In this thesis, local politicians’ regulation of social work practice’s legal authority to make decisions about distributing welfare is investigated, with a particular focus on elder care. Although social workers are central actors in needs assessment and service allocation, they can only exercise legal authority to make decisions if it has been delegated to them by local politicians. In a highly decentralised welfare state such as Sweden, where municipalities are legally responsible for welfare distribution but differ widely in terms of economic, demographic, and geographic conditions, it is essential to understand the local and political contexts of welfare distribution.

This thesis is positioned at the intersection of social work and political science through the analysis of how local “hard policies” – local political policy documents that determine the scope of legal decision-making authority (DMA) – shape the legal premises for social work practice to distribute elder care. By using principal-agent theory, the interdependent relationship between politicians and social workers is made visible. Local political hard policies are understood as tools for control designed to minimise risks when politicians (principals) delegate authority to social workers (agents). Moreover, the concept of accountability is employed to explain external demands on politicians, their need for control over elder-care distribution, and their need to hold civil servants accountable for welfare distribution.

The thesis is based on four studies. The first maps the extent of social workers’ legal DMA across municipalities. The second examines contrasting types of local political policies as examples of strategies for regulating social workers’ legal discretion. The third investigates the relationship between local conditions – economic, demographic, geographic, and political – and restrictiveness in delegating DMA. The fourth analyses the implications of delegating legal DMA for accountability, depending on whether it is transferred to managers or front line social workers or retained by politicians.

The findings demonstrate that local variation in the design of hard policies determining legal DMA can significantly influence whether and how social workers can legally distribute elder care. In some municipalities, social workers possess wide-ranging legal discretion, while in others their authority is extensively restricted. These differences can be linked to local conditions and politics.

Methodologically, the thesis contributes with a macro level, nationwide mapping and comparative analysis of policy documents on delegation, combined with statistical analyses of factors explaining such variations. Theoretically, it advances social work theory by applying the principal–agent framework and highlighting the distinction between soft (optional) and hard (mandatory) policies. This adds to and enhances the legal dimension of discretion and conceptualises hard policies as core instruments of political control in decentralised welfare. Empirically, it provides systematic evidence of municipal variation in the design of legal DMA and discusses the potential implications for equality in access to services, the rule of law, accountability, and the role of educated social workers in relation to local democracy.

Ultimately, the results reveal that the way delegation is structured have implications for the legal and professional discretion of social workers, as well as potential implications for transparency and accountability – vital for democratic values. Ultimately, the thesis highlights the relation between social work and local politics, while pointing toward a contradicting structure with a complex relationship between local politicians and the public administration.