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Who falls for misinformation?: Epistemic beliefs and political identity as predictors of conspiracy ideation, bullshit receptivity, and fallacies
Linköping University, Department of Behavioural Sciences and Learning, Psychology. Linköping University, Faculty of Arts and Sciences.
2025 (English)Doctoral thesis, comprehensive summary (Other academic)Alternative title
Vem faller för missinformation? : Epistemologiska övertygelser och politisk identitet som prediktorer av mottaglighet för konspirationsteorier, bullshit, och fallasier (Swedish)
Abstract [en]

This thesis examines how the tendency to fall for – and spread – misinformation is related to, first and foremost, (1) epistemic beliefs about the nature of truth (particularly belief in truth relativism) and (2) political identity (are leftists and rightists (un)-equally as receptive to misinformation?), but also (3) politically motivated reasoning (the tendency to interpret information in ways that favor one’s ideological preferences) and (4) analytical thinking (whether someone tends to be reflective as opposed jump to conclusions). In the three papers of this thesis, we examined the relation between these predictors and the tendency to fall for and/or spread misinformation within one or more of the following four categories: conspiracy theories, pseudo-profound bullshit (nonsensical sentences), science misinformation, and logical fallacies.

In Paper I, we investigated individuals’ ability to evaluate political arguments and found that the tendency to fall for logical fallacies, and the occurrence of politically motivated reasoning in terms of belief bias (judging a logically invalid argument as valid because of the believability or familiarity of its conclusion), were similarly distributed across the left-right spectrum. Analytical thinking overall predicted better ability to evaluate logical fallacies among both leftists and rightists, and seemed to help at least rightists avoid belief bias. In Paper II, we created a measure of belief in truth relativism and disentangled two distinct forms of belief in truth relativism: belief in subjectivist truth relativism (truth is relative to subjective experience) and belief in cultural truth relativism (truth is relative to cultural context). Belief in subjectivist truth relativism predicted receptivity to both pseudo-profound bullshit and conspiracy theories. Rightists were more likely (than leftists) to believe in conspiracy theories. In Paper III, we examined if belief in subjectivist truth relativism causes the tendency to fall for and spread misinformation. In an experiment, we attempted to activate (1) subjectivist and (2) realist beliefs about truth (in belief in truth realism, a statement is true only if it accurately describes reality which exists independently of human perspective) but could not draw any conclusions from its null results as the belief activation failed. However, belief in subjectivist truth relativism did predict receptivity to both pseudo-profound bullshit and conspiracy theories, and rightists were more likely (than leftists) to believe in conspiracy theories. The tendency to spread science misinformation was positively associated with belief in subjectivist truth relativism and rightist ideology, while it was negatively associated with belief in truth realism.

Overall, the work presented in this thesis advances our understanding of who falls for misinformation in several ways. We introduce a new theoretically important predictor (belief in subjectivist truth relativism) and we develop several new promising research paradigms. Moreover, we replicate the relations between known predictors (political identity, motivated reasoning, and analytical thinking) and receptivity to misinformation using these paradigms with preregistered hypotheses and representative samples.

Abstract [sv]

Denna avhandling undersöker hur tendensen att falla för – och sprida – missinformation hänger samman med, först och främst, (1) epistemologiska övertygelser om sanningens natur (huvudsakligen tron på sanningsrelativism) och (2) politisk identitet (är mottaglighet för miss-information (o)jämnt fördelat mellan vänster- och högerpersoner?), men även (3) politiskt motiverat tänkande (tendensen att tolka information i linje med ens politiska preferenser) och (4) analytiskt tänkande (huruvida en person typiskt sett är reflekterande snarare än drar förhastade slutsatser). I de tre studier som hör till avhandlingen undersökte vi relationen mellan dessa psykologiska prediktorer och tendensen att falla för och/eller sprida missinformation inom en eller flera av följande fyra kategorier: konspirationsteorier, pseudo-djup bullshit (nonsensmeningar), vetenskapsmissinformation och logiska felslut.

I Studie I lät vi deltagare bedöma politiska argument och fann att tendensen att falla för logiska felslut samt förekomsten av politiskt motiverat tänkande i termer av belief bias (att uppfatta ett logiskt ogiltigt argument som logiskt giltigt eftersom slutsatsen låter trovärdig eller bekant) var jämnt fördelad över vänster-höger spektrumet. Sammantaget predicerade analytiskt tänkande bättre förmåga att bedöma logiska felslut hos både vänster- och höger-personer och verkade hjälpa åtminstone högerpersoner att undvika belief bias. I Studie II skapade vi ett mått på tron på sanningsrelativism och identifierade två distinkta former av tro på sanningsrelativism: tron på subjektivistisk sanningsrelativism (sanning är relativ till subjektiv upplevelse) och tron på kulturrelativistisk sanningsrelativism (sanning är relativ till kulturell kontext). Subjektivistisk sannings-relativism predicerade tron på mottaglighet för både pseudo-djup bullshit och konspirations-teorier. Högerpersoner var mer benägna (än vänsterpersoner) att tro på konspirationsteorier. I Studie III undersökte vi om tron på subjektivistisk sanningsrelativism orsakar tendensen att falla för eller sprida missinformation. I ett experiment försökte vi aktivera (1) subjektivistiska respektive (2) realistiska sätt att se på vad sanning är (i tron på sanningsrealism är ett påstående sant endast om det korrekt beskriver verkligheten, som anses existera oberoende av människors perspektiv) men kunde inte dra några slutsatser från experimentets nollresultat eftersom aktiveringen misslyckades. De övriga resultaten visade dock att tron på subjektivistisk sanningsrelativism predicerade mottaglighet för både konspirationsteorier och pseudo-djup bullshit, och att högerpersoner var mer benägna (än vänster-personer) att tro på konspirationsteorier. Tendensen att sprida vetenskapsmissinformation korrelerade positivt med tron på subjektivistisk sanningsrelativism och med högerideologi samt negativt med tron på sanningsrealism.

Sammantaget bidrar denna avhandling och dess studier på flera sätt till vår förståelse för vem som faller för missinformation. Vi introducerar en ny teoretiskt viktig prediktor (tron på sanningsrelativism) och utvecklar flera lovande forskningsparadigm. Därtill replikerar vi sambanden mellan kända prediktorer (politisk identitet, motiverat tänkande och analytiskt tänkande) och mottaglighet för missinformation genom att använda dessa paradigm och representativa urval.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Linköping: Linköping University Electronic Press, 2025. , p. 95
Series
Linköping Studies in Arts and Sciences, ISSN 0282-9800 ; 921Linköping Studies in Behavioural Science, ISSN 1654-2029 ; 271
Keywords [en]
Misinformation, Epistemic beliefs, Belief in truth relativism, Subjectivism, Cultural relativism, Political identity, Motivated reasoning, Belief bias, Analytical thinking, Conspiracy theories, Pseudo-profound bullshit, Science misinformation, Logical fallacies, Spread of misinformation
Keywords [sv]
Missinformation, Epistemologiska övertygelser, Tron på sanningsrelativism, Subjektivism, Kulturrelativism, Politisk identitet, Motiverat tänkande, Belief bias, Analytiskt tänkande, Konspirationsteorier, Pseudo-djup bullshit, Vetenskapsmissinformation, Logiska fallasier, Spridning av missinformation
National Category
Psychology (Excluding Applied Psychology)
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:liu:diva-218108DOI: 10.3384/9789181183009ISBN: 9789181182996 (print)ISBN: 9789181183009 (electronic)OAI: oai:DiVA.org:liu-218108DiVA, id: diva2:2001550
Public defence
2025-10-24, Key1, Building Key, Campus Valla, Linköping, 13:00 (English)
Opponent
Supervisors
Available from: 2025-09-26 Created: 2025-09-26 Last updated: 2025-09-26Bibliographically approved
List of papers
1. Motivated formal reasoning: Ideological belief bias in syllogistic reasoning across diverse political issues
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Motivated formal reasoning: Ideological belief bias in syllogistic reasoning across diverse political issues
2023 (English)In: Thinking and Reasoning, ISSN 1354-6783, E-ISSN 1464-0708, Vol. 29, no 1, p. 43-69Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

This study investigated ideological belief bias, and whether this effect is moderated by analytical thinking. A Swedish nationally representative sample (N = 1005) evaluated non-political and political syllogisms and were asked whether the conclusions followed logically from the premises. The correct response in the political syllogisms was aligned with either leftist or rightist political ideology. Political orientation predicted response accuracy for political but not non-political syllogisms. Overall, the participants correctly evaluated more syllogisms when the correct response was congruent with their ideology, particularly on hot-button issues (asylum to refugees, climate change, gender-neutral education, and school marketization). Analytical thinking predicted higher accuracy for syllogisms of any kind among leftists, but it predicted accuracy only for leftist and non-political syllogisms among rightists. This research contributes by refining a promising paradigm for studying politically motivated reasoning, demonstrating ideological belief bias outside of the United States across diverse political issues, and providing the first evidence that analytical thinking may reduce such bias.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Routledge; Taylor & Francis, 2023
Keywords
Belief bias; ideological bias; motivated reasoning; analytical thinking; syllogism
National Category
Political Science (excluding Public Administration Studies and Globalisation Studies)
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:liu:diva-183236 (URN)10.1080/13546783.2022.2038268 (DOI)000754450400001 ()
Available from: 2022-03-02 Created: 2022-03-02 Last updated: 2025-09-26Bibliographically approved
2. Misperceptions in a post-truth world: Effects of subjectivism and cultural relativism on bullshit receptivity and conspiracist ideation
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Misperceptions in a post-truth world: Effects of subjectivism and cultural relativism on bullshit receptivity and conspiracist ideation
2023 (English)In: Journal of Research in Personality, ISSN 0092-6566, E-ISSN 1095-7251, Vol. 105, article id 104394Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

This research investigated whether belief in truth relativism yields higher receptivity to misinformation. Two studies with representative samples from Sweden (Study 1, N = 1005) and the UK (Study 2, N = 417) disentangled two forms of truth relativism: subjectivism (truth is relative to subjective intuitions) and cultural relativism (truth is relative to cultural context). In Study 1, subjectivism was more strongly associated with receptivity to pseudo-profound bullshit and conspiracy theories than cultural relativism was. In Study 2 (preregistered), subjectivism predicted higher receptivity to both forms of misinformation over and above effects of analytical and actively open-minded thinking, profoundness receptivity, ideology, and demographics; the unique effects of cultural relativism were in the opposite direction (Study 1) or non-significant (Study 2).

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE, 2023
Keywords
Truth relativism; Epistemic beliefs; Misinformation; Conspiracy theories; Pseudo -profound bullshit; Subjectivism; Cultural relativism; Analytical thinking; Actively open-minded thinking; Post -truth
National Category
Cultural Studies
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:liu:diva-197892 (URN)10.1016/j.jrp.2023.104394 (DOI)001054087900001 ()
Note

Funding Agencies|Vetenskapsradet (The Swedish Research Council) [2022-05429]; [2022-02376]

Available from: 2023-09-19 Created: 2023-09-19 Last updated: 2025-09-26

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