In today's global environment competition is no longer limited to companies, but has evolved to supply chains seeking to coordinate ordering and production when faced with challenges such as random yield, lead time uncertainty and stochastic demand. This paper presents an algorithm that combines the base stock model and the option mechanism to address that key problem on how to coordinate ordering and production bilaterally in a dyadic supply chain in a multi-period setting. A numerical study that uses fictive data based on real quantitative data from a multinational manufacturer and its preferred supplier are included to illustrate the effects of the algorithm and show how two decentralised companies can each maximise profits (compared to a wholesale contract) while reaching the optimal centralised system level. The manuscript contributes by extending existing literature on supply chain management and finance to coordinate ordering and production bilaterally in a multi-period. Furthermore, the algorithm provides researchers the possibility to study Fishers portfolio framework from a dyadic supply chain position. (C) 2018 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

The purpose of this dissertation is to study the relationship between dyadic supply chain flexibility and dyadic supply chain profitability.

In today’s global environment, competition is no longer limited to companies but has evolved to supply chains. Supply disruption, lead time uncertainty and stochastic demand can result in costly inefficiencies of up to 40% when companies are trying to coordinate ordering and production. A dyadic supply chain competing in a global economy cannot afford to end up with a 40% smaller share of the pie.

This thesis applies theory and instruments from finance, specifically portfolio theory and real options theory when applying option contracts to create flexibility in a dyadic supply chain.

The methodology applied was to conduct an initial literature review of prior research to establish research gaps (first paper). This resulted in the development of an algorithm (second paper) combining the base stock model and the option mechanism to create flexibility for an OEM and supplier to coordinate ordering and production bilaterally in a multi-period setting. In the third paper the algorithm was applied to a case study using data from two companies, which resulted in the algorithm being tested and validated. Furthermore, option contract theory was integrated with dyadic supply chain practise while Fisher portfolio paradox was addressed.

The dissertation contributes in the following areas: the empirical contribution is evidence of the relationship between dyadic supply chain flexibility and profitability using quantitative data from two companies.

The methodological contribution is a method for the objective valuation of dyadic supply chain flexibility and the measurement of profitability, by valuing the option contract.

The theoretical contribution is achieved through the integration of portfolio and option theory into SCM while addressing Fisher’s portfolio paradox.

The practical contribution is an algorithm that creates flexibility for an OEM and asupplier to coordinate ordering and production bilaterally and maintain its collaborative advantage when competing in a global economy, thus avoiding ending up with a 40% smaller share of the pie. In addition, this dissertation advances this topic in SCM into a quantitatively measurable theory.

This paper investigates the effect of shareholder protection on analysts’ performance. The important corporate governance role analysts can play by monitoring management has largely been ignored in the literature. Using a newly constructed index, we are for the first time able to analyse how changes in shareholder protection over time affect analysts’ performance as a gatekeeper. We find that strengthened shareholder protection improves analysts’ performance as a gatekeeper, i.e. analysts’ ability to reduce information asymmetry improves with strengthened shareholder protection. However, we also find a substitution effect: Strengthened shareholder protection makes analysts’ services less valuable to investors, thereby leading to a reduction in the number of analysts following firms.