And what used to be the most prominent consequences for ethical theory and moral practice continues to be so. What has been regained is a clear view of what the important issues are in metaethics.

  • 166.
    Björnsson, Gunnar
    Linköpings universitet, Institutionen för kultur och kommunikation, Avdelningen för kulturvetenskaper, KVA. Linköpings universitet, Filosofiska fakulteten.
    The Explanation Explanation of the Side-Effect Effect2011Inngår i: Pacific APA San Diego April 2011, Experimental Philosophy Society Group Session, 2011Konferansepaper (Fagfellevurdert)
    Abstract [en]

    Beginning with Knobe (2003), numerous studies have revealed asymmetries in folk judgments about a variety of relations between agents and side-effects of their actions to which the agents are indifferent. When the CEO of a company cares solely about profit and knowingly decides to implement a project that will harm the environment, subjects tend to say that he harmed the environment intentionally, that he is blameworthy for doing so, that he was for harming the environment, that he decided to harm the environment, and that he achieved profit by harming the environment. When the same CEO instead knowingly implements a profitable project that will help the environment, subjects are unwilling to say that he helped the environment intentionally, that he is praiseworthy for doing so, that he was for helping the environment, decided to do so, or achieved profit by helping the environment (see e.g. Pettit & Knobe 2009).

    Given that the CEO was equally indifferent to and aware of the environmental effects in both cases, the asymmetry might seem puzzling. A number of accounts have been proposed, and there is reasonable agreement that the asymmetries depend on norms, or on evaluations of the different effects (see e.g. Nichols & Ulatowski 2007; Knobe 2007; Knobe & Mendlow 2004; Knobe forthcoming; Cole Wright & Bengson 2009). What is not clear, however, is what the nature of this dependence is.

    In this talk, I outline some problems with prior explanations and provide an account that handles all the relevant cases. The basic explanans is that in the harm condition, there is a straightforward and intuitively striking explanation of the effect in terms of the agent’s motivational states: the environment was harmed because the CEO didn’t care enough about the environment. Nothing similar is available in the help condition. This difference in intuitive explanatory judgments between the harm and help conditions is in turn explained by the fact that differences in normative expectations make certain factors seem explanatorily more significant than others (cf. Hitchcock & Knobe 2009). To various degrees, these differences affect judgments of intentionality and related folk-psychological judgments (concerning what was decided, what an agent was for, what was done by doing what, etc), when such judgments are seen as playing an explanatory role: for this purpose the action in question needs to be understood in terms that connect to motivational states that explain the agent’s actions. Given an assumption defended elsewhere (Björnsson & Persson forthcoming) and supported by new empirical evidence, the same is true about judgments of blame- and praiseworthiness: they depend on attributions of responsibility for the outcome, and judgments of responsibility are themselves a species of explanatory judgments.

    If this ‘explanation explanation’ is correct, we can expect similar asymmetries in the case of intended effects of actions performed under microscopic chances of success, and we can expect side-effect asymmetries triggered by non-normative considerations that affect the explanatory relevance of agents’ motivational structures. And this is indeed what we see (Nadelhoffer 2004).

    Björnsson, G.; Persson, K. Forthcoming: ‘The Explanatory Component of Moral Responsibility’. Noûs

    Cole Wright, J; Bengson, J. 2009: ‘Asymmetries in Judgments of Responsibility and Intentional Action’. Mind & Language, 24, pp. 24–50.

    Knobe, J.; Hitchcock, C. 2009: ‘Cause and Norm’. Journal of Philosophy, 106, pp. 587-612.

    Knobe, J. 2003: ‘Intentional Action and Side Effects in Ordinary Language.’ Analysis 63, pp. 190–93.

    Knobe, J. Forthcoming: ‘Person as Scientist, Person as Moralist.’ Behavioral and Brain Sciences

    Knobe, Joshua 2007: ‘Reason Explanation in Folk Psychology’. Midwest Studies In Philosophy 31, pp. 90–106.

    Knobe, J.; Mendlow, G. 2004: ‘The Good, the Bad and the Blameworthy: Understanding the Role of Evaluative Reasoning in Folk Psychology.’ Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology, 24, pp. 252–25

    Nadelhoffer, T. 2004: ‘On Praise, Side Effects, and Folk Ascriptions of Intentionality’. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology, 24, pp. 196–213.

    Nichols, Shaun; Ulatowski, Joseph 2007: ‘Intuitions and Individual Differences: The Knobe Effect Revisited’. Mind & Language, 22, pp. 346-65.

    Pettit, D.; Knobe, J. 2009: ‘The Pervasive Impact of Moral Judgment.’ Mind & Language 24:5, pp. 586-604.

  • 167.
    Björnsson, Gunnar
    Linköpings universitet, Institutionen för kultur och kommunikation, Avdelningen för kulturvetenskaper, KVA.
    The Explanatory Component of Moral Responsibility2010Annet (Annet vitenskapelig)
  • 168.
    Björnsson, Gunnar
    Linköpings universitet, Institutionen för kultur och kommunikation, Avdelningen för kulturvetenskaper, KVA.
    The Explanatory Component of Moral Responsibility2010Annet (Annet vitenskapelig)
  • 169.
    Björnsson, Gunnar
    Linköpings universitet, Institutionen för kultur och kommunikation, Avdelningen för kulturvetenskaper, KVA.
    The Illusion of Undermined Responsibility2010Konferansepaper (Fagfellevurdert)
    Abstract [en]

    Scepticism and consequentialist about moral responsibilityTwo features about our everyday practice of holding people responsible seem to tug in opposite directions. The first feature is that our attributions of moral responsibility for decisions, actions and outcomes as well as our practice of holding agents responsible are notoriously sensitive to sceptical arguments. Ordinarily, people take agents to be morally responsible for their actions and take them to deserve blame or sanctions for bad actions or praise and rewards for good deeds, without prior reflection on possible metaphysical prerequisites for moral responsibility. But they often come to see metaphysical considerations as highly relevant and find their confidence in moral responsibility shaken when introduced to regress arguments such as Galen Strawson’s “basic argument” or Peter van Inwagen’s “direct argument”, arguments from manipulation such as Derk Pereboom’s “four case argument”, or arguments from luck, such as Al Mele’s contrastive argument.

    The second feature is that our practice of holding people responsible is largely driven by concerns about how motivational structures are affected by our holding or not holding people responsible for decisions and their outcomes. The most obvious sign of this concern is that people often motivate practices of holding people responsible with reference to what would happen in their absence: people would care less about values beyond their immediate interests, go lazy, engage in free-riding. Somewhat more subtly, it is clear that our reactive attitudes, expressed in our ways of holding agents responsible, are sensitive to the qualities of will of those agents. If we learn that an action was not the result of ill will, our tendency to hold the agent responsible for a bad outcome tends to be diminished, just as one would expect if the concern were to modify faulty motivational structures. Expressions of regret and guilt and thus willingness to change motivational and behavioural patterns tend to placate indignation or resentment. From an etiological perspective, it seems plausible that our species have reactive attitudes and engage in practices of holding each other responsible exactly because such reactions modify motivational structures and behaviours in ways that protect and promote values that we care about.

    To the extent that our holding people responsible is motivated by the effects of holding people responsible, it is puzzling why it should be subject the sceptical concerns: neither of the sceptical arguments mentioned above seem to undermine the usefulness of holding people responsible. This is how the two features seem to tug in opposite directions.

    In his influential paper “Freedom and Resentment”, Peter Strawson argued that we should let our practice of holding people responsible be deeply affected by neither of these concerns. Unlike “pessimists”, we should not be moved by sceptical, incompatibilist, concerns because they involved judging the practice from a metaphysical perspective foreign to the participatory stance to which our practices of holding people responsible belongs. Unlike “optimists”, we should not justify our practice with reference to its effects, because, again, such concerns are external to the practice itself, or at least leaves out concerns that are internal to the practice, concerns that are focused on how the action came but have no truck with consequences of holding the agent responsible—perhaps the agent is dead. In my paper, I argue that Strawson and some of his followers misrepresent the relation between sceptical arguments and our practice of holding responsible. As many of his critics have pointed out, the appeal of such arguments is very natural and almost unavoidable given the shape of the concept of moral responsibility that governs this practice. Unlike many of his critics, however, I will argue that our impression that the considerations invoked in such arguments diminish responsibility is nevertheless an illusion, comparable to other cognitive and perceptual illusions. Similarly, I will argue that Strawson misrepresents the role of “external” consequentialist concerns. It is correct that our attributions of moral responsibility are backward-looking, relying on information on how a decision, action or outcomes came about rather than on potential effects of holding the agent responsible for it. But it is also true that our judgments focus on backward-looking concerns because our practices of holding responsible is largely driven by forward-looking—consequentialist—concerns. The argument proceeds in three steps. The first is to make plausible an empirical theory about the concept of moral responsibility operative in our practices of holding people responsible and attributing desert. The second step is to explain why sceptical arguments have intuitive force given this structure. The third step is to present a plausible account of why a concept satisfying this empirical description is governing our judgments of moral responsibility as well as our practices of holding people responsible. The fourth step, finally, is to argue that intuitions resulting from sceptical arguments are best understood as illusory because they are insensitive to what our concept of moral responsibility has been designed to track.

    *Björnsson, Gunnar and Persson, Karl, forthcoming: “The Explanatory Component of Moral Responsibility”, forthcoming in Noûs

    *Björnsson, Gunnar and Persson, Karl, 2009: “Judgments of Moral Responsibility: A Unified Account”, Society for Philosophy and Psychology, 35th Annual Meeting 2009, available at http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/archive/00004633/

    *Björnsson, Gunnar and Persson, Karl, ms: “Explaining Judgments of Moral Responsibility”, manuscript

    *Björnsson, Gunnar, forthcoming: “Joint responsibility without individual control—the Explanation Hypothesis”, forthcoming in Compatibilist Responsibility: beyond free will and determinism, eds. Jeroen van den Hoven , Ibo van de Poel and Nicole Vincent

  • 170.
    Björnsson, Gunnar
    Linköpings universitet, Institutionen för kultur och kommunikation, Avdelningen för kulturvetenskaper, KVA. Linköpings universitet, Filosofiska fakulteten.
    The Pragmatics of insensitive Assessments2010Inngår i: Logic & Language Conference 2010, Northern Institute of Philosophy & Institute of Philosophy, Book of Abstracts, 2010Konferansepaper (Annet vitenskapelig)
  • 171.
    Björnsson, Gunnar
    Linköpings universitet, Institutionen för kultur och kommunikation, Avdelningen för kulturvetenskaper, KVA. Linköpings universitet, Filosofiska fakulteten.
    Towards a Radically Pragmatic Theory of If-Conditionals2011Inngår i: Making Semantics Pragmatic / [ed] Ken Turner, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, 2011, s. 103-141Kapittel i bok, del av antologi (Annet vitenskapelig)
    Abstract [en]

    It is generally agreed that constructions of the form “if P, Q” are capable of conveying a number of different relations between antecedent and consequent, with pragmatics playing a central role in determining these relations. Controversy concerns what the conventional contribution of the if-clause is, how it constrains the pragmatic processes, and what those processes are. In this essay, I begin to argue that the conventional contribution of if-clauses to semantics is exhausted by the fact that these clauses introduce a proposition without presenting it as true so that the consequent can be understood in relation to it. Given our cognitive interests in such non-truth-presentational introductions, conditionals will make salient the wide but nevertheless disciplined variety of contents that we naturally attribute to them; no further substantial constraints of the sorts proposed by standard theories of conditionals are needed to explain the phenomena. If this is correct, it provides prima facie evidence for a radically contextualist account of conditionals according to which conditionals have no truth-evaluable or intuitively complete content absent some contextually provided, sufficiently salient relation between antecedent and consequent.

  • 172.
    Björnsson, Gunnar
    et al.
    Linköpings universitet, Institutionen för kultur och kommunikation, Avdelningen för kulturvetenskaper, KVA. Linköpings universitet, Filosofiska fakulteten.
    Almér, Alexander
    Institutionen för Filosofi, Lingvistik och Vetenskapsteori.
    Contextualizing Relativism2009Konferansepaper (Fagfellevurdert)
    Abstract [en]

    Recently, a number of authors, in particular John MacFarlane, have suggested that evidence having to do with disagreement and retractions calls for abandonment of traditional contextualist analyses of some discourses, e.g., epistemic modals and taste judgments. Data, they argue, instead supports a new relativist notion of semantics, embracing that one and the same asserted proposition might vary in truth with context of assessment. We argue essentially two points with pertinence to adjudicate between this notion of relativism and contextualism. First, we point out that data only speaks in favour of relativism given certain general conceptions of semantics. Secondly, we argue that from within a certain well-known naturalistic semantic framework, the evidence suggests contextualist analysis of "true", "false" and cognates. We briefly sketch how such a non-standard contextualism would account for disagreement and retraction data in a way avoiding the objections from the relativist camp.

  • 173.
    Björnsson, Gunnar
    et al.
    Linköpings universitet, Institutionen för kultur och kommunikation, Avdelningen för kulturvetenskaper, KVA. Linköpings universitet, Filosofiska fakulteten.
    Almér, Alexander
    Institutionen för Filosofi, Lingvistik och Vetenskapsteori, Göteborgs universitet.
    The Pragmatics of Insensitive Assessments2009Inngår i: Abstract online. Context and Levels of Locutionary Content, Lisbon December 2009, 2009Konferansepaper (Annet vitenskapelig)
    Abstract [en]

    In assessing the veridicality of utterances, we normally seem to assess the satisfaction of conditions that the speaker had been concerned to get right in making the utterance. However, the debate about assessor-relativism about epistemic modals, predicates of taste, gradable adjectives and conditionals has been largely driven by cases in which seemingly felicitous assessments of utterances are insensitive to aspects of the context of utterance that were highly relevant to the speaker’s choice of words.

    In this paper, we offer an explanation of why certain locutions invite insensitive assessments, focusing primarily on ’tasty’ and ’might’. We spell out some reasons why felicitous insensitive assessments are puzzling and argue briefly that recent attempts to accommodate such assessments (including attempts by John MacFarlane, Kai von Fintel and Anthony Gillies) all fail to provide more than hints at a solution to the puzzle. In the main part of the paper, we develop an account of felicitous insensitive assessments by identifying a number of pragmatic factors that influence the felicity of assessments. Before closing, we argue that the role of these factors extends beyond cases considered in the debate about assessor-relativism and fits comfortably with standard contextualist analyses of the relevant locutions.

  • 174.
    Björnsson, Gunnar
    et al.
    Linköpings universitet, Institutionen för kultur och kommunikation, Avdelningen för kulturvetenskaper, KVA. Linköpings universitet, Filosofiska fakulteten.
    Almér, Alexander
    Göteborgs universitet.
    The Pragmatics of Insensitive Assessments: Understanding The Relativity of Assessments of Judgments of Personal Taste, Epistemic Modals, and More2010Inngår i: The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication, ISSN 1944-3676, Vol. 6, s. 1-45Artikkel i tidsskrift (Annet vitenskapelig)
    Abstract [en]

    In assessing the veridicality of utterances, we normally seem to assess the satisfaction of conditions that the speaker had been concerned to get right in making the utterance. However, the debate about assessor-relativism about epistemic modals, predicates of taste, gradable adjectives and conditionals has been largely driven by cases in which seemingly felicitous assessments of utterances are insensitive to aspects of the context of utterance that were highly relevant to the speaker’s choice of words. In this paper, we offer an explanation of why certain locutions invite insensitive assessments, focusing primarily on ’tasty’ and ’might’. We spell out some reasons why felicitous insensitive assessments are puzzling and argue briefly that recent attempts to accommodate such assessments (including attempts by John MacFarlane, Kai von Fintel and Anthony Gillies) all fail to provide more than hints at a solution to the puzzle. In the main part of the paper, we develop an account of felicitous insensitive assessments by identifying a number of pragmatic factors that influence the felicity of assessments. Before closing, we argue that the role of these factors extend beyond cases considered in the debate about assessor-relativism and fit comfortably with standard contextualist analyses of the relevant locutions.

  • 175.
    Björnsson, Gunnar
    et al.
    Linköpings universitet, Institutionen för kultur och kommunikation, Avdelningen för kulturvetenskaper, KVA. Linköpings universitet, Filosofiska fakulteten.
    Finlay, Stephen
    School of Philosophy, University of Southern California, Los Angeles.
    Ethics Discussions at PEA Soup: Gunnar Björnsson and Stephen Finlay, "Metaethical Contextualism Defended2010Annet (Annet (populærvitenskap, debatt, mm))
    Abstract [en]

    We are pleased to announce the next installment of our collaboration withEthics, in which we host a discussion of one article from each issue of the journal.  The article selected from Volume 121, Issue 1 is Gunnar Björnssonand Stephen Finlay, "Metaethical Contextualism Defended."  We are very pleased that Ralph Wedgwood will be providing a précis of the article to introduce the discussion.

    Professor Wedgwood's précis will appear, and discussion of the article will begin, on Monday, December 13.  The open-access version of Björnsson and Finlay's article is here.  Abstract:

    We defend a contextualist account of normative judgments as relativized both to (i) information and to (ii) standards or ends against recent objections that turn on practices of normative disagreement. Niko Kolodny and John MacFarlane argue that information-relative contextualism cannot accommodate the connection between deliberation and advice. In response, we suggest that they misidentify the basic concerns of deliberating agents, which are not to settle the truth of particular propositions but to promote certain values. For pragmatic reasons, semantic assessments of normative claims sometimes are evaluations of propositions other than those asserted. Other writers have raised parallel objections to standard-relative contextualism, particularly about moral claims; we argue for a parallel solution.

     

  • 176.
    Björnsson, Gunnar
    et al.
    Linköpings universitet, Institutionen för kultur och kommunikation, Avdelningen för kulturvetenskaper, KVA. Linköpings universitet, Filosofiska fakulteten.
    Finlay, Stephen
    School of Philosophy, University of Southern California.
    Metaethical Contextualism Defended2010Inngår i: Ethics, ISSN 0014-1704, Vol. 121, s. 7-36Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)
    Abstract [en]

    We defend a contextualist account of normative judgments as relativized both to (i) information and to (ii) standards or ends against recent objections that turn on practices of normative disagreement. Niko Kolodny and John MacFarlane argue that information-relative contextualism cannot accommodate the connection between deliberation and advice. In response, we suggest that they misidentify the basic concerns of deliberating agents, which are not to settle the truth of particular propositions but to promote certain values. For pragmatic reasons, semantic assessments of normative claims sometimes are evaluations of propositions other than those asserted. Other writers have raised parallel objections to standard-relative contextualism, particularly about moral claims; we argue for a parallel solution

  • 177.
    Björnsson, Gunnar
    et al.
    Linköpings universitet, Institutionen för kultur och kommunikation, Avdelningen för kulturvetenskaper, KVA. Linköpings universitet, Filosofiska fakulteten.
    Kihlbom, Ulrik
    entre for Research Ethics & Bioethics, Uppsala universitet.
    Ullholm, Anders
    Södertörns högskola.
    Argumentationsanalys: Färdigheter för kritiskt tänkande2009 (oppl. 2)Bok (Annet vitenskapelig)
    Abstract [sv]

    Ny reviderad utgåva.Att tänka kritiskt är att självständigt ta ställning till rimligheten i påståenden och argument. Det är en ovärderlig förmåga när vi ställs inför frågor där svaren är många och motstridiga och argumentationen pekar i olika riktningar. I sådana situationer kan det vara svårt att skaffa sig överblick över argumenten, ta ställning till deras styrka och göra en samlad bedömning av alternativen. Lyckligtvis är detta svårigheter som går att hantera med just sådana verktyg som Argumentationsanalys erbjuder. Genom att använda dem förbättrar vi vår förmåga att både identifiera argument i text och tal och bedöma deras beviskraft. Den som själv behöver skriva en argumenterande text eller göra ett argumenterande framförande har dessutom god hjälp av bokens metod att åskådliggöra hur olika argument i en viss fråga förhåller sig till varandra. Argumentationsanalys är en teoretisk och praktisk handledning med övningar. Boken riktar sig till studenter i humanistiska och samhällsvetenskapliga ämnen, men också till alla andra som konfronteras med komplicerade argumentationer.

  • 178.
    Björnsson, Gunnar
    et al.
    Linköpings universitet, Institutionen för kultur och kommunikation, Avdelningen för kulturvetenskaper, KVA. Linköpings universitet, Filosofiska fakulteten.
    Persson, Karl
    Institutionen för Filosofi, Lingvistik och Vetenskapsteori, Göteborgs universitet.
    Judgments of moral responsibility - a unified account2009Inngår i: Conferences and Volumes: [2009] Society for Philosophy and Psychology, 35th Annual Meeting (Bloomington, IN; June 12-14) (5), 2009Konferansepaper (Fagfellevurdert)
    Abstract [en]

    Recent work in experimental philosophy shows that folk intuitions about moral responsibility are sensitive to a surprising variety of factors. Studies by Nichols and Knobe (2007) suggest that whether people take agents to be responsible for their actions in a deterministic scenario depends on whether these actions are described abstractly or concretely, and on how serious moral transgression these actions seem to represent. Studies by Nahmias et. al. (2007) show that the kind of determinism involved affects assignments of responsibility. When deterministic scenarios are described using reductionist explanations of action, subjects were significantly less prone to ascribe responsibility than when the deterministic laws are described as involving ordinary psychological concepts. Finally, a study by Knobe (2003) suggests that people are significantly more inclined to hold an agent responsible for bringing about bad side effects than for bringing about good side effects when the agent just doesn’t care about these side effects. Elsewhere, we have presented an analysis of our everyday concept of moral responsibility that provides a unified explanation of paradigmatic cases of moral responsibility, and accounts for the force of both typical excuses and the most influential skeptical arguments against moral responsibility or for incompatibilism. In this article, we suggest that it also explains the divergent and apparently incoherent set of intuitions revealed by these new studies. If our hypothesis is correct, the surprising variety of judgments stems from a unified concept of moral responsibility. Knobe, J. (2003) Intentional Action and Side Effects in Ordinary Language. Analysis 63, pp.190–93. Nahmias, E.; Coates, J.; Kvaran. T. (2007) Free will, moral responsibility, and mechanism: experiments on folk intuitions. Midwest studies in Philosophy XXXI Nichols, S.; Knobe, J. (2007) Moral responsibility and determinism: the cognitive science of folk intuitions, Noûs 41:4, 663-685

  • 179.
    Björnsson, Gunnar
    et al.
    Linköpings universitet, Institutionen för kultur och kommunikation, Avdelningen för kulturvetenskaper, KVA. Linköpings universitet, Filosofiska fakulteten.
    Persson, Karl
    Institutionen för Filosofi, Lingvistik och Vetenskapsteori, Göteborgs universitet.
    Judgments of moral responsibility –a unified account II2009Inngår i: ESPP 2009 Budapest, Book of abstracts, 2009, s. 16-Konferansepaper (Fagfellevurdert)
    Abstract [en]

    Recent work in experimental philosophy shows that folk intuitions about moral responsibility are sensitive to a surprising variety of factors. Whether people take agents to be responsible for their actions in deterministic scenarios depends on whether the deterministic laws are couched in neurological or psychological terms (Nahmias et. al. 2007), on whether actions are described abstractly or concretely, and on how serious moral transgression they seem to represent (Nichols & Knobe 2007). Finally, people are more inclined to hold an agent responsible for bringing about bad than for bringing about good side effects that the agent is indifferent about (Knobe 2003). Elsewhere, we have presented an analysis of the everyday concept of moral responsibility that provides a unified explanation of paradigmatic cases of moral responsibility, and accounts for the force of both typical excuses and the most influential skeptical arguments against moral responsibility or for incompatibilism. In this article, we suggest that it also explains the divergent and apparently incoherent set of intuitions revealed by these new studies. If our hypothesis is correct, the surprising variety of judgments stems from a unified concept of moral responsibility. Knobe, J. (2003) Intentional Action and Side Effects in Ordinary Language. Analysis 63, pp.190–93. Nahmias, E.; Coates, J.; Kvaran. T. (2007) Free will, moral responsibility, and mechanism: experiments on folk intuitions. Midwest studies in Philosophy XXXI Nichols, S.; Knobe, J. (2007) Moral responsibility and determinism: the cognitive science of folk intuitions, Noûs 41:4, 663-685

  • 180.
    Björnsson, Gunnar
    et al.
    Linköpings universitet, Institutionen för kultur och kommunikation, Avdelningen för kulturvetenskaper, KVA. Linköpings universitet, Filosofiska fakulteten.
    Persson, Karl
    Institutionen för Filosofi, Lingvistik och Vetenskapsteori, Göteborgs universitet.
    The Explanatory Component of Moral Responsibility2008Konferansepaper (Fagfellevurdert)
    Abstract [en]

    Conflicting judgments and intuitions are commonplace in philosophical debates about moral responsibility. Some participants think that if an agent does not fully control a decision, then she has no or little responsibility for that decision; others think that some degrees of luck are entirely compatible with full responsibility. Some think that in order for an agent to be responsible for an action, she must have been capable of doing something else instead; others think that what is important is merely that the action was brought about by the agent in the right way. Some feel quite strongly that responsibility for an action is undermined by determinism; others think that what is relevant is how that action relates to the agent at the time of choice, not how the agent came to be such that she chose the way she did. Many of the arguments supplied in these controversies urge us to focus on one aspect or view of the cases discussed at the expense of others. These arguments seem effective in that various differences in focus do tend to affect intuitions of responsibility, for professional philosophers and laymen alike. The fact that changes of focus affect intuitions of responsibility raises questions: On what factors should we focus our attention? What focus makes for reliable intuitions? It is not clear that such questions can be answered by providing further cases or thought experiments to consider, as reactions to such cases are likely to be subject to the same sort of focus relativity. This paper approaches the problem from a new angle. It would be easier to determine what to think about moral responsibility if we were clearer about why we react the way we do to these arguments, and why our reactions vary. To this end, we will do three things. First, we will present a general model of our judgments of moral responsibility, a model according to which such judgments are, essentially, explanatory judgments. Second, we will explain how this model can account for not only factors that affect the degrees to which we assign moral responsibility in ordinary life, but also the sometimes contradictory judgments that people make about one of the most important thought experiments in the philosophical debate about moral responsibility. Finally, we will argue that this has important methodological consequences for that debate.

  • 181.
    Björnsson, Gunnar
    et al.
    Linköpings universitet, Institutionen för kultur och kommunikation, Avdelningen för kulturvetenskaper, KVA. Linköpings universitet, Filosofiska fakulteten.
    Persson, Karl
    University of Gothenburg.
    The Explanatory Component of Moral Responsibility2012Inngår i: Noûs, ISSN 0029-4624, E-ISSN 1468-0068, Vol. 46, nr 2, s. 326-354Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)
    Abstract [en]

    In this paper, we do three things. First, we put forth a novel hypothesis about judgments of moral responsibility according to which such judgments are a species of explanatory judgments. Second, we argue that this hypothesis explains both some general features of everyday thinking about responsibility and the appeal of skeptical arguments against moral responsibility. Finally, we argue that, if correct, the hypothesis provides a defense against these skeptical arguments.

  • 182.
    Björsson, Kerstin
    Linköpings universitet, Institutionen för kultur och kommunikation.
    Mer än bara konstnär?: Att närma sig en triangelkomposition i begrepp, förutsättning och realitet2008Independent thesis Basic level (degree of Bachelor), 10 poäng / 15 hpOppgave
    Abstract [sv]

    Syftet är att granska relationen mellan konstnären och marknaden. Flertalet frågor behandlas, såsom om konsten och konstnärer står inför ett paradigmskifte, varför det är fult att säga konst och pengar i samma mening och vad verksamma konstnärer tycker om situationen.

    Uppsatsen redogör för begreppet konstnär ur ett historisk och sociologiskt perspektiv. Förutsättningar för konstnären gås igenom med fokus på kulturpolitiken från 1974 tills idag, och marknaden. Fyra konstnärer har intervjuats för att skapa en bild av den realiteten som de verkar i, hur de ser på konstnärskapet och den bästa av världar.

  • 183.
    Björsson, Kerstin
    Linköpings universitet, Institutionen för kultur och kommunikation.
    Var kommer betraktaren in i bilden?: En studie av konstens aktörer i Örebro kommun, deras målsättningar och verklighet2009Independent thesis Advanced level (degree of Master (One Year)), 10 poäng / 15 hpOppgave
    Abstract [sv]

    Uppsatsen behandlar några av de aktörer inom konsten som finns i Örebro kommun, deras målsättningar och verklighet. Detta ställs i relation till betraktaren.

    Frågorna som behandlas och besvaras är vilka aktörer som jobbar med att nå ut till mottagaren; vilka är målsättningarna; hur jobbar de med att genomdriva sina mål; hur ser framtiden och visionen ut; hur kan man ställa detta i förhållande till betraktaren?

    Den teoretiska grunden för betraktarens förutsättningar finns i perceptionsteori, samt sociologen Pierre Bourdieu.

    Ekonomiska förutsättningar presenteras kort.

    Aktörerna som har intervjuats, samt deras verksamhet, presenteras och sedan följer intervjuer med respektive informant.

    Slutligen behandlas uppsatsens frågeställningar utifrån den grund som materialet har gett och en slutdiskussion förs.

  • 184.
    Blomberg, Olle
    Linköpings universitet, Institutionen för kultur och kommunikation. Linköpings universitet, Filosofiska fakulteten.
    Disentangling the Thick Concept Argument2007Inngår i: Sats: Nordic Journal of Philosophy, ISSN 1600-1974, E-ISSN 1869-7577, Vol. 8, nr 2, s. 63-78Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)
    Abstract [en]

    Critics argue that non-cognitivism cannot adequately account for the existence and nature of some thick moral concepts. They use the existence of thick concepts as a lever in an argument against non-cognitivism, here called the Thick Concept Argument (TCA). While TCA is frequently invoked, it is unfortunately rarely articulated. In this paper, TCA is first reconstructed on the basis of John McDowell’s formulation of the argument (from 1981), and then evaluated in the light of several possible non-cognitivist responses. In general, TCA assumes too much about what a non-cognitivist is (or must be) committed to. There are several non-cognitivist theories, and only some fit the view attacked by TCA. Furthermore, TCA rests on a contestable intuition about a thought experiment, here called the External Standpoint Experiment (ESE). It is concluded that TCA is remarkably weak, given how frequently the argument is invoked.

  • 185.
    Blomqvist, Jim
    Linköpings universitet, Institutionen för kultur och kommunikation, Avdelningen för svenska och litteratur. Linköpings universitet, Filosofiska fakulteten.
    Den Vite Mannens Totem: Övermänniskor och imperialism i verk av Jack London2011Independent thesis Basic level (degree of Bachelor), 10 poäng / 15 hpOppgave
    Abstract [sv]

    Syftet med denna uppsats är att enligt nämnda frågeställning utvinna en systematisk klassificering av Londons karaktärer utifrån Nietzsches text. Detta innebär i en imperialistisk kontext, med utgångspunkt i den postkoloniala teori formulerad av Edward Said, en problematisering av dikotomin västerländsk och icke-västerländsk samt ett uppdagande av en etnisk-kulturell hierarki, där det västerländska, i form av den londonska övermänniskan, gestaltas som högst och urinvånaren, det icke-västerländska, som lägst.

    Den kulturella representationen ska i denna studie undersökas i valda litterära texter av Jack London utifrån en nietzscheansk matris. Det är alltså inte en historisk granskning av hur imperialismen och kolonialismen i Nordamerika inverkat på dess urinvånare, även om denna studie undersöker en problematik som kan inplaceras i den historiska kontexten.

  • 186.
    Blåder, Niclas
    Linköpings universitet, Institutionen för kultur och kommunikation. Linköpings universitet, Filosofiska fakulteten.
    Gemenskap och mångfald: En ekklesiologisk studie med utgångspunkt i Don S. Brownings metod, där två församlingars tal om identitet och pluralism i den egna församlingen relateras till Dietrich Bonhoeffers teologiska tänkande2008Doktoravhandling, monografi (Annet vitenskapelig)
    Abstract [sv]

    Gemenskap är eftersträvansvärt för de flesta människor. Samtidigt är många gemenskaper relativt homogena och likriktade. På ett liknande sätt är många kristna församlingsgemenskaper uppbyggda, dvs. de är gemenskaper där mångfalden får svårt att hävda sig. Kan teologin bidra med öppningar i ett samtal om gemenskap och mångfald i den kristna församlingen och i mänskligt samliv? Denna avhandling utgår från hur man inom två konkreta församlingar i Svenska kyrkan talar om identitet och pluralism och försöker komma till rätta med att man har olika tankefigurer för hur en församlingsgemenskap skall kunna innefatta mångfald. Församlingarnas svårigheter pekar mot ett allmänkyrkligt dilemma, kanske allmänmänskligt: Hur förena gemenskap och mångfald? Dietrich Bonhoeffer är en teolog som i sina skrifter diskuterade just denna problematik, först som ung i avhandlingen Sanctorum Communio, senare som ledare för prästseminariet i Finkenwalde i boken Life Together och slutligen som motståndsman under krigsåren i det som var avsett att bli hans magnum opus, Ethics. Utifrån Bonhoeffers teologiska diskussion blir det viktigt att möta församlingarnas praktiska dilemma genom ansvarigt handlande i den konkreta situationen, att försöka gestalta en församlingsgemenskap som bejakar olikhet, medveten om mångfalden och om att varje handling hotar att utestänga några.

  • 187.
    Bobrowski, Lena
    Linköpings universitet, Institutionen för kultur och kommunikation.
    Textila ljudabsorbenter: En textanalys av forskningsarbeten om textila fibrer och buller2009Independent thesis Basic level (degree of Bachelor), 10 poäng / 15 hpOppgave
    Abstract [sv]

    Arbetets syfte är att genom en textanalys av olika forskningsarbeten upptäcka sambanden mellan textila fibermaterial, buller och ohälsa med inriktning mot det öppna kontorslandskapet och det lågfrekventa ljudet. Utifrån syftet besvaras följande frågeställningar: Vilka kunskapsområden blir synliga vid tillverkning av textila ljudabsorbenter med inriktning mot det lågfrekventa ljudet? Vilka kunskapsområden kan en tillverkare av textila ljudabsorbenter behöva belysa utifrån ett specifikt ljudproblem?

    Frågeställningen besvaras genom en kvalitativ dokumentstudie där textmaterialet består av forskningslitteratur, facklitteratur och artiklar. Syftet är att utveckla nya perspektiv kring textila ljudabsorbenter. Genom att ge inblick kring ljudets beteende och skapa insikter kring hur buller påverkar hälsan. Detta för att få en så bred kunskapsspridning som möjligt gällande textila ljudabsorbenter för att finna samband mellan olika berörda områden.

    I resultatet framgår det att textila fibrer har betydelse vid tillverkning av en textil ljudabsorbent. Betydelsen ligger i att olika textila fibrer får varierande ljudupptagningsförmågor beroende vilken grovlek, längd och behandling materialet utsätts för. Likaväl är varierande kunskaper av vikt utifrån rummets utformning, ljudets påverkan på hälsan och kring ljudets akustiska egenskaper. Kunskaper från olika områden som sedan kan vävas samman vid tillverkningen av textila ljudabsorbenter.

  • 188.
    Bodin, Maja
    et al.
    Uppsala University, Sweden; Humanistiskt Centre, Sweden.
    Stern, Jenny
    Uppsala University, Sweden.
    Käll, Lisa
    Linköpings universitet, Institutionen för kultur och kommunikation, Avdelningen för kulturvetenskaper, KVA. Linköpings universitet, Filosofiska fakulteten. Humanistiskt Centre, Sweden.
    Tyden, Tanja
    Uppsala University, Sweden.
    Larsson, Margareta
    Uppsala University, Sweden.
    Coherence of pregnancy planning within couples expecting a child2015Inngår i: Midwifery, ISSN 0266-6138, E-ISSN 1532-3099, Vol. 31, nr 10, s. 973-978Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)
    Abstract [en]

    Background: joint planning and decision-making within couples have evident effects on the well-being of the family. The purpose of this study was to investigate the level of pregnancy planning among pregnant women and their partners and to compare the coherence of pregnancy planning within the couples. Methods: pregnant women and their partners were recruited from 18 antenatal clinics in seven Swedish counties between October 2011 and April 2012. Participants, 232 pregnant women and 144 partners, filled out a questionnaire with questions about pregnancy planning, lifestyle and relationship satisfaction. 136 couples were identified and the womens and partners answers were compared. Results: more than 75% of the pregnancies were very or rather planned and almost all participants had agreed with their partner to become pregnant There was no significant difference in level of pregnancy planning between women and partners, and coherence within couples was strong. Level of planning was not affected by individual socio-demographic variables. Furthermore, 98 % of women and 94 % of partners had non distressed relationships. Conclusion: one of the most interesting results was the strong coherence between partners concerning their pregnancy and relationship. Approaching these results from a social constructivist perspective brings to light an importance of togetherness and how a sense and impression of unity within a couple might be constructed in different ways. As implications for practice, midwives and other professionals counselling persons in fertile age should enquire about and emphasise the benefits of equality and mutual pregnancy planning for both women and men. (C) 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

  • 189.
    Bommarco, Birgitta
    et al.
    SmDi, Malmö.
    Parmenius Swärd, Suzanne
    Linköpings universitet, Institutionen för kultur och kommunikation, Avdelningen för svenska och litteratur. Linköpings universitet, Utbildningsvetenskap.
    Läsning Skrivande Samtal: Textarbete i svenska på gymnasiet2012 (oppl. 1)Bok (Annet (populærvitenskap, debatt, mm))
    Abstract [sv]

    Textarbete i svenska på gymnasiet

    Varje svensklärare har som sin uppgift att stödja och utveckla unga människors språk och genom läsning och samtal hjälpa till att vidga gränserna för deras omvärldsuppfattning. Det är en ansvarsfull uppgift som många gånger kan verka nästan omöjlig. I de nya ämnesplanerna för gymnasieskolan ses arbetet med texter som det centrala i svenskämnet. Men vad innebär det att arbeta med texter? Hur kan man iscensätta aktiviteter som upplevs som meningsfulla, språkutvecklande, lustfyllda och kreativa och som samtidigt leder till kunskapsutveckling i språk och litteratur?

    I boken ger författarna en mängd förslag på undervisning som öppnar upp för litteraturläsning och samtal, de presenterar aktiviteter som utvecklar elevernas skrivande samt diskuterar frågor som rör respons och bedömning. Författarna anlägger ett dialogiskt och analytiskt perspektiv på lärande och språkutveckling och visar hur en genomtänkt teori kan ligga till grund för stimulerande undervisning. Konkret handlar det om läsning, skrivande och samtal - om språket som redskap för reflektion, kommunikation och kunskapsutveckling.

    Läsning, skrivande, samtal inspirerar till förändring och utveckling av svenskundervisningen på gymnasiets studie- och yrkes­förberedande program och vänder sig till såväl blivande som verksamma lärare i svenska.

  • 190.
    Bondesson, Rebecka
    Linköpings universitet, Institutionen för kultur och kommunikation, Avdelningen för språk och kultur. Linköpings universitet, Filosofiska fakulteten.
    "Make a Man of Him": The Question of Upbringing in Anne Brontë's The Tenant of Wildfell Hall2014Independent thesis Advanced level (professional degree), 10 poäng / 15 hpOppgave
    Abstract [sv]

    Behandlar synen på barnuppfostran i Anne Brontës The Tenant of Wildfell Hall. Argumentet är att huvudkaraktären, till skillnad mot de traditionella idéerna rådande i 1820-talets England, antar ett progressivt förhållningssätt till barnuppfostran. Det visas även att romanen presenterar en möjlig bakgrund till hennes långt framskridna idéer vad beträffar erfarenheterna som har influerat hennes utveckling. Ytterligare en dimension tillförs uppsatsen i och med ett didaktiskt kapitel som behandlar frågorna varför och hur man bör använda sig av The Tenant of Wildfell Hall i undervisningen av Engelska i den svenska gymnasieskolan. 

  • 191.
    Bonu, Bruno
    et al.
    Université Paul Valéry Montpellier 3, France.
    Broth, Mathias
    Linköpings universitet, Institutionen för kultur och kommunikation, Avdelningen för språk och kultur. Linköpings universitet, Filosofiska fakulteten.
    Crozat, Dominique
    Université Paul Valéry Montpellier 3, France.
    Fauré, Laurent
    Université Paul Valéry Montpellier 3, France.
    Sélimanovski, Catherine
    Université Paul Valéry Montpellier 3, France.
    Voir, montrer, dire un ”carnaval de rues” dans un centre de vidéosurveillance2013Inngår i: Dire l'événement: Langage, mémoire, société / [ed] Sophie Moirand, Sandrine Reboul-Touré, Danielle Londei, Licia Reggiani, Paris: Presses Sorbonne Nouvelle, 2013, s. 49-59Kapittel i bok, del av antologi (Fagfellevurdert)
  • 192.
    Borg, Kajsa
    et al.
    Institutionen för estetiska ämnen, Umeå universitet.
    Sjögren, Jan
    Linköpings universitet, Institutionen för kultur och kommunikation. Linköpings universitet, Filosofiska fakulteten.
    Forskning och konstnärligt utvecklingsarbete2014Inngår i: Slöjd, bildning och kultur: om pedagogisk slöjd i historia och nutid / [ed] Sven Hartman, Stockholm: Carlsson Bokförlag, 2014, s. 212-227Kapittel i bok, del av antologi (Annet vitenskapelig)
    Abstract [sv]

    I ett historiskt perspektiv har skolslöjden under lång tid satt spår i det allmänna medvetandet, åtminstone i de nordiska länderna. Hos många små och stora slöjdare tycks just detta skolämne ha stannat kvar i minnet. Det representerar ett stycke materiell kultur, som en gång gjorde den svenska skolan känd långt utanför landets gränser.

    Den svenska skolslöjden har en märklig historia, vilket framgår av bokens tretton kapitel, från första början fram till dags dato. Här redogörs för vad slöjd egentligen är; om handens visdom; slöjdens förhistoria och om den kvinnliga skolslöjden. Carl Malmstens betydelse avhandlas liksom hur läroplaner ändrats. Folkbildning och slöjdlärarutbildning etc.

    Även andra slöjdarter uppmärksammas i faktarutor. Boken är rikt illustrerad. Den har alla möjligheter att bli ett standardverk med lång livstid som referens och faktabank.

  • 193.
    Borges, Heather
    Linköpings universitet, Institutionen för kultur och kommunikation, Centrum för tillämpad etik.
    Against Marketing in U.S. Public Schools2011Independent thesis Advanced level (degree of Master (Two Years)), 10 poäng / 15 hpOppgave
    Abstract [en]

    This thesis provides and ethical discussion of the place of marketing in U.S. public schools.  This problem is especially interesting in a time where schools are having their budgets vastly cut.  The importance of education is lauded as the reason to allow marketing, along with it being used as a teaching tool, among other reasons.  The opponents of in-school marketing are discussed, such as health and psychological problems and the social functions of school.  I conclude that marketing in U.S. public schools should no longer be allowed, but that it is only realistic to eliminate it gradually.

  • 194.
    Boström, Axel
    et al.
    Linköpings universitet, Institutionen för kultur och kommunikation.
    Pettersson, Martin
    Linköpings universitet, Institutionen för kultur och kommunikation.
    Läsförståelse och läsarter i två centrala kunskapsmätningar: –En forskningsöversikt över svenska elevers resultat i de nationella provens och PISA-undersökningarnas läsförståelsedelar2018Independent thesis Basic level (professional degree), 10 poäng / 15 hpOppgave
    Abstract [sv]

    Syftet med den här uppsatsen är att undersöka vad forskningen säger om vilken slags läsning som testas i de nationella proven och PISA, svenska elevers resultatutveckling i PISA över tid, samt att redogöra för undervisningsmetoder för läsförståelse. Resultaten visar att de läsarter som prövas i de bägge proven är relativt lika, men att vissa läsarter får olika stort utrymme i de olika proven. Svenska elevers läsförståelse utifrån PISA visar sig ha försämrats över tid. Gällande undervisningsmetoderna redogörs det för två olika metoder där störst fokus har lagts på litteratursamtalet.

  • 195.
    Broberg, Maria
    Linköpings universitet, Institutionen för kultur och kommunikation. Linköpings universitet, Filosofiska fakulteten.
    Teckensnitt: Hur svenska bokstavsformgivare har influerats av historiska snitt2012Independent thesis Basic level (degree of Bachelor), 20 poäng / 30 hpOppgave
    Abstract [sv]

    Syftet är att ge en introduktion till viktiga termer och uttryck inom bokstavsformgivningen samt att undersöka på vilket sätt den historiska bokstavsformgivningen influerat bokstavsformgivare som varit verksamma i Sverige under 1900–talet och fram till idag.

    Utöver syftet har två frågeställningar ställts upp;

    • Vilka termer och uttryck är av stor vikt inom bokstavsformgivningen?
    • På vilket sätt har den historiska bokstavsformgivningen influerat bokstavsformgivare som varit verksamma i Sverige under 1900–talet och fram till idag?

    För att söka svar på syftet och frågeställningarna görs en litteraturbaserad studie. Innan resultatet presenteras behandlas bokstavsformens utveckling, under de senaste 3000 åren, kortfattat. Efter det följer resultatet som tar upp termer och uttryck inom bokstavsformgivningen som är av vikt att känna till för att förstå indelningen i de svenska teckensnittsfamiljer som behandlas i uppsatsen. Sist undersöks också på vilket sätt fem bokstavsformgivare som varit verksamma i Sverige under 1900–talet har influerats av den historiska bokstavsformgivningen. En del av bokstavsformgivarna menar att de söker inspiration i den historiska formgivningen och de menar även att det är viktigt att studera dessa teckensnitt för att kunna formge nya klassiska snitt.

  • 196.
    Broström, Jenny
    Linköpings universitet, Institutionen för kultur och kommunikation.
    Avez-vous une méthode et une stratégie pour enseigner le vocabulaire?: Une étude littéraire sur les fondements de l’enseignement des langues2018Independent thesis Basic level (degree of Bachelor), 10 poäng / 15 hpOppgave
    Abstract [sv]

    I den svenska skolan använder lärarna sig ofta av översättning och ordlistor för att lära ut vokabulär till eleverna, och användningen av andra undervisningsmetoder är inte lika vanligt. Det är inte heller vanligt att eleverna använder sig av strategier för ordinlärning trotts att det är ett av kunskapskraven i Lgr11.  Syftet med denna studie är att ta reda på hur översättning och den så kallade direktmetoden kan användas enligt forskningen inom ämnet som undervisningsmetoder i vokabulärundervisningen och att jämföra nackdelarna och fördelarna med respektive undervisningsmetod. Syftet med denna studie är även att se vilka inlärningsstrategier som är rekommenderade av forskningen inom ämnet att lära ut och använda sig av för att lära sig vokabulär.

  • 197.
    Broth, Mathias
    Linköpings universitet, Institutionen för kultur och kommunikation. Linköpings universitet, Filosofiska fakulteten.
    Analyse de l'interaction à la télévision2003Inngår i: Moderna Språk, ISSN 0026-8577, Vol. 2, nr 2, s. 193-202Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)
  • 198.
    Broth, Mathias
    Linköpings universitet, Institutionen för kultur och kommunikation, Avdelningen för språk och kultur. Linköpings universitet, Filosofiska fakulteten.
    Att koppla ihop ansikten och namn: Om gemensamt memorerande inom ett TV-team2011Inngår i: Lärande och minnande: som social praktik / [ed] Roger Säljö, Stockholm: Norstedts Förlag, 2011, s. 253-283Kapittel i bok, del av antologi (Annet vitenskapelig)
    Abstract [sv]

    Minnesfunktioner är något som det forskas intensivt om. Flera traditioner existerar parallellt. När det gäller minne i kombination med lärande är idag det socialpsykologiska perspektivet på frammarsch. Det går i korthet ut på att inget lärande sker som något isolerat utan alltid i samspel med andra människor och det sker också i samspel med allehanda hjälpmedel eller artefakter. Hur går lärande och minnande till? Vad är det egentligen? Det är detta denna bok försöker besvara. För att förstå det har en tvärvetenskaplig grupp samlats under Roger Säljös ledning för att utforska lärande och minnande. Varför är det viktigt att veta? Den nya kunskap som presenteras i denna bok får konsekvenser för framtida undervisning, för utformande av kommunikation av varierande slag och av artefakter. Vad är "minnande"? Det är en aktiv form av att minnas, minnande är något man lär sig, alltså ingen statisk förmåga. Det sker i samspel med andra människor och artefakter. Minnande är en del av lärandet och vice versa. Man kan inte lära något om man inte samtidigt minns. När man lär något sker ett minnande. Dessa tankar om minnande och lärande grundar sig alla medverkande författare på när de berättar om sina respektive forskningsprojekt. Deras berättelser spänner över många mänskliga områden, från hur tolvåringar arbetar med naturvetenskapliga experiment via dataspelande till polisförhör och från specialpedagogik via kontroverser till minnande och lärande i arkitektur

  • 199.
    Broth, Mathias
    Linköpings universitet, Institutionen för kultur och kommunikation. Linköpings universitet, Filosofiska fakulteten.
    La clôture interactionnelle d'une émission télévisée2002Inngår i: Actes du XVème Congrès des romanistes Scandinaves, 2002Konferansepaper (Annet vitenskapelig)
  • 200.
    Broth, Mathias
    Linköpings universitet, Institutionen för kultur och kommunikation, Avdelningen för språk och kultur. Linköpings universitet, Filosofiska fakulteten.
    La Pertinence des formes d’adresse pour la construction interactive d’une interview télévisée2006Inngår i: Dialogic Language Use: Dimensions du dialogisme = Dialogischer Sprachgebrauch / [ed] Taavitsainen, I., Härmä, J., Korhonen, J. & Ursin, M., Helsingfors: Société Néophilologique , 2006, s. 275-294Kapittel i bok, del av antologi (Fagfellevurdert)
    Abstract [en]

    Dialogic language use can be defined as textual interaction between text participants in constructing and negotiating meaning in discourse. The articles in this multilingual volume show a rich variety of approaches and ask various pragmatic, text linguistic or sociolinguistic questions about synchronic and / or diachronic literary and nonliterary materials.

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