This paper studies a two-echelon logistics service supply chain (LSSC) composed of one logistics service integrator (LSI) and one functional logistics service provider (FLSP). We develop a two-period service capacity procurement model where market demand surges in the second period. The LSI, as the Stackelberg game leader, tends to be overconfident when market demand surges. The results show that when the demand surges in the second period, if the overconfident purchasing capacity of LSI cannot meet the market demand, the overconfidence behaviour will negatively affect LSI s optimal pricing. Besides, the overconfidence behaviour leads to the lowest service level of the FLSP in the second period under demand surge. However, such negative impacts can be reduced or even eliminated in certain conditions through the FLSP-led mechanism and the dynamic wholesale price mechanism. The numerical simulation and the case study from China are used to illustrate the model and draw some conclusions.