In this paper, the focus is on the role of the municipality, as an enabler of a collaboration between freight forwarders and the municipality in which the consolidation of goods is considered as a means for goods flow improvement in urban freight transportation. We present a cost allocation model that is based on solution concepts from cooperative game theory, for allocating the operational costs associated with the collaboration. It is assumed that the municipality is willing to carry some cost to ensure a stable collaboration for the potential benefits received, e.g., reduced traffic congestion in the city. The model is applied to some illustrative examples, and the cost allocation results are discussed. It is shown that the role of the municipality may be decisive in achieving a stable collaboration between the freight forwarders, and further that the municipality does not necessarily need to contribute to covering the costs.

When a set of players cooperate, they need to decide how the collective cost should be allocated amongst them. Cooperative game theory provides several methods or solution concepts, that can be used as a tool for cost allocation. In this note, we consider a specific solution concept called the Equal Profit Method (EPM). In some cases, a solution to the EPM is any one of infinitely many solutions. That is, it is not always unique. This leads to a lack of clarity in the characterization of the solutions obtained by the EPM. We present a modified version of the EPM, which unlike its precursor ensures a unique solution. In order to illustrate the differences, we present some numerical examples and comparisons between the two concepts.

In this paper, we focus on how cost allocation can be used as a means to create incentives for collaboration among companies, with the aim of reducing the total transportation cost. The collaboration is assumed to be preceded by a simultaneous invitation of the companies to collaborate. We make use of concepts from cooperative game theory, including the Shapley value, the Nucleolus and the EPM, and develop specific cost allocation mechanisms aiming to achieve large collaborations among many companies. The cost allocation mechanisms are tested on a case study that involves transportation planning activities. Although the case study is from a specific transportation sector, the findings in this paper can be adapted to collaborations in other types of transportation planning activities. Two of the cost allocation mechanisms ensure that any sequence of companies joining the collaboration represents a complete monotonic path, that is, any sequence of collaborating companies is such that the sequences of allocated costs are non-increasing for all companies.