Being able to revoke currently valid certificates is essential to the security of the WebPublic-Key Infrastructure (WebPKI), yet today’s most widely deployed revocation pro-tocols (CRLs and OCSP) have numerous limitations, mainly added latency and compro-mised privacy, leading to almost no major browser fully checking certificate revocations.Consequently, web users are left oblivious to the legitimacy of certificates and vulnerableto man-in-the-middle attacks.In this thesis, we first take a close look at 1.5 million certificate replacements, focus-ing on comparing valid certificates with revoked ones and finding noticeable differencesbetween the characteristics of the two. Secondly, we utilize both observations as well asconservative approximations to estimate the actual lifetime of the certificates and usethese findings in conjunction with revocation times to discover that at a minimum of 7%(observed) / 24% (approximated) were used more than one day after being revoked andhalf of those for more than a week. Furthermore, as these certificates were most likelyinvoluntarily revoked, we propose insufficient revocation checking by web browsers as themain reason for subscribers’ lack of motivation to replace their invalid certificates. Fi-nally, we highlight CRL/OCSP limitations, discuss existing improvements and advocatefor shorter certificate validity in general.