Fair priority setting is based on morally sound criteria. Still, there will be cases when these criteria, our primary considerations, are tied and therefore do not help us in choosing one allocation over another. It is sometimes suggested that such cases can be handled by tiebreakers. In this paper, we discuss two versions of tiebreakers suggested in the literature. One version is to preserve fairness or impartiality by holding a lottery. The other version is to allow secondary considerations, considerations that are not part of our primary priority setting criteria, to be decisive. We argue that the argument for preserving impartiality by holding a lottery is sound, while the argument for using tiebreakers as secondary considerations is not. Finally, we argue that the instances where a tiebreaker seems necessary are precisely the situations where we have strong reasons for preferring a lottery. We conclude that factors that we consider valuable should all be included among the primary considerations, while ties should be settled by lotteries.

How should scarce healthcare resources be distributed? This is a contentious issue that became especially pressing during the pandemic. It is often emphasised that studies exploring public views about this question provide valuable input to the issue of healthcare priority setting. While there has been a vast number of such studies it is rarely articulated, more specifically, what the results from these studies would mean for the justification of principles for priority setting. On the one hand, it seems unreasonable that public values would straightforwardly decide the ethical question of how resources should be distributed. On the other hand, in a democratic society, it seems equally unreasonable that they would be considered irrelevant for this question. In this paper we draw on the notion of reflective equilibrium and discuss the relevance and roles that empirical studies may plausibly have for justification in priority setting ethics. We develop a framework for analysing how different kinds of empirical results may have different kinds of implications for justification.

It is uncontroversial to claim that the extent to which health care interventions benefit patients is a relevant consideration for health care priority setting. However, when effects accrue to the individual patient, effects of a more indirect kind may accrue to other individuals as well, such as the patients children, friends, or partner. If, and if so how, such relational effects should be considered relevant in priority setting is contentious. In this paper, we illustrate this question by using disease-modifying drugs for Alzheimers disease as a case in point. The ethical analysis begins by sketching the so-called prima facie case for ascribing moral weight to relational effects and then moves on to consider a number of objections to it. We argue that, whereas one set of objections may be dismissed, there is another set of arguments that poses more serious challenges for including relational effects in priority setting.

Current studies indicate that robotic-assisted surgery is not inferior to laparoscopic or open surgery regarding oncologic or functional outcomes. An exception may be uterine cervix cancer, where the survival after minimal invasive surgery might not be as good as after open surgery. There is less bleeding and need for blood transfusion after robotic-assisted surgery, and postoperative complications are similar to open or laparoscopic surgery. Robotic-assisted surgery offers ergonomic advantages compared to laparoscopic surgery. The effect of the surgical learning curve is not sufficiently studied. Presently robotic-assisted surgery is not cost-effective due to high costs of investments. The operation is more time consuming than laparoscopic or open surgery with risks of delaying and cancellation of other operations.

Preexposure prophylaxis for HIV is a drug that reduces the risk for an HIV-negative person to acquire HIV if taken prior to sex. It has been suggested that it is important for resource allocation decisions that there are alternatives (such as abstinence, masturbation, etc.) for individuals potentially benefitted by this prophylaxis. In this paper we explore this idea from an ethical perspective in relation to three notions often discussed in priority setting ethics, namely responsibility, outcomes, and severity of disease. While the relevance of alternatives may be explained in terms by responsibility-sensitive priority setting, such a view comes with several challenges. We then discuss two other ways in which this intuition could be better explained: (a) in terms of total outcome of health, and (b) in terms of severity of the condition.

Intensive research is carried out to develop a disease-modifying drug for Alzheimers disease (AD). The development of drug candidates that reduce Ass or tau in the brain seems particularly promising. However, these drugs target people at risk for AD, who must be identified before they have any, or only moderate, symptoms associated with the disease. There are different strategies that may be used to identify these individuals (eg, population screening, cascade screening, etc). Each of these strategies raises different ethical challenges. In this paper, we analyse these challenges in relation to the risk stratification for AD necessary for using these drugs. We conclude that the new drugs must generate large health benefits for people at risk of developing AD to justify the ethical costs associated with current risk stratification methods, benefits much larger than current drug candidates have. This conclusion raises a new set of ethical questions that should be further discussed.

In recent years, the issue of accepting a higher cost per health improvement for orphan drugs has been the subject of discussion in health care policy agencies and the academic literature. This article aims to provide an analysis of broadly egalitarian arguments for and against accepting higher costs per health improvement. More specifically, we aim to investigate which arguments one should agree upon putting aside and where further explorations are needed. We identify three kinds of arguments in the literature: considerations of substantial equality, formal equality, and opportunity cost. We argue that considerations of substantial equality do not support higher costs per health improvement orphan drugs, even if such considerations are considered valid. On the contrary, arguments of formal equality may support accepting a higher cost per health improvement for orphan drugs. However, in order to do so, a number of both normative and empirical issues must be resolved; these issues are identified in the article. For instance, it must be settled to what extent the opportunity cost in terms of foregone health for other patients is acceptable in order to uphold formal equality. We conclude that certain arguments can be set aside, and future focus should be put on the unresolved normative and empirical issues related to formal equality and opportunity cost.

In a recent extended essay, philosopher Daniel Hausman goes a long way towards dismissing severity as a morally relevant attribute in the context of priority setting in healthcare. In this response, we argue that although Hausman certainly points to real problems with how severity is often interpreted and operationalised within the priority setting context, the conclusion that severity does not contain plausible ethical content is too hasty. Rather than abandonment, our proposal is to take severity seriously by carefully mapping the possibly multiple underlying accounts to well-established ethical theories, in a way that is both morally defensible and aligned with the term’s colloquial uses.

In a recent extended essay, philosopher Daniel Hausman goes a long way towards dismissing severity as a morally relevant attribute in the context of priority setting in healthcare. In this response, we argue that although Hausman certainly points to real problems with how severity is often interpreted and operationalised within the priority setting context, the conclusion that severity does not contain plausible ethical content is too hasty. Rather than abandonment, our proposal is to take severity seriously by carefully mapping the possibly multiple underlying accounts to well-established ethical theories, in a way that is both morally defensible and aligned with the term’s colloquial uses.

Background Genetic testing is moving from targeted investigations of monogenetic diseases to broader testing that may provide more information. For example, recent health economic studies of genetic testing for an increased risk of breast cancer suggest that it is associated with higher cost-effectiveness to screen for pathogenic variants in a seven gene panel rather than the usual two gene test for variants inBRCA1andBRCA2. However, irrespective of the extent to which the screening of the panel is cost-effective, there may be ethical reasons to not screen for pathogenic variants in a panel, or to revise the way in which testing and disclosing of results are carried out. Main text In this paper we discuss the ethical aspects of genetic testing for an increased risk of breast cancer with a special focus on the ethical differences between screening for pathogenic variants inBRCA1/2and a seven gene panel. The paper identifies that the panel increases the number of secondary findings as well as the number of variants of uncertain significance as two specific issues that call for ethical reflection. Conclusions We conclude that while the problem of handling secondary findings should not be overstated with regard to the panel, the fact that the panel also generate more variants of uncertain significance, give rise to a more complex set of problems that relate to the value of health as well as the value of autonomy. Therefore, it is insufficient to claim that the seven gene panel is preferable by only referring to the higher cost effectiveness of the panel.

How to balance the maximization of health and concerns for the worse off remains a challenge for health care decision makers when setting priorities. In regulatory guidelines these concerns are typically specified in terms of priority setting according to needs and priority setting according to cost-effectiveness. Still, it is often unclear when and why needs and cost-effectiveness diverge or overlap as guiding priority setting principles in practice. We conduct a comparative analysis of need and cost-effectiveness in the context of health care priority setting. Based on theories of distributive justice we specify three normative interpretations of need and explicate how these relate to the normative basis for cost-effectiveness analysis. Using priority-setting dilemmas we then move on to explicate when and why need and cost-effectiveness diverge as priority-setting principles. We find that: (i) although principles of need and cost-effectiveness may recommend the same allocation of resources the underlying reason for an allocation is different; (ii) while they both may give weight to patients who are worse off they do so in different ways and to different degree; and (iii) whereas cost-effectiveness clearly implies the aggregation of benefits across individuals principles of needs give no guidance with regard to if, and if so, how needs should be aggregated. Priority setting according to needs or cost-effectiveness does not necessarily recommend different allocations of resources. Thus, the normative conflict between them, often highlighted in practice, seems exaggerated. For health policy this is important knowledge because unclear conceptions may obstruct an informed public discussion. Moreover, if decision-makers are to properly account for both principles they need to recognize the inconsistencies as well as similarities between the two.

Priority setting in health care is ubiquitous and health authorities are increasingly recognising the need for priority setting guidelines to ensure efficient, fair, and equitable resource allocation. While cost-effectiveness concerns seem to dominate many policies, the tension between utilitarian and deontological concerns is salient to many, and various severity criteria appear to fill this gap. Severity, then, must be subjected to rigorous ethical and philosophical analysis. Here we first give a brief history of the path to todays severity criteria in Norway and Sweden. The Scandinavian perspective on severity might be conducive to the international discussion, given its long-standing use as a priority setting criterion, despite having reached rather different conclusions so far. We then argue that severity can be viewed as a multidimensional concept, drawing on accounts of need, urgency, fairness, duty to save lives, and human dignity. Such concerns will often be relative to local mores, and the weighting placed on the various dimensions cannot be expected to be fixed. Thirdly, we present what we think are the most pertinent questions to answer about severity in order to facilitate decision making in the coming years of increased scarcity, and to further the understanding of underlying assumptions and values that go into these decisions. We conclude that severity is poorly understood, and that the topic needs substantial further inquiry; thus we hope this article may set a challenging and important research agenda.

Intensive research is carried out by several pharmaceutical companies in order to develop a disease modifying drug for Alzheimer’s disease (AD). The development of drug candidates which reduce Aß and tau in the brain seems particularly promising. These drugs and the characteristics of AD raise a number of ethical challenges. In this report we analyze these challenges in relation to priority setting and the diagnostic measures associated with these drugs. The former analysis draws primarily on the Swedish ethical platform for health care priority setting, whereas the latter draws on the guidelines for screening developed by the National Board of Health and Welfare.

Although the effect of the new drugs is likely to have an impact on relatives of people with AD, it is our interpretation that the Swedish ethical platform leaves no room for such considerations.

In relation to the effect of the drugs there is also reason to pay special attention to the extent to which the surrogate measures used in the clinical studies are of clinical relevance.

When it comes to aggregating benefits across individuals, it is our interpretation that the platform does not allow aggregation of patient benefits in such a way. This means that the fact that people with AD constitute a large group of patients does not in itself constitute a reason for giving this group a higher priority. The ethical platform rather seems to prescribe that the effect must be assessed with regard to how it accrues to each individual. In a scenario where the budgetary impact becomes so great that decision makers need to prioritize within the group, it seems that there are no relevant criteria for these priorities.

AD is a condition with a very high degree of severity. However, as the new drugs are targeting the preclinical or Mild Cognitive Impairment (MCI) phase, the severity of the condition should be decreased with respect to the likelihood of actually developing AD. The severity of the condition thus becomes different for drugs that aim at the preclinical phase, those that aim at the MCI phase and those that aim at clinical stages of AD.

Solidarity considerations in the platform prescribes that people with AD may be less able than other patient groups to communicate their needs, they should therefore be given special consideration. However, this does not mean a higher priority but to stress that people with AD have the same right to health care as other groups with similar needs.

Population screening for AD is associated with several problems. There are general problems with screening from, for example, an autonomy point of view. But there are also problems related to the fact that current methods of risk stratification are so unreliable, which in turn results in false negatives (with risk of undertreatment) and false positives (with risk of overtreatment).

Screening in the MCI phase has (in addition to the problems that come with population screening) problems with inequality and arbitrariness. When the clinical phase begins, there is no longer any point with screening: the later the identification, the less potential treatment benefits compared to standard diagnostics.

It is our overall assessment that the new drugs must generate large health benefits for people at risk of developing AD in order to be eligible for general funding and to justify the ethical costs that come with current diagnostic methods.

Granulocyte transfusions have been administered to patients with life-threatening infections for more than five decades. However, to what extent this should be the case is far from established. On the one hand, the clinical effects of these transfusions are difficult to prove in clinical studies, and the donors of granulocytes may be exposed to certain risks. On the other hand, clinical experience seems to support the idea that granulocyte transfusions do play an important role for severely ill patients, and the donors are primarily motivated by altruistic reasons. In this paper, we first discuss the ethical issues that arise from the fact that there is a conflict between clinical experience and the results from the attempts to perform randomized control trials, and second, the risk/benefit assessment that has to be made between two different parties, namely the recipient and the donor of granulocyte transfusions.

There is a growing body of literature which suggests that decisions about healthcare priority setting should take into account the extent to which patients are worse off. However, such decisions are often based on how badly off patients are with respect to the condition targeted by the treatment whose priority is under consideration (condition-specific severity). In this paper I argue that giving priority to the worse off in terms of condition-specific severity does not reflect the morally relevant sense of being worse off. I conclude that an account of giving priority to the worse off relevant for healthcare priority setting should take into account how badly off patients are when all of their conditions are considered (holistic severity).

Principles of need are constantly referred to in health care priority setting. The common denominator for any principle of need is that it will ascribe some kind of special normative weight to people being worse off. However, this common ground does not answer the question how a plausible principle of need should relate to the aggregation of benefits across individuals. Principles of need are sometimes stated as being incompatible with aggregation and sometimes characterized as accepting aggregation in much the same way as utilitarians do. In this paper we argue that if one wants to take principles of need seriously both of these positions have unreasonable implications. We then characterize and defend a principle of need consisting of sufficientarian elements as well as prioritarian which avoids these unreasonable implications.

Föreliggande etiska analys rör pre- expositionsprofylax (PrEP) mot hiv som en hivnegativ person kan ta för att minska risken för att drabbas av en hivinfektion. Om PrEP tas som ordinerat ger det en ungefärlig skyddsgrad mot hiv på 85 % jämfört med en kontrollgrupp. Eftersom PrEP inte ger 100 % skydd och inte heller skyddar mot andra sexuellt överförbara sjukdomar så är rekommendationen att det tas i kombination med praktiserandet av säkert sex.

Den här etiska analysen har gjorts på uppdrag av NT-rådet och behandlar följande två frågeställningar: 1) finns det etiska skäl som talar emot förskrivning av PrEP; (2) hur bör PrEP prioriteras i relation till den etiska plattformen med ett särskilt fokus på huruvida PrEP bör egenfinanseras. Det finns starka skäl att minska smittspridningen av hiv utifrån såväl ett individ- som ett samhällsperspektiv vilket talar för förskrivning av PrEP. I diskussionen kring PrEP har det dock framförts att PrEP skiljer sig från annan preventiv behandling för att minska smittspridning på ett sätt som talar emot att PrEP förskrivs. Den etiska analysen diskuterar ett antal sådana argument: att friska personer utan medicinskt behov behandlas, att det handlar om ett socialt riskbeteende, att individer själva bör ta ansvar för smittspridning genom att ändra sitt beteende, samt risken för resistensproblematik. Slutsatsen är att inte något av dessa motargument är tillräckligt starkt för att tala emot förskrivningen av PrEP.

När det gäller prioritering av PrEP i relation till den etiska plattformen dras slutsatsen att PrEP hamnar i den lägre delen av prioriteringsskalan baserat på svårighetsgraden hos tillståndet som PrEP riktar sig emot. Det innebär att PrEP skulle kunna vara en kandidat för egenfinansiering.

Eftersom den etiska plattformen säger mycket lite om vilka åtgärder som bör egenfinaiseras så har analysen utgått från två ramverk presenterade i den internationella literaturen. Trots att flera aspekter av dessa ramverk talar för att PrEP skulle vara passande för egenfinansiering så väger aspekten av minskad smittspridning tungt. Dessa positiva externa effekter tillsammans med svårigheten att bedöma huruvida patientpopulationen skulle kunna egenfinansiera PrEP bidrar till bedömningen att PrEP bör finansieras inom ramen för det offentliga åtagandet.

The focus of this thesis is needs in the context of health care priority setting. The notion of needs has a strong standing in health care policy; however, how the idea should be understood more specifically and how it should guide decisions about priority setting remain contentious issues. The aim of this thesis is to explore how needs should be characterised in health care priority setting. This matter is approached by, first, exploring and developing the conceptual structure of health care needs, and second, discussing and suggesting solutions to normative questions that arise when needs are characterised as a distributive principle.

In the first article, the conceptual structure of needs in general and health care needs in particular is explored, and it is argued that a specific characterisation of health care needs is required.

In the second article, the notion of health care needs is explored in relation to preferences for health care within the context of shared decision-making. The paper further discusses a number of queries that arise in the intersection between what the patient needs and what the patient wants.

The third article discusses how a principle of need should handle questions about interpersonal aggregation. The paper characterises a principle of need which strikes a reasonable balance between giving priority to the worst off and the distribution of benefits with regard to interpersonal aggregation.

The fourth article discusses how a principle of need should account for the fact that patients often are badly off due to several conditions rather than one single condition. It is argued that how badly off patients are should be understood as a function of how badly off these patients are when all of their conditions (for which they need health care) are considered.

The frame story provides the terminological, theoretical, contextual, and methodological background for the discussion undertaken in this thesis. The conclusions of the articles are brought together and the discussion extended in the concluding discussion by sketching a number of conditions of adequacy for the concept and principle of need relevant for health care priority setting.  

How to handle orphan drugs for rare diseases is a pressing problem in current health-care. Due to the group size of patients affecting the cost of treatment, they risk being disadvantaged in relation to existing cost-effectiveness thresholds. In an article by Niklas Juth it has been argued that it is irrelevant to take indirectly operative factors like group size into account since such a compensation would risk discounting the use of cost, a relevant factor, altogether. In this article we analyze Juths argument and observe that we already do compensate for indirectly operative factors, both outside and within cost-effectiveness evaluations, for formal equality reasons. Based on this we argue that we have reason to set cost-effectiveness thresholds to integrate equity concerns also including formal equality considerations. We find no reason not to compensate for group size to the extent we already compensate for other factors. Moreover, groups size implying a systematic disadvantage also on a global scale, i.e. taking different aspects of the health condition of patients suffering from rare diseases into account, will provide strong reason for why group size is indeed relevant to compensate for (if anything).

In the editorial published in this journal, Daniels and colleagues argue that his and Sabin's accountability for reasonableness (A4R) framework should be used to handle ethical issues in the health technology assessment (HTA)-process, especially concerning fairness. In contrast to this suggestion, it is argued that such an approach risks suffering from the irrrelevance or insufficiency they warn against. This is for a number of reasons: lack of comprehensiveness, lack of guidance for how to assess ethical issues within the "black box" of A4R as to issues covered, competence and legitimate arguments and finally seemingly accepting consensus as the final verdict on ethical issues. We argue that the HTA community is already in a position to move beyond this black box approach.

Introduction Given healthcare resource constraints, voices are being raised to hold patients responsible for their health choices. In parallel, there is a growing trend towards shared decision-making, aiming to empower patients and give them more control over healthcare decisions. More power and control over decisions is usually taken to mean more responsibility for them. The trend of shared decision-making would therefore seem to strengthen the case for invoking individual responsibility in the healthcare priority setting. Objective To analyse whether the implementation of shared decision-making would strengthen the argument for invoking individual responsibility in the healthcare priority setting using normative analysis. Results and conclusions Shared decision-making does not constitute an independent argument in favour of employing individual responsibility since these notions rest on different underlying values. However, if a health system employs shared decision-making, individual responsibility may be used to limit resource implications of accommodating patient preferences outside professional standards and goals. If a healthcare system employs individual responsibility, high level dynamic shared decision-making implying a joint deliberation resulting in a decision where both parties are willing to revise initial standpoints may disarm common objections to the applicability of individual responsibility by virtue of making patients more likely to exercise adequate control of their own actions. However, if communication strategies applied in the shared decision-making are misaligned to the patients initial capacities, arguments against individual responsibility might, on the other hand, gain strength.

Det finns ett ökat intresse för patientinflytande i vården. Ett sådant fokus kan dock komma i konflikt med ett antal värden/praktiker inom vården. I denna artikel identifierar vi att följande värden/praktiker kan påverkas: 

Idén om patientens vårdbehov förefaller tappa sin moraliska och politiska ställning. 

Prioriteringar på gruppnivå kan bli svårare att tillämpa på individnivå. 

Det kan bli svårare att bedöma nyttan med behandlingar. 

Det kan bli svårare att få fram evidens för behandlingar. 

Det tycks komplicera idén om den följsamme patienten. 

Det kan innebära vissa implikationer för resursanvändning. 

Det kan ge ett nytt perspektiv på idén om att prioritera efter en ansvarsprincip.

In this paper we explore the relation between health-care needs and patients desires within shared decision-making (SDM) in a context of priority setting in health care. We begin by outlining some general characteristics of the concept of health-care need as well as the notions of SDM and desire. Secondly we will discuss how to distinguish between needs and desires for health care. Thirdly we present three cases which all aim to bring out and discuss a number of queries which seem to arise due to the double focus on a patients need and what that patient desires. These queries regard the following themes: the objectivity and moral force of needs, the prediction about what kind of patients which will appear on a micro level, implications for ranking in priority setting, difficulties regarding assessing and comparing benefits, and implications for evidence-based medicine.

One generally considered plausible way to allocate resources in health care is according to people’s needs. In this paper I focus on a somewhat overlooked issue, that is the conceptual structure of health care needs. It is argued that what conceptual understanding of needs one has is decisive in the assessment of what qualifies as a health care need and what does not. The aim for this paper is a clarification of the concept of health care need with a starting point in the general philosophical discussion about needs. I outline three approaches to the concept of need and argue that they all share the same conceptual underpinnings. The concept of need is then analyzed in terms of a subject x needing some object y in order to achieve some goal z. I then discuss the relevant features of the object y and the goal z which make a given need qualify as a health care need and not just a need for anything.

Method

The assignment from the National Board of Health and Welfare consists of three related parts. Part one presents different interpretations of the concept “care that cannot be deferred” based on an analysis of how the concept is used in the government bill and the wording of the Act. Several criteria are used to specify these interpretations. Part two analyses the interpretations of the concept “care that cannot be deferred” discussed in part one. The analysis is based on the ethics platform for priority setting. Part three aims to analyse how the concept “care that cannot be deferred” relates to the National Model for Transparent Prioritisation in Swedish Health Care and discuss whether it can be used to support prioritisation and rationing. The theoretical analysis is complemented by several examples of practical decision-making situations, as described by clinicians, that involve the care of non-registered individuals.

Analysis

In this report we have formulated several criteria that the concept “care that cannot be deferred” must fulfil according to the law (2012/13:407).

These criteria address: Care need: The individual has a care need – i.e. a discrepancy exists between the desired and actual condition, which can be influenced by a care intervention.

Limitations: The provider may place limitations on “care that cannot be deferred” delivered to non-registered individuals in Sweden and who are 18 years of age or older. Such limitations should be based on considerations involving:

• Severity of the condition (current ill health, risk for future ill health, or special needs arising from previous assault and trauma).
• Effect of the intervention if it is provided now compared to deferred intervention.
• Cost-effectiveness of the intervention if it is provided now compared to deferred intervention.

Limited responsibility: When applying the concept “care that cannot be deferred” the provider should assume that the individual is expected to be in Sweden for a limited time, but it is not necessary to consider the person’s opportunities to receive care once he/she is no longer in Sweden.

Expanded responsibility: When applying the concept “care that cannot be deferred” the provider should assume that the individual is expected to be in Sweden a limited time, but should also consider the person’s opportunities to receive care once he/she is no longer in Sweden.

Conclusions

Based on the care need criterion, we conclude that non-registered individuals who seek care should be adequately evaluated in each case so the provider can determine whether a care need exists.

We conclude that the limited responsibility criterion conflicts with the human dignity principle when it comes to limiting care based on chronological age and national registration. Further we conclude that the rationing of care implied by the limited responsibility criterion does not appear to be based on limited resources, but that the non-registered individual does not have the same right to health services as the nationally registered population does.

We conclude that in choosing between the limited and the expanded responsibility criteria, the latter is preferable in light of the ethical platform since, to a greater extent, the expanded responsibility criterion allows consideration of relevant aspects (e.g. severity level, effect of intervention, and cost effectiveness) similar to the way the registered population is treated. Further, we conclude that the time limitation of the responsibility criteria is difficult to address since in many cases it is highly uncertain how long a person can remain in Sweden without necessary authorisation.

We conclude that the factors presented for determining how to define “care that cannot be deferred” are basically the same as those in the national model for priority setting – i.e. severity of the condition (current and potential), effect of the intervention (and how it changes over time), and cost effectiveness. Concurrently we point to several contradictions in defining the definition, and in the law generally, that conflict with the ethical platform and the national model for priority setting. This includes the cases where specific diagnostic or treatment areas are explicitly noted, regardless of severity level, effect of intervention, or cost effectiveness.

Further, we conclude that it is possible to point to several general combinations of severity level, effect of intervention, and cost effectiveness that can define “care that cannot be deferred” – so these combinations are very difficult to apply at the individual level. The reason is that it is difficult to determine individual risks and effects. As regards the registered population, a normal way to determine risks or effects would be either to provide treatment “for safety’s sake” or to wait, thus providing the opportunity for the patient to return if the  condition deteriorates or for the provider to call the patient for a return visit. If the provider decides that care can be deferred, usually there is an opportunity for a new evaluation at the initiative of the patient or provider. Since it is less certain that patients in the non-registered population can return for a new evaluation, it might seem reasonable to offer treatment more often for safety’s sake. Concurrently, this must be balanced against the risks associated with treatment and the opportunities to follow up on these risks wherever the individual resides.

The first part of this report draws attention to the vast amount of different criteria for policymakers to consider in priority setting decisions. There are several similarities between criteria that have been used in decision making in different countries and regions. However, it is interesting to highlight an important difference between the Swedish ethical platform and other countries and regions. The difference lies in the lexical ordering between the principles in the Swedish platform. This implies that one should take into account the principle of human dignity before the principle of need and solidarity and that the same relation should apply between the principle of need and solidarity and the principle of cost effectiveness. This strict hierarchy does not exist between principles in other countries. Similarities between different ethical platforms are especially found in relation to the principle of need or severity of the disease of which both play an important role in all countries and regions. Cost- effectiveness is another criterion that appears in all platforms that we have included in this report. Furthermore, it should be mentioned that the effect of an intervention plays an important role in all of the studies and reports that we have included. In several cases, there is a special focus on the prioritization of interventions with a proven efficacy. The above mentioned criteria are the most commonly present in reports on priority setting in health care but there are many other criteria which may be relevant to consider. It should also be noted that there are great similarities between the various reports on what should not constitute a basis for prioritization. For example, many countries and regions are reluctant to include chronological age as one criterion in their official reports.

The second part of the report presents the methods of multi-criteria analysis; an umbrella term for various methods that uses a formalized process and ranks different alternatives on how they perform on a number of selected criteria. The different steps of a general multi-criteria analysis are presented: (1) identification of the object (2) construction of the model (3) evaluation of results and (4) the development of an action plan. A performance matrix, which is a standard tool for multi-criteria, is illustrated. In the next step, a selection of a number of various methods is presented, namely: direct analysis of the performance matrix, ordinal methods, the even swap-method, multi-attribute utility theory (MAUT), and the analytic hierarchy process (AHP). A number of applications of multi-criteria analysis have been performed in the area of health care decision making and the advantages and disadvantages of applying these methods in this area are highlighted.

Detta kapitel presenterar de rättviseteorier som brukar diskuteras i samband med prioriteringar inom hälso- och sjukvården. Målet med prioriteringar är i grund och botten att uppnå en större rättvisa i fördelningen av knappa hälso- och sjukvårdsresurser. Men hur ska man egentligen förstå rättvisa? Det är ett normativt begrepp som kan diskuteras utifrån ett antal teorier som också presenteras här. Den svenska etiska plattformen presenteras närmare liksom dess koppling till etablerade rättviseteorier. Slutligen redovisas några etiska principer som den svenska riksdagen tagit avstånd från.

Som vi visat har utvecklingen av metoder och strukturer för öppna prioriteringar i Sverige kommit långt. Många frågor återstår likväl. Under vårt arbete med denna bok har vi identifierat ett antal förbättringsområden och utmaningar som vi avslutningsvis vill lyfta fram. Det rör sig om vilka som ska delta i prioriteringarna, tydliggörande av värdegrunden, behov av bättre kunskap, baserad på både vetenskaplig metod och erfarenhet, och fortsatt utveckling av prioriteringsprocesser på olika nivåer och i olika sammanhang. Även om vi i Sverige skulle nå en god enighet kring principer och kriterier för prioriteringar så kommer vi alltid finna många olika sätt att praktiskt lösa specifika prioriteringsproblem.