Wind power production is expanding globally and with this comes social resistance. In this article, we study controversies concerning the expansion of wind power in Sweden between 2009 and 2022. To this end, we study national press coverage and local press coverage from Sweden's 290 municipalities. Despite previous studies showing that Swedish people are generally in favour of expanding wind power, our results show that this policy is controversial and often is met with significant local resistance. We identify a clash between two environmental concerns: developing national policies to mitigate the effects of climate change and local opinions calling for the preservation of natural landscapes, which are often coupled with concerns about whether expansion of wind power leads to positive climate effects. We analyse national and local discourses through a multi-level governance perspective, a view that argues Sweden's market-oriented and decentralized wind power planning regime feeds the controversy. In conclusion, the dispersal of power throughout the planning system facilitates scaling up of local resistance to an energy policy issue of national concern, creating significant uncertainty about the expansion of wind power in Sweden.

Sweden has experienced two decades of wind power expansion and enters a broad diffusion phase. In this study the aim is to deepen the knowledge of the municipal role in this phase in relation to national wind power policy. Local public officials and politicians was interviewed in fourteen Swedish municipalities. The results show that municipal representatives experience great uncertainty about the responsibilities and incentives they have in the energy transition – responsibilities that are difficult to interpret but also difficult to realize in practice. In conclusion, unclear State policy, increased social resistance, lacking municipal capabilities, and a market-driven planning regime adds a burden of incongruous responsibility on municipalities, which risks enforcing uncertainties in the transition of the national energy system. The study brings socio-technical insight to the global expansion of renewable energy within decentralized political systems.

Sweden has set itself aspirational climate goals to reduce its fossil fuel dependence, and has the ambition of being a global climate transition leader. These goals have proven difficult to achieve in the transport system. In this paper we describe the development since 2016 of a broad and heterogeneous discourse coalition in favour of more strategic governance in Swedish transport planning, encompassing business, trade unions, environmental experts and green-left politicians. We first analyse their claims for a radical reorientation of Swedish transport planning, which are shown to focus on fiscal rules, a lack of political courage, and slow-moving environmental legislation processes, as three main reasons why the transport system is slow to transition. We then discuss whether these claims constitute a politicisation of the climate policy discourse, or rather a new iteration of the previously depoliticised discourse.

The paper traces a discursive shift in Swedish transport decarbonisation discourse, by which neoliberal hegemony has been increasingly challenged through the emergence of an eco-Keynesian discourse coalition encompassing trade unions, business and industry, and green and left-wing members of parliament. The investigation testifies to the importance of political ideas in effecting discursive change, and in restricting subject positions within discourses. The Swedish case is informative for transport decarbonisation in general for the tensions it harbours between classic Social Democratic industrial policy and neoliberalism, and between historical continuity and radical discontinuity. In particular, it reveals how the return to a specific historical idea of the state determines the subject positions of actors within the new discourse coalition. 

Trots upprepade politiska utfästelser om att transportsystemet ska bli fossilfritt har dess omställning gått trögt. Det har länge funnits en påtaglig kontrast mellan visionerna för transportsystemets omställning och de faktiskt vidtagna åtgärderna. De dominerande förklaringarna till denna kontrast, liksom föreställningarna om vad som kan göras, har skiftat över tid och beroende på vilken regering som suttit vid makten. I grunden kretsar de emellertid alltid kring samma frågor: Hur väl rustat är det svenska planeringssystemet för att genomföra en fundamental omställning av transporterna? I vilken omfattning kräver transportsystemets omställning en mer djupgående förändring av samhället? Vilken roll bör stat och marknad ha i transportsystemets omställning? I denna bok skildrar vi hur den offentliga diskussionen om transportsystemet förändrats under de fyra olika regeringar som suttit vid makten mellan 2006-2022. Genom att följa formuleringen av politiska visioner i statliga utredningar och hur dessa visioner diskuterats i den offentliga debatten visar vi hur en period av utpräglat marknadsliberal politik utmanas av klimatkeynesianistiska idéer. Samtidigt har hela undersökningsperioden karakteriserats av betydande institutionella låsningar.

The world’s agricultural production is declining due to severe loss of soil fertility through natural processes or because of human activities. Biochar has been identified as a potential soil amendment to regain its fertility and increase crop productivity. This study aimed to assess the effects of biochar on soil nutrients and crop yields in the southern highlands of Tanzania. Data were collected through key informant and household interviews, and from sampling of soils in coffee farms where biochar of maize cobs origin was incorporated at the rate of 3 t ha^-1. Purposive sampling approach was deployed to identify the villages in which farmers have been incorporating biochar in farms. A total of 172 households, 30 key informants, and 12 top and subsoil samples were involved in this study. Quantitative data were analyzed using SPSS version 20, and excel spreadsheet was used for descriptive results and relationships. The findings revealed that biochar significantly increased soil pH, iron (Fe), organic carbon (OC), cation exchange capacity (CEC) and exchangeable bases (potassium-K, magnesium-Mg). T - tests showed significant increase of soil nutrients in biochar treated soils. In addition, biochar increased coffee and maize yields from 1 t ha^-1 to 3 t ha^-1.

"Med begreppet 'kunskapscirkulation' vill Larsson Heidenblad konkretisera hur kunskapsprids mellan aktörer i samhället. Det aktörsnära perspektivet motiveras av författaren som en sorts medelväg mellan å ena sidan abstrakta, diskursteoretiska analyser och å andra sidan tematiskt snäva miljöhistoriska studier." Läs Simon Haikolas recension af boken Den gröna vändingen.

This chapter analyses the history of opposition to large-scale hydropower in Sweden and reasons it succeed in using ethical arguments to stop further expansion of hydropower in the 1970s. It finds that framing of oppositional arguments, elite participation, the existence of nuclear power as a plausible energy alternative and a political opportunity in the form of parliamentary dynamics were prerequisites for its success.

Biochar may contribute to both agricultural productivity and atmospheric carbon dioxide removal. However, despite the many potential upsides of adding biochar to amend carbon-depleted soils in sub-Saharan Africa, deployment is largely lacking. This paper explores the socio-economic factors that can explain tendencies to avoid action. Based on a survey of 172 farming households, key informant interviews, and focus group discussions in the Mbeya and Songwe regions of Tanzania, which were targeted for a biochar aid program in 2014, several socio-economic drivers behind the continued use of biochar deployment were identified in this follow-up study. A key deployment driver was the increased crop yields, perceived to be the result of adding biochar to soils, increasing yields from 1 metric ton per hectare to 3 metric tons per hectare. Food security and family income were cited as the main reasons to engage in biochar production and use. Climate change mitigation and increased resilience were other key reasons that motivated adoption. In terms of socio-economic factors, farmers with low education and income, the majority being males aged 40–60 years, contributed to low adoption rates in the study area. Respondents often cited the alternative usage of biochar feedstocks, lack of government involvement or extension services, traditions, and farming customs as the main constraints limiting biochar deployment.

In contrast to its successful decarbonisation of the electricity system, Sweden has failed to achieve momentum in its attempts to decarbonise transport. This paper examines the reasons for this failure by investigating the discourse around investment in Swedish transport infrastructure. Our analysis focusses specifically on discussions about establishing high-speed rail (HSR) spanning 25 years. We identify three central discursive themes: the issue of financing, the role of the state in socio-technical change, and fatalism. We then trace these themes to storylines within the HSR discourse that each tell a story about good transport governance, informed by a specific interpretation of Swedish modernisation. Four storylines converge in a ‘‘deflationary’’ discourse coalition, characterised by ideas of sound finance and depoliticised governance, that reinforces material dependencies on existing transport infrastructure. A competing, ‘‘Weberian’’ discourse coalition is united through a contrasting storyline that instead highlights state capacity as evidenced by Swedish modernisation.

This perspective paper illustrates that the critical debate regarding geological storage of carbon dioxide has been discursively marginalised in recent years. However, two crucial factors make it reasonable to assume that significant storage-related uncertainties and challenges still exist.

Firstly, experiences of geological storage are primarily related to enhanced oil recovery. Secondly, recent assessments indicate a doubling of the required quantity compared to what was envisioned back in 2005. Therefore, there seems to be a contradiction: as the visions of geological carbon dioxide storage have grown increasingly ambitious, the risks and challenges associated with storage have been marginalised.

The paper suggests geological storage should become a topic of concern for critical social science and concludes with a reflection on five tentative explanations to the discursive marginalisation: 1) Increasing experience and knowledge have resulted in reduced risks; 2) The climate crisis and urgency have supported a broader acceptance of controversial mitigation options; 3) A shifting focus from fossil fuels with CCS to bioenergy with CCS has introduced new and salient problems that make storage-related challenges seem relatively less significant; 4) Coupling CCS to bioenergy has disarmed critics that primarily argue against prolongation of the fossil fuel era, and finally 5) Familiarisation and normalisation processes.

Carbon capture and storage (CCS), including bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS), could contribute to climate change mitigation strategies. However, the 2020s is not the first time that CCS is high on the agenda. This study explores the differences between the past and current developments of CCS and discusses how incumbent actors' experiences can inform the understanding of potential future energy system transitions in Sweden. For this purpose, a multi-level perspective (MLP) analysis was conducted based on documents, in- terviews and focus groups with key actors. Since the 2000s, increased urgency of climate change has further pushed policy makers into action. In addition, there is a new framing of CCS that underscores the potential of BECCS to provide negative carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions, as well as prospects for offshore storage of CO2 in Norway and other territories. As such, this study shows that Sweden could be on a transformation pathway towards implementing CCS alongside other mitigation measures.

Biochar was recently included as a promising negative emissions technology (NET) in theSpecial Report on Global Warming of 1.5 °C published by the Intergovernmental Panelon Climate Change. Unlike other NETs, it can potentially be used to mitigate global climatechange while adding to local resilience in countries highly exposed and sensitive toimpacts of climate change, such as least-developed countries (LDCs). The study is as anempirical contribution to the, as of yet, underdeveloped literature on deployment of negativeemissions technologies in LDCs in general and on biochar use in developing countriesand LDCs specifically. Nine historical and existing biochar projects in Tanzania aremapped in order to analyse problems, goals and common trade-offs associated with smalltomedium-scale biochar production in LDCs. The mapping is based on a literature anddocument study, interviews with project actors, and on-site visits to biochar projects during2019. The paper gives support to the observation made in the biochar literature thatwhile biochar has many potential socio-economic and environmental benefits, combiningthem in one single project is difficult. It is concluded that implementing biochar projects inTanzania will likely involve trade-offs between the development and subsistence strategiesand needs of local communities, the motivational forces of different project participants,and the uneven regulatory capacity of the state. We end by reflecting on the use of biocharprojects to offset carbon emissions made elsewhere.

Agriculture in the least developed countries (LDCs) is highly vulnerable to the impacts of climate change. Applying biochar to soils has been proposed as a solution, especially in the carbon-depleted and acid sub-Saharan soils. Correctly applied, biochar increases yield capacities, decreases contamination, and promotes resilience. Hope is that biochar will store atmospheric carbon in soils, thus generating negative emissions. Nonetheless, several goal conflicts may arise, for example, between the global aspirations to achieve negative carbon emissions and local sustainability. Using interviews, a survey, and field visits to biochar initiatives in Tanzania, this chapter explores deployment drivers and barriers in LDCs and their implications for biochar carbon removal in local contexts. As such, it seeks to address a gap in the literature on actual, opposed to hypothesized, engagement of biochar practitioners. The chapter concludes that the idea of carbon removal alone is unlikely to motivate widespread biochar deployment in LDCs. Optimization of carbon content and stability must be balanced against maximizing yields with minimum inputs. Tangible results drive deployment among smallholders and agricultural businesses alike, yet developing biochar systems is challenging due to their complexity and long lead times. Thus, while financing and external expertise are vital at the initial stages, education,  wareness, and persistent demonstration are key to sustained action.

Paris Agreement-compatible emissions pathways produced by integrated assessment models (IAMs) often rely on large amounts of carbon dioxide removals, especially afforestation and bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS). These pathways feature prominently in the work of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), to the extent that the IAMs have been granted an interpretative privilege at the interface between climate science, economics, and policymaking. The privilege extends to and influences climate governance, including governance of BECCS. This paper contributes to recent debates about the role of the IPCC, and its framing of BECCS, at the science-policy interface. By analyzing all BECCS-related expert review comments and author responses on the IPCC Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5°C, the paper shows that boundary work influences the representation of BECCS by authors referring to: (1) a limited scope or capacity; (2) a restrictive mandate; (3) what constitutes legitimate science, and; (4) relativizing uncertainties. The responses to the review comments indicate a significant degree of compliance on behalf of the authors. Yet, the revisions do not seem to go to the heart of the unease that runs through many of the reviewer comments, i.e., that BECCS seems to be presented as a viable CDR technology at grand scale. While several revisions serve to clarify uncertainties surrounding BECCS, some fundamental aspects of the critique are deflected, through the boundary work identified. What the analysis reveals, beyond a dissatisfaction among many reviewers with the focus on integrated assessment modeling, the associated pathway literature, and analysis of BECCS, is a disagreement about how model results should be interpreted and communicated. While acknowledging the herculean task of the IPCC and the efforts to improve the pathway literature that the SR1.5 triggered within the IAM communities, we argue that the identified boundary work also risks entrenching rather than problematize dominant framings of the feasibility of BECCS. Such entrenchment can counteract the ambition of opening up the scientific work of the IPCC to include more diversity in the process of drafting reports, and arguably also influence the governance of CDR.

Bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS) plays a central role in scenario pathways that limit global warming in line with the objectives of the Paris Agreement. Yet deliberate policy efforts to incentivise BECCS—whether through amending existing climate policies or introducing entirely new ones—remain rare. In this paper, we contend that BECCS must be incentivised responsibly, through policy-making processes which account for diverse and geographically varying societal values and interests. More specifically, we make the case for responsible incentivisation by undertaking a comparative analysis of stakeholder attitudes to four idealised policy scenarios for BECCS, including representatives of government, business, nongovernmental and academic communities, in the UK and Sweden. The scenarios were: business as usual; international policy reform; national BECCS policy; and national policy for negative emissions technologies. Based on our findings, we recommend that policymakers 1) recognise the need to develop new incentives and make enabling reforms to existing policy instruments; 2) consider the risk of mitigation deterrence in their real world (and not abstracted) contexts; 3) employ multi-instrument approaches to incentivisation that do not overly rely on carbon pricing or 4) force a choice between technology specific or technology neutral policies; and 5) attend to the diversity of stakeholder and wider public perspectives that will ultimately determine the success—or failure—of their policy designs.

In recent years, bio-energy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS) has been awarded a key role in climate mitigation scenarios explored by integrated assessment models and referenced in reports by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Because a majority of scenarios limiting global warming to 2 °C or 1,5 °C include vast deployment of BECCS, a critical discussion has emerged among experts about the moral implications of thus introducing an unproven technology into the policy realm.

In this paper, we analyse this discussion as it has played out between 2013 and 2019, with a focus on how expert narratives are constructed in the mass media about the possibilities for decarbonisation within the current political-economic order. We find there are almost no narratives that support massive deployment of BECCS, and that all narratives presuppose limits to decarbonisation imposed by the current political-economic system. The perception of such limits lead some to argue, through deterministic and apolitical narratives, for the necessity of negative emissions technologies, while others argue instead that “degrowth” is the only solution. Thus, there is a distinct lack of positive narratives about how capitalism can bring about decarbonisation.

Sweden and Finland have national goals to reach net negative greenhouse gas emissions before mid-century. Achieving these ambitious goals could employ negative emission technologies, such as bioenergy with carbon capture and storage, but it is unclear how this technology could be realized in an energy transition. Sweden and Finland stand out for having a large share of substantial point source emissions of biogenic carbon dioxide, in the production of pulp, heat and power. In the European Pollutant Release and Transfer Register, Sweden and Finland reported 64% and 51% biogenic emissions, respectively, in facilities emitting over 100 kt of carbon dioxide in 2017, while the corresponding collective figure for all European states in the database is 6%. This qualitative study highlights company actors’ perspectives on bioenergy with carbon capture and storage within a Nordic regional context and explores their perspective on emerging tensions in the energy transition. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with 20 of the 24 companies with the largest point sources of biogenic emissions. The results are framed around four emerging tensions regarding bioenergy with carbon capture and storage from companies’ perspectives in this study: (1) absence of reliable long-term policies; (2) limits to companies’ climate change responsibility; (3) technical trade-offs of carbon capture; and (4) lack of customer demands for negative emissions. According to most of the companies, it is technically feasible to capture carbon dioxide, but it could be a challenge to determine who is responsible to create a financially viable business case, to enact supporting policies, and to build transport and storage infrastructure. Company representatives argue that they already contribute to a sustainable society, therefore bioenergy with carbon capture and storage is not their priority without government collaboration. However, they are willing to contribute more and could have an increasing role towards an energy transition in an international context.

This study investigates the consequences of dramatic price fluctuations on the global iron ore market between boom and bust for the Swedish communities Kiruna and Pajala, located above the polar circle, in the years 2006-2018. It focuses on the impact of the Swedish state’s reorientation towards neoliberal policies that have entailed reduced state involvement in peripheral communities still dependant on heavy industry. This reorientation was manifested in the Mineral Strategy presented by the liberal-conservative government in 2013, in which the state was prescribed a role as facilitator of investment of foreign and private capital in the Swedish mining sector, but not as an active owner or developer of mining enterprises. The neoliberalisation of Swedish mining has established a fundamental conflict of interests between communities whose economic, social and cultural wellbeing depends on long-term state commitment, and the state whose main interests are aimed at global capital flows rather than the maintenance of industrial production in peripheral regions. This conflict remained latent as long as global mineral prices were high, but as boom turned to bust around 2012, it was activated in a way that highlighted asymmetric relations of power and economic development between the sparsely populated and resource-rich northern parts of the country and the densely populated south.

Bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS) is considered a key mitigation technology in most 1.5–2.0°C compatible climate change mitigation scenarios. Nonetheless, examples of BECCS deployment are lacking internationally. It is widely acknowledged that widespread implementation of this technology requires strong policy enablers, and that such enablers are currently non-existent. However, the literature lacks a more structured assessment of the “incentive gap” between scenarios with substantive BECCS deployment and existing policy enablers to effectuate BECCS deployment. Sweden, a country with progressive climate policies and particularly good preconditions for BECCS, constitutes a relevant locus for such examinations. The paper asks to what extent and how existing UN, EU, and Swedish climate policy instruments incentivize BECCS research, development, demonstration, and deployment in Sweden. The analysis is followed by a tentative discussion of needs for policy reform to improve the effectiveness of climate policy in delivering BECCS. Drawing on a tripartite typology of policy instruments (economic, regulatory, and informational) and the ability of these instruments to create supply-push or demand-pull, the article finds that: (1) no instruments create a demand-pull to cover operational expenditure; (2) economic instruments provide partial support for research and the capital expenditure associated with demonstration, and; (3) regulatory instruments provide partial clarity on environmental safeguards and responsibilities. A few regulatory barriers also continue to counteract deployment. The article concludes that the existing policy mix requires considerable reform if BECCS is to contribute substantially to the Swedish target for net-zero emissions. Continued effort to dismantle regulatory barriers must be complemented with a strong demand-pull instrument that complements the current focus on supply-push incentives. If unreformed, the existing policy mix will most likely lead to substantial public expenditure on BECCS research, development, and demonstration without leading to any substantial deployment and diffusion.

Most mitigation scenarios compatible with a likely change of holding global warming well below 2 °C rely on negative emissions technologies (NETs). According to the integrated assessment models (IAMs) used to produce mitigation scenarios for the IPCC reports, the NET with the greatest potential to achieve negative emissions is bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS). Crucial questions arise about where the enormous quantities of biomass needed according to the IAM scenarios could feasibly be produced in a sustainable manner. Africa is attractive in the context of BECCS because of large areas that could contribute biomass energy and indications of substantial underground  CO2 storage capacities. However, estimates of large biomass availability in Africa are usually based on highly aggregated datasets, and only a few studies explore future challenges or barriers for BECCS in any detail. Based on previous research and literature, this paper analyses the pre-conditions for BECCS in Tanzania by studying what we argue are the applications of BECCS, or the components of the BECCS chain, that are most feasible in the country, namely (1) as applied to domestic sugarcane-based energy production (bioethanol), and (2) with Tanzania in a producer and re-growth role in an international BECCS chain, supplying biomass or biofuels for export to developed countries. The review reveals that a prerequisite for both options is either the existence of a functional market for emissions trading and selling, making negative emissions a viable commercial investment, or sustained investment through aid programmes. Also, historically, an important barrier to the development of production capacity of liquid biofuels for export purposes has been given by ethical dilemmas following in the wake of demand for land to facilitate production of biomass, such as sugarcane and jatropha. In these cases, conflicts over access to land and mismanagement have been more of a rule than an exception. Increased production volumes of solid biomass for export to operations that demand bioenergy, be it with or without a CCS component, is likely to give rise to similar conflicts. While BECCS may well play an important role in reducing emissions in countries with high capacity to act combined with existing large point sources of biogenic  CO2 emissions, it seems prudent to proceed with utmost caution when implicating BECCS deployment in least developed countries, like Tanzania.The paper argues that negative BECCS-related emissions from Tanzania should not be assumed in global climate mitigation scenarios.

The incongruence between the United Nations objective to hold global warming well below 2 °C and the rate of global emission reductions has intensified interest in negative emissions. Previous research has explored several pros and cons of individual negative emissions technologies. Systematised approaches to comparing and prioritising among them are, however, largely lacking. In response to this gap in the literature, this article reviews the scientific literature on indicators for designing negative emissions climate stabilisation value indexes. An index typically provides summary measures of several components, often denoted indicators. Utilizing a narrative review methodology, the article derives five categories of indicators underpinned by overlapping and often mutually reinforcing environmental and socio-economic values. A list of 21 indicators are proposed to capture both positive and negative values associated with effectiveness, efficiency, scale, risk, and synergies. While discussing indicators capable of providing guidance on negative emissions is timely, given the emerging shift away from pure emission reduction targets towards net-zero targets, numerous complexities are involved in determining their relative values. The results herein serve to inform policy making on the prioritisation and incentivisation of negative emissions technologies capable of delivering on the new objectives, and the results highlight the many risks and uncertainties involved in such exercises. The article concludes that systematic research on the comparison of NETs is incomplete. An iterative, interdisciplinary research programme exploring such questions has the potential to be extremely rewarding

The paper covers the public debate on BECCS (bioenergy with carbon capture and storage) between 2008 and 2018. Through a qualitative analysis of around 800 feature articles, editorials, and opinion pieces published in English, German, Swedish, Danish, and Norwegian in news media and debates sections of scientific media, we highlight conspicuous aspects of the debate and relate them to the theoretical concept of post-normal science. We find that the debate is characterized by an emphasis on values, scientific uncertainty and the integrity of science, premised on a pervading sense of urgency. To a significant extent, the debate can be understood as a “normal” view of science questioning what it perceives to be unscientific model-based climate scenarios, and the scenarios, in turn, can be seen as a response to post-normal circumstances. The urgency permeating the debate provides conditions for open debate about ethical and epistemological uncertainty. The debate goes through a period of polarization – corroborating findings from previous studies on the climate science debate after COP21 – between an intense critique of BECCS inclusion in climate scenarios and reluctant acceptance thereof. Towards the end of the studied period, emphasis shifts towards reluctant acceptance, indicating that post-normal debate may only occur as a temporary state always tending towards new consensus.

Bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS) has recently risen to international prominence due to its modelled potential to allow a mid-term temperature overshoot compensated by large, long-term removal of carbon dioxide from the atmosphere. The technology, however, is far from commercial. Therefore, BECCS is a suitable entry point for exploring how modellers identify, manage and communicate uncertainties. By applying framing analysis to 21 interviews with researchers working directly or closely with integrated assessment models (IAMs), three prevalent cognitive frames are identified: Climate scenarios as (1) talking points to discuss possible futures, (2) fundamentally political prescriptions that foreclose alternatives, and (3) distortions of pure science. The discourse around IAMs has entered a phase of critical reflection about their performative, political dimensions, both inside and outside of the IA modelling community. This phase is marked by modellers grappling with the responsibilities that are perceived to come with simultaneously providing maps of possible futures and standards by which these maps are to be evaluated.

An argument within the wider theory of postpolitics that has gained traction over the last decade is that environmental concerns in general, and climate policy in particular, are especially conducive to depoliticization. In this paper, we take issue with this notion by presenting an empirical case study of the repoliticization of Swedish mining and then, on the basis of this analysis, offer theoretical reflections on how to better understand depoliticization and repoliticization of the environment. We argue for the use of a narrow definition of 'depoliticization', and that sufficient attention must be paid to temporal and scalar differentiation of continuous processes of de- and repoliticization, and that normative assumptions of what constitutes the genuinely political should be abandoned. We argue that environmental concerns harbour large potential for effective politicization, and that this politicization occurs as a response to depoliticization, through concurrent, cross-fertilizing and intertwined processes of repoliticization across scales both inside and outside of formal channels of government, whereby previously depoliticized state agencies may become crucial.

Den svenska gruvpolitiken under 2000-talet kan i stora drag sammanfattas som präglad av ett pånyttfött intresse från statligt håll för framförallt de exploateringsmässiga förutsättningarna för gruvindustrin, och en social mobilisering på lokal såväl som nationell nivå mot den förda politiken. Denna utveckling har ägt rum i kontexten av en internationell så kallad »boom and bust« – konjunkturuppgång-följt av nedgång – vilken på avgörande vis har bestämt förutsättningarna för det statliga intresset för gruvindustrin liksom för lokala intressegruppers förhoppningar och farhågor gällande gruvindustriell expansion. Sådana konjunkturcykler är en naturlig del av all form av gruvverksamhet. Det kan därför finnas anledning att från dagens utsiktspunkt, med ett visst retrospektivt avstånd till den turbulenta tiden kring Northland Resources konkurs och vid en tid då världsmarknadspriser såväl som produktionssiffror verkar ha börjat klättra uppåt igen, ställa oss frågan vilka lärdomar vi har möjlighet att dra av just denna boom och bust.

I detta kapitel försöker vi förklara hur förhoppningar, idéer och löften tillsammans skapade stora förväntningar på ett gruvprojekt i Pajala, ett demografiskt och ekonomiskt stagnerande samhälle ovanför polcirkeln, något som ledde till etableringen av en gruva som lades ned efter bara två års produktion. Syftet är att skapa en förståelse av hur de centrala aktörernas förväntningshorisonter formades av specifika intressen i förening med historiska föreställningar knutna till platsen. Särskilt intresse ägnas åt att analysera hur dessa förväntningar under en period förenades i en för de berörda aktörerna gemensam förväntningshorisont som drev projektet framåt. Vi visar också hur den gemensamma förväntningshorisonten upplöstes efter en likviditetskris i bolaget, vilket blottlade de avsevärda skillnaderna mellan de berörda aktörernas ståndpunkter, i samband med att de olika aktörerna återvände till sina utgångspositioner. Med andra ord undersöker kapitlet hur förväntningshorisonter formas kring storskalig, långsiktig och råvarubaserad industriproduktion i avfolkningsbygder, inom ramen för en ekonomi som i övrigt är inriktad på kortsiktig ekonomisk tillväxt, globala kapitalflöden och konsumtion.

Historiskt sett så kan relationen mellan det liberalt kapitalistiska systemet och miljön beskrivas som en dubbel rörelse mellan ett kontinuerligt ökande resursuttag och statens ökade befogenheter att administrera miljöförstörande verksamheter.148 En viktig faktor för ett förbättrat skydd av miljön har parallellt med den liberala kapitalismens framväxt varit allmänhetens miljömedvetenhet, som har satt press på staten att införa miljömässigt motiverade regleringar. Givet hur ett nyliberalt beslutsfattande ofta verkar avpolitiserande, dvs. det strävar efter samstämmighet mellan grupper och en ökad grad av formalisering av sakfrågorna, har det blivit allt svårare för civilsamhället att påverka politiken. Detta beror också på att miljölagstiftningen anpassas för att gynna det privata kapitalets intressen, samtidigt som besluten ofta förläggs till teknokratiska processer i vilka ansvaret för miljön blir diffust.149 Trots detta utmanas avpolitiseringen av kontinuerliga försök till återpolitisering. Kraven höjs på att ansvar utkrävs av de politiker vars beslut påverkar livsbetingelserna för lokalsamhällen och deras omgivningar, och på att andra intressen än dem som gynnas och skyddas av ett avpolitiserat beslutsfattande också beaktas och tillåts påverka den politiska dagordningen....

In this paper we use a case of resistance towards a proposed limestone quarry in Sweden to raise certain theoretical points regarding environmental politicization. Departing from ideas about depoliticization and neoliberal environmental governance, we first analyze the case in terms of scaling-up of the local conflict through actor alliances, discourse coalitions and through the juridical process. We then discuss how this case may indicate effective ways to politicize areas that have been depoliticized through neoliberal environmental governance. Most particularly, the chosen case highlights how depoliticization may be reversed through the politicization of the very channels through which depoliticized forms of environmental governance occur, here the juridical, formalized and nominally neutral processes of environmental planning.

The paper investigates two Swedish cases of state regulation of profound infrastructural change in relation to mining above the polar circle. An analytical framework of neoliberal depoliticisation and state regulation is used to investigate the extent to which neoliberal logics, especially the logic of distancing, determine the state relation to peripheral communities dominated by extractive accumulation regimes. The paper finds that the neoliberal prerogatives of distancing and flexibility are dominating the state relation to peripheral communities, and that this relation is determined by different aspects of distance. The dominance of neoliberal prerogatives also leads to a questioning of the widely held notion that the Swedish state has adopted an industrial policy devoted to mining expansion since the release of the Mineral Strategy in 2013.

Under 1900-talet försåg Norrland den svenska staten med råvaror som lade grunden för Sveriges utveckling till välfärdssamhälle. Den svenska ekonomin har dock efterhand alltmer inriktats på att skapa ekonomiska värden på andra sätt än genom råvaruutvinning och varuproduktion. Sverige har med andra ord omvandlats till det som ofta benämns som en post-fordistisk ekonomi,460 vilket ger upphov till frågor om vilket socialt ansvar staten ska ta på sig för platser som fortfarande är beroende av tung industri och varuproduktion för att upprätthålla sin lokala ekonomi och sysselsättning. Samtidigt har emellertid betydelsen av svensk gruvindustri understrukits i EUs råvaruinitiativ från 2008. Där bedöms självförsörjningen av råvaror inom EU som avgörande för framtiden.461 Sverige står för omkring 91 % av Europas järnmalmsproduktion och är en inom EU ledande producent av en rad andra strategiskt viktiga metaller.462 Den svenska regeringen har också i linje med EUs råvaruinitiativ understrukit sina ambitioner att skapa incitament för en intensifierad gruvverksamhet i landet.463 Som ett svar på såväl EUs initiativ som den parlamentariska oppositionens krav på reformering av gruvpolitiken lanserade alliansregeringen 2013 en Mineralstrategi, som syftade till att stödja och stimulera gruvverksamheten i landet, huvudsakligen genom nyliberalt färgad avreglering och undanröjande av potentiella hinder för gruvetableringar.464 Relationen mellan den svenska staten och lokalsamhällen som är beroende av utvinning och produktion av mineraler präglas således av utvecklingstendenser som kan antas motverka varandra, vilket gör dessa lokalsamhällens roll i statens industripolitik som helhet mycket oviss.

This paper investigates a greenfield mining project in a peripheral region in northern Sweden through the analysis of how different actor groups formed their own ‘horizons of expectations’ that temporally became fused, only to crumble together with the mining company in a short period of time. By focusing on the co-evolvement of expectations, we show how expectations are differentiated along geographical and temporal scales, reflect upon how these differences relate to interests and historical memory, and finally what these differences mean for the development of large-scale, long-term, raw materials-based projects devoted to industrial production in depopulating areas in an economy otherwise orientated towards neoliberal governance and post-industrial development. By doing so, we make a theoretical contribution to the literature on expectations through the introduction of the concept ‘horizon of expectations’, and a contribution to the literature on neoliberalism and its cultural-geographical implications.

Chapter 3 (“Views of BECCS Among Modelers and Policymakers”) moves from exploring the magnitude of BECCS deployment in climate scenarios to outlining caveats raised by modelers themselves. The chapter addresses how modelers navigate the landscape of political and academic pressures to deliver timely, insightful, and relevant policy advice despite inherent and crucial uncerttainties and increasing model complexity. Based on interviews with modelers, the chapter discusses perspectives on uncertainty, the communication of IAM results, and the models’ relationship to reality. The chapter also discuss views of BECCS among policymakers whom generally want to give relatively low priority to investments in BECCS. Failing to invest in the future delivery of BECCS, combined with today’s lack of mitigation ambition, limits future generations’ maneuvering room to resolve the climate crisis.

Historically, every form of large scale power production in Sweden has given rise to organised, sustained and partly successful resistance motivated by environmental arguments. Since wind power is identified by the Swedish Parliament as an important energy source for the future and the wind power industry is expected to expand on a large scale, there is reason to believe that the already existing environmental opposition to wind power will continue to grow and will attempt to limit or at least partly obstruct the wind power expansion. In order to facilitate an understanding of this opposition and its possibility to significantly influence future wind power expansion in Sweden, this paper draws upon previous research on the opposition towards hydropower, nuclear power and biomass in Sweden, and discusses these findings in relation to previous research on wind power opposition.

As initiatives are taken in Sweden to evaluate the geological potential for carbon dioxide storage in the adjacent Baltic Sea, experiences from elsewhere may provide lessons about perceptions of and potential opposition toward carbon capture and storage (CCS). A comprehensive analysis of storage feasibility needs to include the issue of social acceptance. The knowledge of CCS is low in Sweden however and there are no Swedish CCS projects to learn from. This paper therefore draws on lessons from other large-scale energy projects that are embedded in similar Baltic Sea contexts to complement lessons on CCS acceptance provided in the literature. The aim of this study is to facilitate an understanding of acceptance of potential future CO2 storage initiatives in the Swedish Baltic Sea region and to analyze what contextual factors are likely to be determinative of the outcome of these and similar projects. The study identifies climate change as one such key contextual factor, which can often be used both to support and oppose a large-scale energy project. Furthermore, the study finds that there are perceptions of uncertainties regarding the regulatory framework that need to be ad-ressed in order to facilitate the planning of CCS projects in the region.

In this paper, we analyse the critique that has accompanied sustained efforts made in recent years by the Government of Sweden to facilitate global investment in the country's mining sector. The minerals market in the 21st century has been characterized by increasing global prices. In Sweden, the largest mining nation within the EU, this has led to what has been identified as a mining boom. The governmental mining policy, aimed at attracting an increasing part of the global venture capital seeking to profit from the volatile but lucrative minerals market, has been met with growing domestic resistance, fuelled by what has been perceived as dangers and side effects of a rapidly expanding Swedish mining industry. This resistance has largely focused on the mineral strategy launched by the government in 2013, as it crystallized the neoliberal ideas judged by critics to severely jeopardize social, cultural, economic and environmental values. After a critical analysis of the mineral strategy, we go on to analyse the mining-critical discourse, concluding with a discussion where we highlight the main implications of the analysis and identify a possible path for compromise between proponents and opponents of the mineral strategy.

Today,industrialised societies are frequently confronted with new warnings deliveredby experts about risks associated with anthropogenic substances. Such warnings aretypically not related to any definitive consequences but rather to admissionsof great uncertainty about effects, and thus they contrast sharply to politicalpromises of non-toxic environments and a highly regulated production ofchemicals. It is the argument of this article that the high uncertaintysurrounding chemicals allows for the proliferation of radically divergent andparadoxical images of chemicals regulation and its functionality. The articleanalyses the rationality underlying the system of chemicals control in Sweden,a country often priding itself on having one of the most progressivelegislations in the world. The regulation and control performed by the twocentral agencies involved in the control of chemicals are studied through textanalysis and interviews, and the concluding discussion frames chemicalsregulation by theories on post-politics and postecologism.

Chemical substances have become an inextricable feature of the late-industrial society, deemed necessary for the welfare, technological development and economic growth that large parts of the world have come to expect. In Sweden, the identification in the 1960s and 1970s of DDT, PCB and mercury as serious environmental threats led to the establishment of a system of chemicals control which is widely held to be one of the most advanced in the world. The thesisexamines this control system, its possibilities, its problems and its logic, through text analysis of state reports, governmental propositions, the reports of the Swedish Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA) and the Swedish Chemicals Agency (SCA), and interviews with employees at these agencies. The analysis shows chemicals control in Sweden to be a system pervaded with contradictions, which may be explained by an epistemological paradox at its core: that the accumulation of knowledge only serve to increase uncertainty. The constant increase of chemicals production, in combination with the highly unpredictable character of chemicals in the environment, puts the monitoring agencies in an impossible situation, always working against the tide. The thesis also shows, however, that the agencies are themselves an important part of maintaining a system of control that is to a large extent simulated. This in the sense that the system, by its very existence as well as by the circulation of regulatory concepts and principles within it which are in fact without much substance, always signals control, and constitute uncertainty as the exception.

This article contributes to what we hope will become a vigorous debate on Internet surveillance and privacy issues, ensuring that privacy issues will not be neglected in the future when political propositions on state surveillance are made. The relevant question to ask is not how to protect privacy at all costs, but how a balance can be found between the need of the state to know about its citizens and those same citizens’ need for privacy from state intrusion. This paper explores the future role of the library pertaining to the issue of state sur veillance. After a short introduction, we present the procedure and theoretical background for the article. The latter is grounded on Foucault’s theory on discourse, power and the modern state. We then discuss our two main fi ndings, and fi nally we relate those fi ndings to the library and its future roles, and to library and information science research and teaching. We fi nd one of these roles to be as instigator of and facilitator and forum for a healthy debate on surveillance and privacy issues.