Quota-based systems are commonly used in sales organizations to motivate employees, create direction, and improve performance. These systems set clear targets for employees to work toward, but previous research also shows that performance targets can influence employee behavior in unintended ways. For example, employees may prioritize short-term sales, adjust the timing of deals, or focus on individual targets at the expense of broader organizational goals. At the same time, sales organizations differ in how authority, control, and decision-making are distributed. The purpose of this thesis is therefore to analyze how centralized and decentralized organizational structures influence the relationship between quota-based systems and employee behavior in sales organizations.

To answer the purpose, a qualitative study was conducted through four semi-structured interviews with respondents from centralized and decentralized sales organizations. The empirical material was analyzed thematically, with a focus on motivation, autonomy, control, dysfunctional behavior, and the relationship between individual and organizational goals.

The findings show that quota-based systems can create motivation, focus, and direction when targets are clear and realistic. However, the findings also show that quotas can create pressure, frustration, short-term prioritization, and dysfunctional behavior when targets are perceived as unrealistic or poorly aligned with organizational goals. The study further shows that organizational structure influences how employees work toward quota-based targets. In centralized structures, quota work is more closely connected to top-down control, monitoring, and evaluation. In decentralized structures, employees experience greater autonomy and flexibility, which allows them to adapt their work to customer needs and market conditions.